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Introduction
This thesis addresses three different topics and is based on six papers. The first part
(Chapters 2 and 3) concerns exchange economies with asymmetric information.
An exchange economy is a model for a market where agents moot and exchange thalr
initial bundles of goods for other, more preferred bundles. Asymmetric informal ion captures
the idea that agents can have different information about the goods that they exchange.
When the agents have met at the market the resulting allocation of goods depends on the
initial allocation of goods, the preferences of the agents and their information. It can In-
expert ed that with this resulting allocation, no group of agents wants to meet again and
exchange their goods amongst them once more. If that is the case they could have done
SO at the market in the first place. Game-theoretically the set of allocations that lias this
property is called the core (of the market game). The market fails, whenever there are
no allocations with the desired properties, meaning in mathematical terms that the con-
is empty. When all agents have the same information it can be shown that under quite
acceptable assumptions the core is not empty. When different groups of agents have access
to different information this is no longer true. This is due to the fact that core allocations
are based on the information accessible by the so called grand coalition, i.e. the coalition
consisting of all agents. The following example may serve to illustrate this.
Think of a market consisting of three agents. Agent 1 has four apples and agents 2 and
3 have four peaches each. However, the apples that agent 1 has may have worms. Ix't us
call the apples without worms good apples and the apples with worms bad apples. Agents
2 and 3 know that there is a 50% chance that the apples they are offered arc good apples.
There are no such doubts about the quality of the peaches. Agent 1 knows which kind
of apples he has. Agents 1 and 2 know that they can trust each other. When agents 1,2
and 3 meet, however, agent 2*a confidence in agent 1 disappears since agent 3 docs not
trust agent 1, and even convinces agent 2 not to trust agent 1. Now, suppose that the bad
apples have no worth for agents 2 and 3, and that agents 2 and 3 want at least three good
apples in their allocation after exchange. Agent 1 would like to have some peaches and
some apples. Now, with the information that is used in the coalition of agents 1,2 and 3,
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agents 2 and 3 expect to be fooled by agent 1 with probability 50%, so they expect to get
at most 50% * 4 = 2 good apples from agent 1 on average. Hence, in the grand coalition no
exchange will take place. In the subcoalition of agents 1 and 2 however, these two agents
could exchange without quality doubts and achieve an allocation that they both prefer.
Hence, in this example the core is empty.
In Chapter 2 a condition on the information that the agents have is given that ensures
that the core of the exchange economy is nonempty. In particular the condition rules
out "insider trading", because this possibility creates problems with the existence of core
allocations. When smaller groups of agents have access to superior information they may
prefer to trade only among themselves, thus destroying the existence of core allocations
which require that all agents can participate in the exchange of goods.
In real markets goods are usually allocated through prices, but these have no use in the
model described so far. If there are prices for the goods, everybody is assumed to buy the
most preferred bundle of goods among those that he can afford. This yields the demand side
of the market. The total supply is given by the initial bundles of all agents. Prices should
level out in such a way that demand equals supply. In economic terms, markets "clear" or
are in equilibrium, and a price that clears the market is called an equilibrium price. The
associated area in economics is called General Equilibrium Theory. Again with symmetric
information the existence of such equilibrium can be shown under acceptable assumptions;
with asymmetric information, however, it need not exist (see e.g. Akerlof 1970). Moreover,
it can !)(• shown I hut under symmetric information equilibrium allocations are also core
allocations. This is a nice result, since it says that when the market has cleared through
an equilibrium price system there is no need for the agents to meet again and redistribute
their goods by exchange. There are. however, still more core allocations than equilibria,
so it could be argued that organizing the market through prices is efficient hut not as
flexible us exchange. Here general equilibrium theory provides another result that says
that if the market is large the core shrinks to the set of equilibrium allocations. So. in
sufficiently large markets, when it is also hard to imagine negotiations of exchange among
all agents, equilibrium prices are a good way to organize the market. How these prices come
about is another problem. The validity of these results, however, has thus far only been
proven under symmetric information. Chapter 3 investigates their validity in the presence
of asymmetric information. It turns out that under the assumption of "no insider trading"
as in Chapter 2, along with some other conditions on the information and the initial wealth
of the agents, more or less similar results also hold under asymmetric information.
The second part (Chapter 4) of the thesis deals with partially defined cooperative games.
Think of a project that can be undertaken by some firms. They may choose to form
coalitions that cooperate, i.e. join forces to undertake the project, for manifold reasons.
Each such coalition has a different worth because of the firms" different possibilities. The
question arises how to divide the benefits of cooperation. Equal division will usually not
be an option, e.g., there may be big and small firms. In game theory a solution of thisproblem is called a value function. A value function divides the worth of the coalition of
all firms among the firms. One will demand certain properties of the value function, e.g. a
firm that contributes more to any coalition than another firm should also receive a higher
share. Value functions satisfying thus property are called monotonic. Two other quite
natural properties are anonymity and efficiency. They say that firms whose contributions
are the same should receive the same share, and that the shares of till firms together equal
the worth of the coalition of all firms (nothing is left over and no manna comes from
heaven to be divided). Young (1985) shows that there is only one value function satisfying
these three properties, which is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). A drawback of the
Shaplev value is that the worths of all coalitions haw to be known to compute it If
you think of a cooperation like Star Alliance, that is a lot of information. So, one might
think of a cooperation where the worths of some coalitions are not known for sure. Such
a cooperation is modelled by a partially defined cooperative game. Chapter -I extends
some results about the Shapley value to partially defined cooperative games by defining
the expected Shapley value. By doing so Chapter -4 also unifies and extends some value
functions that have been considered for partially define* 1 cooperative games: the l>-weighted
Shapley value, the reduced Shapley value and the normalized Shapley value (Wil)non, 1993
and Housman, 2001). These correspond to having certain estimates about the missing
values of cooperation, which may he interpreted as the game that agents expect to be
playing on average - this is called the expected game in Chapter 4. The expected Shapley
value is then the Shapley value of this expected game, and it can be characterize! by
similar properties as the Shapley value. It is shown that the expected games that underly
the b-wcighted Shapley value, the reduced Shapley value and the normalized Shaplev value
may be rather inadequate in certain situations, e.g. when agents know they are playing n
monotonic game. The expected Shapley value offers more flexibility.
The third part of the thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) considers minimally manipulahlc
social choice functions. Consider the problem of a group of individuals having to agree on
an action out of a certain set of possibilities, or to select a candidate from a set of candidates.
Each individual has his own ranking of the opportunities, and for each possible combination
of such rankings among the individuals some decision must be taken. A well-known example
is voting by plurality. Since ties are not allowed, assume that when some alternatives receive
most of the votes, a previously appointed "president of the committee" decides. Suppose
that there are three alternatives to choose from, say A, 5 and C. Furthermore there are
three individuals in the committee, call them agents 1,2 and 3. Now agent 1 prefers /I
to B and B to C and since he is rational also ,4 to C. In short we say that agent 1 has
preference ABC. Assume that agents 2 and 3 have preferences BCA and C/tB respectively.
The committee agrees to use majority voting and that agent 1 is to act as a president of the.
committee. In that case A should be chosen, since all alternatives receive one vote and then
the president decides. But note that agent 2 prefers C to A and if he votes for C instead of
B, C has two votes and is chosen. So, by misrepresenting his true ranking BC/4 by CAB,4 CHAPTER i. INTRODUCTION
agent 2 can get an outcome that Ls better for him. In social choice theory such decision
problems arc described by social choice functions, and the particular social choice function
described above would be called manipulable at the profile (ABC, BCA, CAB). Now, one
might think that, by using a different way to decide, manipulation can be avoided. That is
true, but it has boon shown that when there are more than two alternatives the only way
to decide without allowing for manipulation at some profile Ls by appointing a dictator'
(Gibbard, 1973, and Satterthwaite, 1975), which is not desirable.
Think for example of a situation with two individuals and three alternatives A, B and
C. There are 3! = 6 different rankings of these alternatives: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB
and C'BA. Hence;, then: are 36 = 6^ different combinations of these rankings among the
two individuals. In the following table, agent l's ranking is specified in the first cell of
the rows and agent 2'.« ranking in the first cell of the columns. The entries in each of the

























































At a given cell agent 2 can change the outcome to any other outcome in the same row,
and agent 1 can change the outcome to any other outcome in the same column. Clearly,
for tin* dictatorial situation depicted none of them can manipulate in this way. Gibbard's
and Sat tort hwaite's result says that if there are cells with .4. B and C in them, but not in
a dictatorial way, then there is a cell where an agent can manipulate, i.e. agent 1 can find
a better outcome for him in the same column, or agent 2 can find a better outcome for him
in the same row. For example, if wo have C instead of A in the (ABC .4BC)—coll then
















































'A dictator in an individual whiwc most prrforml outcome Ls always chowrn. i.e. if the dictator has
ranking /tliC (IH'II .4 is cluwn. ivKardl<«s of thr rankings of all other individuals.Kelly (1988) has shown that the minimal number of manipulahle profiles that such two
agent, three alternative social choice functions have to admit if they are noiulictatorial and
can select any alternative is 2. Note that there are about 3"* such tables (in each of 36
cells one of 3 alternatives), so it is of course not possible to analyze all of them. Fristrup
and Keiding (1998) have shown that for two agents and m > 4 alternatives the minimal
number is 2m — 1. Apart from some other special cases in Kelly (1988) for two or three
agents and three or four alternatives these were the only minimal numbers known in the
literature.
In Chapters 5. 6 and 7 we investigate this issue of minimal mniiipulnhilitv under some
additional assumptions on the social choice functions.
Chapter 5 asks additionally to nondictatorship for unanimity, which means that an
alternative is chosen if all agents agree that it is their most preferred outcome. For example,
choosing Z? at the profile (,4flr\ .4CZ?) violates unanimity. At such profiles .4 has to be
chosen. It turns out that the minimally manipulable social choice functions under these
assumptions are almost dictatorial - i.e. an agent is a dictator except at one profile If that
profile is carefully chosen such social choice functions have (n — l)(y - 1) + 1 manipulahle
profiles if there are n > 3 agents. With the help of this result the three alternative case
without unanimity can tie solved as well. In this case the minimal number of manipulablc
profiles is equal to the number of agents n. For a description of (he social choice functions
attaining thus minimum the reader is referred to Section 5.6.
Chapter 6 asks for anonymity but not for unanimity. Anonymity means that the names
of the agents do not matter, so e.g. at the profile (/t/JC. C£M) the same choice is made
as at the profile (CZ?^4. ABC). Anonymity rules out dictatorialitv since anonymity implies
that then all agents have to be the dictator, a clear contradiction at any profile where their
most preferred outcomes do not coincide. The minimal number of manipulahlc profiles is
found to be n (^ — l) (»» — 2). However that case is not completely solved: we have to
assume that n > m + 1 if m = 4 and that II > m + 2 if »n > 5. For a description of the
social choice functions attaining these minima if m > 4 the reader is referred to Chapter
6. The case m = 3 is contained already in Chapter 5, since the minimally manipulable
surjective and nondictatorial social choice functions in Section 5.6 are anonymous.
Chapter 7 asks for unanimity and anonymity. Only the case of three alternatives in
analyzed. The minimal number of manipulable profiles is found to be 2" - 2. Some of the
social choice functions attaining that lower bound have a nice interpretation if a status
quo z among the alternatives exists, e.g. a current jurisdiction 2 about which there is
consensus that it should only be altered to one of two new jurisdictions x and y if every
voter prefers the new jurisdiction. Then, the least manipulable social choice functions
that guarantee anonymity and unanimity of the outcome are as follows. Choose 2 in the
situation where there is consensus that no change should be made. In the other situations
choose an alternative which is unanimously preferred to z; if necessary, i.e. if there are
two such alternatives, choose according to an arbitrary unanimous and anonymous social
choice function over two alternatives.Part I




Balancedness and the core
A condition is given that is equivalent to balanccdness of all NTU-games derived from
an exchange economy with asymmetric information when endowments are variable. The
condition is applicable to the ex-ante model with expected utilities, but also to the more
general model of Arrow-Radner type economies without subjective probabilities. Differ-
ences in the interpretation of measurabilitv assumptions between these two models are
discussed, and another model with information consistent utility functions is developed in
which the result would also hold.'
2.1 Introduction
The standard Arrow-Debreu model of an exchange economy can be extended to account for
uncertainty by differentiating the commodities over the states of nature, as first proposed
already by Debreu (1959) in Chapter 7 of his 'Theory of Value'. This approach has been
extended to account for asymmetric information in a seminal paper by Radncr (19C8, 1982),
using economies where agents possess different information. It is assumed, that an agent
can carry out only such trades that are compatible with his information structure.
After this development in the fifties and sixties, the seventies and eighties saw a growing
literature on Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), which is a natural extension of
Arrow-Debreu's deterministic model of Walrasian equilibrium to a differential information
framework. However, prices in a fully revealing REE are not able to reflect the informational
asymmetries of agents. This left room for criticism and further work.
A new literature emerges from the work of Wilson (1978), who considers the core of
an economy with differential information. Wilson considered the problem of how agents
within a coalition share information. He gave two different scenarios, corresponding to the
notion of fine core (pooling information) and coarse core (use only common information)
of an economy with asymmetric information structure. He uses an interim core concept,
'The author thanks particularly Hans Peters for helpful suggestion*! The result* in thin chapter were
first formulated in Maus (2002).10 CHAPTER 2. BALANCEDNESS AJVD THE CORE
where agents engage in coalitiona] negotiations after receiving their private information.
For both core notions problems with existence and incentive compatibility arise, so that
this approach was not pursued further for some time.
In the early nineties, the core was reconsidered. Yannelis (1991) considered a new
information sharing concept based on measurability constraints, and thus introduced the
private core. This core concept exists tinder quite general assumptions, and it is coalitional
Bayesian incentive compatible, as shown in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993). Further-
more, it rewartls the better informed agents, and it provides sensible outcomes in some
situations where REE fails too exist. Allen (1991a, 1991b, 1994) carries the development
further, by introducing more general information sharing rules. Recently, Einy et al. (2001)
have shown a core equivalence theorem for large economies.
In one of her mentioned articles, Allen (1994) considers the ex-ante core, where agents
have to form coalitions before the true state of the world is revealed to them. She allows
for arbitrary communication systems rather than fine or coarse communication. This raises
the question to find conditions on the communication system that assure nonemptiness of
the ex-ante core. In this chapter such a condition is given. It turns out to be an equivalent
to liiilancedness of all NTU-games derived from the exchange economy with asymmetric
information when endowments are viewed as variable. Moreover, the condition is applicable
to the model without expected utility, its introduced in Schwalbe (1999). Mast articles con-
sider agents' preferences derived from state-dependent preferences by taking expectations
with respect to some subjective probability measure over the states of the world. However,
such a description of preferences is not necessary. As Debreu (1959) explains in Chapter 7
of his 'Theory of Value', and as is the case in Radnor (19G8), preferences under uncertainty
can be formulated without referring to probabilities. The case- of expected utility functions
is I lien included in this more general approach.
The analysis is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 the formal model is developed
and the core (oncepts are defined. Section 2.3 contains the results and some examples to
illustrate the relation of the new condition with other conditions. In Section 2.4 a discussion
is included on measurability assumptions and how the implications of these differ for the
models with and without expectations. Some concluding remarks follow in Section 2.5.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this sort ion the relevant definitions for the notion of an exchange economy with asymmet-
ric information are given. Two different alternatives are considered, one, where the agents
have state-dependent utility functions and priors, and another one, where the utility func-
tion is defined on tho state-commodity space altogether. The state-dependent utility case
includes tho exported utility model with finitely many states of the world as in Allen (1994).
The case of a utility function avoiding tho usage of expected utility by defining the utility
function on tho state-commodity space appears in Srhwalhc (1999). There. l>alancedness2.2. PREIJAJJ.V.4RJES /••'••• 11
for all exchange economies with asymmetric information is shown. But this holds only if
one assumes the feasible allocations for the economy to lx> determined on the maximum
amount of information available, that is, the information an agent would have if all coali-
tions could be formed simultaneously. Here, I will only assume that agents can use the
information available to them in the grand coalition. This seems less artificial, and is in
agreement with the expected utility model of Allen (199-4).
2.2.1 Information
Let n be the finite set of states of the world. Let P" be the set of partitions of 17. A
P € P" is called an tn/ormafton ,sr<. The interpretation is that states contained in an
element 5 € P cannot bo distinguished under that information set. For each u> € fl denote
by P(u>) the element of the partition P that contains u;.
An information set P is called /infr than P, if every element of P is contained in an
element of P. P is then called coarser than P.
Let ,/V be a finite set of agents. Each agent has an initial endowment of information,
described by P, € P*. Then forming coalitions the information of agents may change, e.g.
due to communication. Let P* be the information that agent i € 5 has if the coalition
5 is formed. Throughout I assume that P,'"' = P,. A collection (P*).€.V..SC;N » called a
communication
is the maximum amount of information of agent i. Checking that P,"' G P" is straightfor-
ward.
An information set P generates a a-algebra <r(P). A communication system (P*)i€.s\.¥£/v
is called nested if o-(P*') C o-(p^) or equivalently P* C <r(P/") for all i € S C T. It is
called 6otm<f«f if <T(P*) C <T(P,") for alii € 5 C JV.
Information restricts the possible net trades of an agent. He cannot trade different
amounts on events that he cannot distinguish. Formally this is captured by the following.
Let P be the information the agent has. Then his trades of A; goods are limited to the
following set of functions
Xp := {i | i : ft —» R* and J- is a(P)-measurable}.
Hence, i € XV if and only if x Ls constant on elements of P. The characteristic function
of the set ft, denoted by
I,, : ft - R
:w—> 1,12 CHAPTER 2. BALANCEDNESS AND THE CORE
is in Xp for every ^ in a one good economy for example. When there are fc > 1 goods
€B* -.., ••••/ <-••:.- • • •:••••. • VaH
is in Xp for every P. I will denote Xps by Xf and Xj>™ by X,"". Then, if S = {i} I
will write X,. Call Xp the set of m/ormahona/ /easi6/e trades under P, Xf the set of
«/ /fa«»6/f <rarfrs o/ aycrU t »n coa/thcm 5 and Iliei' ^ ^ ^^ ^^ «n/orrnot»onai
• u
2.2.2 Exchange economies with asymmetric information
An ezc/»<mgfi pranomj/ «n</» asymmetric in/ormo<ion E is given by
1. u finite wt of agents /V = {1,2,..., n},
2. a finite set H of states of the economy,
3. the initial endowments e, : H —» R* for every agent i € ./V.
4. the rornniuniration system (P;''),c/v,.s-c,v,
5. (lie utility functions », : R*"" —» R for every agent i6 JVor
5.' state-dependent utility functions u| : 12 x R* —• R and strictly positive subjective
probabilities //,(u,') > 0.
When using !> I will write
and Hpeak of the motM «h//i««4< fj^rtntions, when using 5 I will write
and speak ot the <.I^XC/CI/ u<iMy
A vector of net trades (;,),e.s satisfying e, + 2, > 0 for all i € 5 and X)i€S *• = 0
CIUUHI />/)i/.stc<W/j/ /«i.«ii6/p for the coalition SCiV.
Moreover, for the results in this chapter it is necessary to assume that
(>. the utility functions are quasi-concave in R**"
li." the state-dependent utility functions n(a.\ •) are concave in R*.2.2. PRELIAiLYARJES rr ^ IS
By taking expectations
it becomes clear, that the expected utility model with concave state-dependent utilities is
really a subclass of the model without expectations. In Allen (199-1) it was assume* 1. that
the state-dependent utility functions be concave, which is reflected here in assumption 6'.
The proofs in the more general case of assumptions 5 and 6 demand only quasi-concavity
of the utility function. As the integral of concave functions is concave, this encompasses
the case of state-dependent concave utilities. Nothing similar can be said aluiut the case of
state-dependent quasi-concave utilities, since the integral of quasi-concave functions need
not be quasi-concave.
Here no assumptions are made with respect to measurahility of initial endowments or
state-dependent utility functions. It might l>e regarded as unreasonable, to have initial
endowments or utility functions that contain more information than any of the information
partitions the agent has in the coalitions of the game. For the decision to form coalitions
and trade in these coalitions the information contained in endowments and utility seems
essential, and therefore it might be argued that the agent has to know it. I will discuss
these matters in Section 2.4.
2.2.3 The core
An ^VrtZ-^amp m r/iarnr<fris<ic /unrfion /orm is a correspondence V : 2* \ {0} —• R^
satisfying
1. V(S) is nonempty and closed for S ^ 0,
2. if .r € V(5) and y € R" is such that «, < x, for all i € 5 then y € V(5),
3. for every t € AT there is an m, 6 R with V({»}) = {x € R* | x, < m,}, and
{x 6 R* | X; > m, Vi € W} is nonempty and compact.
A collection of coalitions S C 2* \ {0} is 6a/anc«f if there are positive real numbers As for
every 5 € B such that lefties A.s = 1 for every I 6 W. An NTU-game V is ftoianrrd if
fls€B^(^) £ ^(^) for every balanced collection S. Scarf (1967) has proved that if V is
balanced, then it has a nonempty core.
The /VTl/-jame asAoctatai wit/i <Ae expertwf «<i/i<y mode/ is defined by
= S x € R*'| there exists (z,),es € fl ^ »«ch that c, -I- 2, > 0,
z, = 0 and x, < Ep,u,(u;, (e, + z,)(u/)) V
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for each coalition 5/0.
Allen (1994) shows that this defines indeed an NTU-game. Let int(X) denote the
interior of a set X C R* with respect to the usual topology on R*. The expected uftiity
cone of the exchange economy with asymmetric information is then defined to be the NTU-
core of the associated NTU-game:
The NTtZ-^ame as«octated uritA <Ae mode/ wttAout ejyectottons is defined by I, i
(• •: -jY
VE(5) = |i6R"| there exists (Zj)i€&* € fj *? such that e, + z< > 0,
^ 1
2_, Zi = 0 and I; < Uj(ej-(-z.) S
for each coalition 5/0.
The core o/ tAr «xc/»anoe economy un<A asj/mmetric in/ormahon is then defined to be
the NTU-core of the associated NTU-game:
C(E) :=
2.3 Balancedness of the market games with asymmet-
ric information
Sehwalbe (1999) defines the mrtnrnum m/ormoiion of an agent i as the information P,"* he
could gain by joining all coalitions simultaneously. His set of/rastb/r a//orations E for the
whole economy then consists of all physically feasible allocations (J",),J,V € Ilie.v -^T- That
makes the set E large enough to assure balancedness of the associated market game with
asymmetric information for any communication system. As there are no obvious reasons
for using this notion of maximum information. I will give here another condition to assure
balancednoss based on the sets A';\ and use P,\ rather than P,'". for the whole economy.
Note that P,'" = P* if the communication system is bounded.
I give an example to show that the condition contained in Allen (1994), to guarantee
(total) Imlancedness of the associated market game in the expected utility model, is not
correct, and then present an alternative that is applicable to both models.
The following definitions are taken from Allen (1994).
Definition 1 TAr frmimuriirafton .<y.strm (Pf ),,>• is p.*sentia//y npsffd i//')'" «M i € ./V and
a// riKi/iriori.s 5 and 7' MICA tAat i € 5 C T C ;V, «/ft* C ft w .surA tAa< 0 < /i,(ft*) < 1
ft' € <r(Pf'). and ft* = ft| U fta U ... U ft/.. L > 1 /or some dwjomf ft, € PfJ,2.3. BALAVCED.VESS OF THE AMRA'ET G.4A/ES 15
6 5 \ {t}, / = 1 L. </>en 17 € ff(P^) and rarA 1), € <T(P/,H). Tne communimhon
(Pf )«^ u essentially bounded i/ tne condition afcot*- /toids /or T = /V.
Obviously essentially nested implies essentially bounded. Furthermore, nested implies
essentially nested and bounded implies essentially bounded. Now the claim in Allen (1994)
is, that essential nestedness is equivalent to total ttalanccdiiess of the associated market
games with varying utilities and endowments, and essential boundedness is equivalent to
balancedness. I give a counterexample to show that this is not so. The game sp<xified
will be essentially nested, but not balanced, hence constituting a counterexample to !>oth
claims.
Example 2 Let tApre 6e/iwe apents Af = {1,2,3,4,5}, 4 states fi = {1,2,3,4} and prior
p,(u/) = /i(w) = j /or a// i 6 AT. TAe communication system i.s pit>rn 6y
Pf = {{1,2}.{3,4}}, i/l€S,|S|<4,
Pf = {{1,4}, {2,3}}, t/2€S,|5|<4,
Pf = {{1,3,4}. {2}}, i/3€5,|5|<4,
P* = {{1.2,3}, {4}}, «/4€5,|5|<4,
Pf = {«}• i/5€S,|5|<4,
and P* = {0} /or a// i € AT TAis communication system is ofttiou-s/y ps.-<pri*irt%
as iy C n untA 0 < /i^n*) < 1, 0* € <r(Pf), and 0* = Qi U flj U ... U D/. /or some
fi/ € Pjj,, twtn j(/) e 5 \ {i}, / = 1 L, does not exist /or any ieSCJV.
Afou; consider t/ie /o//ounnp one pood pronomy
e, = (1,1,0,0) ,u, : fi x R,u(u;,x) =
ej = (0,1,1,0) ,uj:fi xR,u(w,x) =
ej = (0,0,0,0) ,u;,:fi xR,u(u/,x) = x,
e4 = (0,0.0,1) ,«4 :fi xR,u(w,x) = x,
ej = (1,1,1,1) ,U5:fixR,u(w,x)=x.
77»ere iw// 6e no excAanpe o/poo<is in £AP prand roa/ttion as on/y {0, {fi}}-meas«ra6/p
are a//ou;pd t/ipne and so on/y apent 5 rouW po.ssi6/t/ trade as a// ot/ipr.< Aave a state untA
0 endowment. So tAe unK/up candidate /or t/ie core is tAe u<tit(y vector (u,(p,))^>r artsmp
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Consider «Ae coa/ition 5= {1,2,3,4}. 7%e net <radea . 1 \ ; ; S)v
.-.., ^3 = (0,l-,0,0), . „ ,.
^ _,1 1 1 -V
~~ 2' 2' 2' ~
arr: in/ormationa/ and p/jysieai/y/easi6/e and /ead to fne /o/Zowjn^ eipected uti/tiy , ^
r-.b
1
3 , , 1
> ) 7
3
r > W:i(c.t) = 0,
3 , , 1
()
««d /i(7irr <nerp w a deviation to t/ie u<i/ity vector (Ui(e,))ig^. 5o t/ie rore is empty and t/ie
rannot fc«' (wlrmwrf.
Remark 3 77»r reatrirtion o/in/ormation in tne ^rand roa/ttton to {n} miy/tt seem strong.
iJtu'i/A (j.ie i»ua< iafa ts ortiy tnat net trades t/iat arr pos.st6/e in a suftroa/ihon are removed
trt //»• r/rand roa/i^iori and /ifnrc dcvia/ton.s o/ tni.s .tu/>ro<i/i<ion fcecome posst'6/e. 77>u.«, t/ie
^ = {ii} is ori/y made /or simp/trtty.
The iilcii l)i>liiml tlio roiidition of essential iHwteflness/hoiiiuhHlness was that the possi-
bility of net trades is not only tied to physical feasibility, but also to informational feasibil-
ity. Hence, not all combinations of physically feasible net trades have to be considered as
possible deviations. I propose the following definition that captures this idea better than
essent ially nestedness/bmindedness.
Definition 4 77ir communication system ('Pf )i,.s M trade nested i//or a// coa/itions 5 C
T C yV and a// («^«.« 6 fUs */ "«<« E>€S*i = 0. «< *oW« <A«< («>)>es € n^s*/"
sj/.s/ctn (P;*"'),..s' »s tmdr hounded i/ tnr condition aftove Zio/ds /or T = JV.
Clearly, the system in Kxainple 2 is neither trade nested nor trade bounded. Now I
claim the following for the model without expectations.
Theorem 5 Fix tne num6rr o/ goods A- and tAe /inite sets J1 and Af artitrartiy. Consider
a// IJI7III>((/C cconoriiics unt/i a.sy»/imrtfir in/orwation and urit/i tnese parameters ^xed. As
e'Ndot<?m'fit.s and uti/ttic.s »'ar-y, a// /V77' marirt yarnes u'ltA asymmetric m/ormation are
totai/y (xiiartccd i/ and oriiy i/ (P^)i..s *-•>' trade nested.2.3. BALANCEDNESS OF THE AfARAET GAA/ES 17
Proof. Necessity: Suppose that the communication system (Tf"),.s is not trade nested.
Then one can construct an exchange economy with asymmetric information that is not
totally balanced, as follows. By assumption there are coalitions 5 C T and (<j)je.v €
Fl es*/ ™eh '"*" £j€S*> ~ 0 **"* (*j)>€S £ Flies*/* Consequently there is an agent




for all j € S, j ?4 j. Then put e, := -?, for all j € S, j ^ J and e^ := 0 for all j e N \ S
and for j = j. Let the utility functions of the agents j y^ _; be the zenvftmctions and
for agent j let «j(x) := p S^tn 5Im = i •'"">('*')• ' show that the subgame (7\V) is not
balanced. Consider the balanced collection B := {S, T \ S} with constimt weight function
I5. Obvioasly
V(T\ S) = {1 € R^" I T, < 0 for all 1 € T\ S}.
The best that j can get in coalition 5 is the sum of all the initial endowments of the others
*? =
So ?- is P? measurable and
«?(%) = isi E E ^-.M > o-
As Uj is the zero function for j / j we have
V(S) = {1 € R^ I i, < 0 for all i € S \ 0} and 1- < U3(r^)}.
Hence
f) V(B) = {x € R^ I x, < 0 for all i 6 T \ {}} and xj < uj(2j)}.
But on the other hand, as (ij)jgs ^ Fires*/' °"* "*•'' "^ ^"** (f;)jrs ^ Flj?.v*7-
Furthermore, as H- = e(T) := X)J€T*"J *"^ ^(^ \ £) = ()• any physically feasible vector of
net trades (^)jeT € Fljer *7 leads to a utility for agent j that is strictly less than Uj(i^).
So the balancedness conditionII CHAPTER 2. BALANCEDATESS AND THE CORE
is violated in the subgame (T. V). This shows that the game (Af. V) is not totally balanced.
Sufficiency: To show total balancedness of the derived game (Af. V), it has to be shown
that every subgame (T, V), T C N is balanced, i.e. V(T) D floes ^(^) ^lds for every
balanced collection B of subsets of T. So let B be an arbitrary balanced collection of subsets
of T with weights 7 : B -» (0,1]. Let 1 € Haes ^(#) for every B e B one has a: € V(B),
and hence there are by definition of V(B) net trades z/*,i € B, that are informational
and physically feasible in the coalition B such that J, < u^e* + 2,^) for all J € B. Extend
(*^)i€fl to * vector of net trades in the grand coalition T of the subgame by putting z,^ := 0
for all t e T\ B. The communication system is trade nested so (z^),gr € fLes -*7' *°^ *®
0 € X?" this implies (2,").e/ € fl.t/ *f • Moreover £,gr *." = E.efl *." = 0- Consequently
(z/'jigr is an informational and physically feasible vector of net trades in T. Now let
z< := 5Z/jc8fl3,'y(B)z," = 5ZB£B7(B)2," for every t € 7\ As it follows easily that the sets
A/" are convex and contain the ^ for every B € B one obtains that also 2j 6 X,^, i.e.
(*i)<eT is informational feasible in the coalition T. It is clear that e, + z, > 0 for all 1 € T
so
ieT ie7 HtB
shows that (^i)ier is also physically feasible. Quasiconcavity of the utility functions now
implies that for all 1 € 7
HfB Befl,fl=>i
Hfifl./O.
so a- € V(T), and that shows V(T) D DB€B^(^) f°r »H subgames (T. V) and balanced
collections B of subsets of 7\ Hence the derived game is totally balanced. •
Corollary 6 Fix tAr number 0/ pixxii it and (Ac /intte sets H and JV or6t<rnn/j/. Coastder
a// rxr/ian^r eronorntes wtt/i asymmehir tn/orr;in<ion and uritn (Aese parameters /ixe<f. As
rndo«irnrn/.s find ti/i/t(ir.« t'ory. a// AT(' mariket games witA asymmetric in/ormation are
baiamrd 1/and oniy «/(P;''),..s- is tmde bounded.
Proof. For nec««ity and sufficiency set T = N in the corresponding parts of the proof of
Theorem 5. •
Corollary 7 Fir tAe number 0/ goods it and fAe /inite sets ft and N arfcitrariiy. Consider
a// rrrAan<;r rronormes tnt/i asymmetric in/ormation and uttA (Aese parameters yurd. As
endoutrients and udiide.s txir-y, a/i A'77' marilri jame.s ut(A asymmetnr in/ormatton are2.3. BALAATCEDiVESS OF THE AfARA'ET GAAfES IS
^ faianced i/and oniy i/(P*\s M trade founded arid .i.?*-*iv..»m"=»•
''...'•ji' •
^ totai/y 6aiar»r«f 1/ and on/y 1/ (7f ),.s « frndf nf»<«f.
Proof. The expected utility case is a subclass of the other mode) recovered by taking
u, : R**" —» R to be the expected utility functions
for all i e AT. •
As balaneedness implies that the core of the NTU-game is not empty and total luU-
ancedness implies that the core of all suhgames is not empty one obtains another corollary.
Corollary 8 Fir tAe num6er 0/ joods Ar and tAe /intie acto fl ond A^ arfotraniy. Conaidrr
a// accAangf pronomifs iw'tA asymmptnr in/ormation and twtA tAr.ie paramrtprs yircd. ^4.1
endotwnefits arid ulf/tftr.s rary, a .su^Virnt rondifinn /or n// rxr/ianpr rronorNir.t un</i a.<ytn-
mflnr in/ormadon to /law a non-empty rorr M tradr fcoundpdnpss 0/ </ir rommuntradon
5ystrm. A su^iricnt rondifion /or ai/ .suijamfa to Ziatie a non-empty core is trade nejtednes*
0/ tAe communiai<ion system.
Note that the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 5 to show that
is also a necessary condition has a non-empty core. In fact zero utility for every agent,
corresponding to no trade, is in the core. So the corollary cannot state equivalence of
nonemptiness of the core (subcores) and boundedness (ncstedncjw).
Ohvously. ncstedncss (boundednetss) of the communication system implies trade nest-
edness (boundedness).
To see that the conditions of trade nested ness and trade bouudodnesN arc really weaker
than nestedness and boundedness of the communication system, consider the following
example.
Example 9 /,<•< t/ierr <*> tArr-e aoents AT = {1,2,3} and 4 state* ft = {1,2,3,4}. 77ie
communication system (?iwn 6y
Pf = {{1,2,3}, {4}}, i/2€5,
Pf = {{1,2,4}{3}}, i/3€5,
P," = {{1,2},{3,4}},
is trade nested fcut not nested. Tnis ts east/y seen, a.« any p/iysi«i//y /ea.«t6/e trades tAat
1 can maJke must necessart/y 6e con.»tant on t/ie set {1,2}.
On the other hand trade nestedness (boundedness) is stronger than essentially nested-
ness (boundedness) in the expected utility model.
Theorem 10 Any trade nested (7*>un(Wy rommuniralton ruie ts essenttoi/y nested20 CHAPTER 2. BALANCEDJVESS AND THE CORE
Proof. Let the communication system (Pf)i.s be trade nested. Fix arbitrary t, 5 and
T such that t € 5 C T C JV. Suppose there is IV C ft such that 0 < /ij(ft') < 1
where ft' € <7(Pf), and ft' = fti U ^ U ... U ft*, for some disjoint ft, € Pj},, with j(Z) €
6' \ {i}, / = 1,..., I«. If such sets ft', ft/ do not exist for any combination of i, 5 and T
the communication system is by definition trivially essentially nested. If they exist put
= Ijjj and 2, = 0 for all
Then (2>)>es € flies*/ *"><* Eje.s^ = 0 hence by trade nestedness (zj)>gs € flies *T
But thiH implies that ft' € <r(P/') and each ft/ € <*(^/)) As i, 5 and T were arbitrary this
shown that the communication system is essentially nested. The boundedness case follows
by specialising 7" to the grand coalition /V. •
2.4 Discussion of Measurability assumptions
As far as the initial endowment is concerned, an assumption such that every information
partition P;\ i gSCIV is finer than the information contained in the initial endowment e,,
i.e. the coarsest partition P that makes e* cr('P)—measurable, seems reasonable. After all,
an agent must know his initial endowment for planning his net trade, hence he can use that
information in every coalition. Observation of the initial endowments by the agents would
not be necessary anymore if one would use utility functions defined on the net trades 2
rather than the commodity bundle r, + 2, and assign infinitely low utility —oo to net trades
where r, + i £ R**". In detail, one switches in the general model from u^ : R**" —» R to
u, : R**« - R
{
u,(e, + 2) if e, + 2 > 0,
-00 otherwise,
and in the expected utility model from u, : ft x R*' —» R to
fi, :(hR'-.R
1 —00 otherwise.
Note that quasiconcavity of utility functions is not disturbed by this switch. However the
"penalty restriction".
on the utility functions that can be used is imposed. Now an agent plans his net trade and
olwerves and outcome in R or R", depending on which model is used. Assume an agent
okserves an outcome of —00 in the model without expectations. He could then infer that2.J. D/SCl/SSJON OF MEASl'/MB7LITY ASSt'.\iP77ONS 21
e, + ; > 0 is violated. But as he can only trade constant on states he cannot discern he
will not be able to find out which state(s) lead to infinitely low utility, and therefore lie
can gain no information that he does not already have. ' _ \.
Unfortunately, in the expected utility model the agent observes a vector of outcomes,
and if these differ he can still gain information. Measurahility of the outcome vector
(u,-(w, 2(u,'))L-€Ji € R" plays also a role here. As decisions in this chapter are hascd on
the expected utility of that outcome vector one can easily withdraw from a thorough a
discussion of these matters by opting for the usage of the model without expectations to
circumvent these problems. But in general for state-dej>endent utility it might be useful
to use state-dependent utility functions that depend also on the information partition
the agent is using. That makes sense if the agent has to know his utility function to
decide. Utility at some state u,' and information partition P must then equal utility in the
nondiscernable states u/ e P(w). A definition of a state-dependent utility function would
then be
such that the outcome vector (tI(w,x,P))^rn. is P—measurable for all r € R**" that are
informational feasible, i.e. x — e, is P—measurable. In the expected utility model given
here this could be reached by letting the utility function S at P € P" be a version of the




Moreover, it might be argued that subjective probabilities should also reflect infor-
mation. That could easily be incorporated by taking information dependent subjective
probabilities £(-,P), that are consistent in the sense that they arise from an underlying
probability measure /i independent of the information partition, i.e.
: ft x P* -. R
Obviously u and fiat a particular P reveal no more information than is contained in
P already. Furthermore, this replacement does not change the expected utility function in32 CHAPTER 2. BALAJVCEDJVESS AND THE CORE
the expected utility model, as may be seen from . : . > . • . v-,|s
u/€fl w€tt ' * '
Summarizing, agent i now plans in a particular coalition 5 a net trade z that
is Pf-measurable, observes a utility outcome (5(w, e^ + 2,Pf))weJi that is also
P/"* —measurable, and uses that outcome to take expectation under an also Pf—measurable
subjective probability /«(-, P*)- So the expected utility model of Allen (1994) can be rewrit-
ten, with an additional restriction on the used utility functions, to reveal no information
to the agent at the planning stage.
All results in this chapter would remain valid, if one would transform an exchange
economy modelled without or with expectations in the way suggested in this section. What
can be said in general for an exchange economy arising from this new framework, but not
having an underlying representation in the model with or without expectations, is left open
here.
Another approach would be to view the information contained in P* as the information
one is allowed to use for trading, and any additional information contained in the initial
endowment or utility vectors is information that is e.g. insider information, and hence
trading based on this information is forbidden. Page (1997) interprets the boundedness
restriction on a communication system into that direction, calling it 'no insider trading'.
Pooling information may be impossible to certain degrees as well which would lead to
coarser information in larger coalitions.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter a condition on the communication system was given to assure balanced-
ness of all NTl'-games derived from an asymmetric exchange economy, when endowments
are variable. The NTU-games can be derived in an ex-ante setting without using state-
dependent utility and subjective probabilities. The condition remains valid in the ex-ante
expected utility core. It provides an alternative to the condition given in Allen (1994).
Possible extensions are to consider trade l>oundedness in an interim core concept or to
study implications for value or equilibrium concepts. Various results are already available
for special communication systems leading to the weak fine, tine and private core. Einy et
al. (21)01), for example, show that with a continuum of traders and 'irreducibility' of the2.5 OONCL US/OAT 23
economy the set of equilibrium allocations in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982) coincides
with the private core of Yannelis (1991). Moreover, they show that such an equilibrium
allocation exists.
The existence of private and fine value allocations in an ex-ante sense was established
in Krasa and Yannelis (1994. 1996). They also argued that there are problems with the
coarse value. Again one might consider arbitrary communication systems and investigate
whether trade boundedness leads to an existence result for the value.24
' f i ' 'l ' ' I, - • * ft
.-;>:'» stfT
ri.:: ?:. ..iI;.IJ:j(;lt.ri VChapter 3 J
Competitive equilibrium and the core
A replica theorem is shown to hold for exchange economies with asymmetric information.
In a replicated exchange economy with asymmetric information the set of nil core elementN
with equal treatment is nonempty, but it is in general only a sulwet of the core. Nev-
ertheless, the replica theorem and the presence of at least one core element with equal
treatment suffice to show existence of a competitive quasi-cquilibrium. Conditions on the
initial endowments and the communication system are given to ensure that every compet-
itive quasi-cquilibrium is a competitive equilibrium.'
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to study the relationship between the core and competitive
allocations in economies with asymmetric information. This extends the analysis of uncer-
tainty, as introduced in Chapter 7 of Debreu's 'Theory of Value' (19Ii!)). There, uncertainty
Ls incorporated into the Arrow-Debreu theory by introducing a finite set of states of the
world, and viewing the commodities as differentiated by state. Still, every agent is assumed
to possess the same full information set. i.e. there are no states that cannot be distinguished.
This analysis Ls extended by Radnor (1968, 1982), to cover the case of private information
Every agent Ls assigned a partition of the set of states of the world, with the interpreta-
tion that the sets in the partition contain those states which cannot be distinguished by
the agent. A trade of an agent then has to be compatible with his information, that is,
he cannot act differently on states that he cannot distinguish, or mathematically, his net
trades have to be measurable with respect to the ^-algebra generated by his information
partition. Radnor (1968) extends the notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium to
this model. Trades are contingent contracts before information about the realized state of
nature Ls obtained. Information cannot be communicated and restricts the budget sets of
the agents. A Radner competitive equilibrium rewards the better informed trailer in the
'The author thanks particularly Hans Peters for helpful NURgrstionji The remiltn in Ihiit rhaplcr were
first formulated in Maws (2004a).
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sense that his budget set is larger, thus he will in general be better off.
From the core perspective, the incorporation of information structures into the core
dates back to Wilson's seminal paper (1978). However, with the core, there is more to be
considered than just private information. One can devise an information structure to be
parameterized not only by the agent space but also by the coalitions that an agent can
be in. Private information would then be the case, where an agent's information does not
change, regardless of the coalition he belongs to. But a lot of other cases are imaginable,
e.g. agents pooling their information, leading to a situation in which superset coalitions
have more information and the grand coalition has full information. Such a fine information
system, and others, as the coarse, strong coarse and weak fine information system, have
been the subject of various papers, investigating the existence of core allocations. As a
starting point to this literature one can consider, apart from Wilson's work of course,
the papers of Yannelis (1991) and Allen (1994). The frameworks given there have to be
carefully distinguished tinder the aspect that, in Yannelis (1991). an allocation is preferred
to another by an agent if its expected utility over every single set in the information partition
(mathematically the conditional expected utility vector) is greater. This is often referred
to as an interim concept. Allen (1994) on the contrary considers an ex-ante concept, where
an allocation is preferred to another if the expected utility is greater. Of course if an
allocation is preferred in Yannelis (1991), it will be preferred also in Allen (1994). but not
vice versa, making the ex-ante core a subset of the interim core. Note, however, that as
pointed out yet again in the inspiring work of Debreu's Theory of Value (1959), the usage of
(conditional) expected utility, requiring a probability measure over the states of the world
and state-dependent utilities, is not essential. Instead one can consider a utility function
which maps the state-commodity space to the reals. This function could be the outcome of
taking expectation over slates, but this only shows that this model is able to incorporate
the e.\pe« ted utility case. Recently, the existence of ex-ante core allocations in this general
context has been addressee! by Maus (2002, see Chapter 2), providing a condition on the
information partitions, which is equivalent to noiiemptiness of the core with asymmetric
information, when endowments are variables. This result will be used here to investigate
the question of equal treatment in the core and the existence of an adapted version of the
Radner competitive equilibrium. The core reflects the veto power of any coalition. The
recent p.-ip.T by Herves-Beloso et al. (2003) characterizes Radner Equilibrium by using the
veto powei of the grand coalition only. They show that an allocation Ls a Radner equilibrium
if and only if it can not be blocked by the grand coalition in every economy obtained by
perturbing the original endowments in the direction of the equilibrium candidate.
The list of contributions on the relationship between Radner equilibrium and ex-ante
core concept with asymmetric information comprises two other recent papers by Einy et al.
(2(HK). 2001) working with a continuum of agents. In Einy et al. (2001) they show that in
an ex-ante model, if the economy is 'irreducible", then a Radner equilibrium exists and the
set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. It is also3.2. PRELJ.WJ.Y4RJEB '; ^ i ii.-iy • fH) 8?
shown, that the weak fine core corresponds to competitive equilibrium of an economy, where
the symmetric information of the agents is their pooled private information. In the other
paper Einy et al. (2000) they show that in an interim model the fine core is a subset of the
ex-post core, and consequently every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium
correspondence of the associated family of full information economies. Differences with
the work presented in this chapter are manifold. First of all the core is defined here
without referring to expected utility and prior beliefs. Secondly the concept is strictly
ex-ante. Thirdly the set of agents is finite, though agents are replicated to get to the core
convergence result. Fourth, the communication system is not specified. Last but not least,
no free disposability of commodities is assumed. As pointed out already in a footnote by
Radner (1982). p.945, the disposed commodities may not be measurable with respect to the
information of any single trader, making free disposability objectionable. In this chapter,
resource feasibility will bo considered as denoting strict equality of the sum of the allocated
commodities and the sum of the initial endowments. This complicates the existence of an
equilibrium considerably, since existence results from the theory of production economies
such as employed in Radner (1982) or Einy et al. (2001) cannot be used. The reason for
that is that the proofs of these existence results rely on the assumption that production sets
have a nonempty relative interior. In a pure exchange economy that assumption translate*
into disposability of at least part of the endowments. Therefore, these existence results are
not applicable, and a number of other, partly new results is necessary. These results are
the existence result for the core from Mans (2002, see Chapter 2), a result extending equal
treatment of agents of the same type in replicated economies to the rase of the core with
asymmetric information, and a result on the connection between quasi-competitive Hiulner
equilibria and the cores of the replicated economies. All of these results are also of interest
on their own.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 the formal model is described along
with the definition of core and competitive (quasi-(equilibrium Section 3.3 discusses the
relationship between competitive (quasi-(equilibrium allocations and core allocations in
large economies. To arrive at an existence result for equilibrium, further investigation
of 'equal treatment in the core' is necessary, which is dealt with in Section 3.4 Then
Section 3.5 establishes existence of an competitive quasi-cqiiilibrium. and introduces some
conditions under which this turns into an existence result for competitive equilibrium.
3.2 Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter, R+ is the set {i € R 11 > 0}, and x > y for vectors or matrices
means that every entry in x strictly exceeds the corresponding entry in j/. When a constant
c € R is written in a place where a matrix or vector is expected, it is understood to be the
matrix or vector where all entries have the value c. A product of matrices or vectors pz in
the same space is understood to be the sum of the products of the matching entries, i.e.18 CHAPTERS. COAfPETJTJVE EQU/L/BRJl/Af AND THE CORE
the scalar product (matrices have to be interpreted as vectors for this). ; • :i«
3.2.1 Information . 1
Let 12 be the finite set of states of the world. Let P* be the set of partitions of fi. A
P € P* is called an in/orm«<ton set. The interpretation is that states contained in an
element 5 6 P cannot be distinguished under that information set. For each w 6 fi denote
by P(w) the element of the partition P that contains w.
I.rf't N be a finite set of agents. Each agent has an initial endowment of information,
described by P, € P. When forming coalitioius the information of agents may change, e.g.
due to communication. Let P* be the information that agent « € 5 has if the coalition
5 is formed. Throughout I assume that P,-'' = Pj. A collection (P*)ies,scN is called a
A communication system is called prtwifp if P* = P, for all S 9 t, i.e. the information
does not change.
An information set P generates a <r-algebra <r(P).
Information restricts the possible net trades of an agent. He cannot trade different
•mounts on events that he cannot distinguish. Formally this is captured by the following.
Let P be the information the agent has. Then his trades of fc goods are limited to the
following set of functions
Xp := {x | x : fi —» R* and x is <r(P)-measurable}.
Hence, x e Xr if and only if x is constant on elements of P. Thus, x : Q —» R* can be
identified with x : P -• R*, where x(A) is the constant value on A The characteristic
function of any set /? € P, denoted by
I • ft -• R*
f i. if we #,
" " | 0. if w £ tf.
is in Xr for every P for example. I will denote Xps by Xf and if S = {»} I will write
X*. Call Xr the net of tn/ormationo//rnsib/r frndfs under P, Xf the set of in/ormattona/
/nwiMr <ITJ(/«-.S- o/a<;rn< i in coo/ition 5 and [],*«. ^^ *"** ••**• **^ in/ormaiiono//ea«6fc trade*
t»/ tAr rua/i/ion i'.
Definition 11 77»r rotnrnunimlion .fy.s^m (Pf),..s- is trarfr 6oi»n<if(f t//or ai/ coaittions
5 C A/ and a// (s,),«» € n>€S^ •«* E,e.^7 = 0, a /u>W« tAa< (^),es € FI^s^-
Informally speaking, this assures that every net trade possible in a subcoalition remains
possible in the grand coalition.3.2. PRELJA//.VARJES ^ • rn^civ 39
3.2.2 Exchange economies with asymmetric information
An excnanje economy untA asymmrfnr in/orrnadon E is given by
-. • -«• r*
1. a finite set of agents JV.
...... . - • .... •.,-;r
2 a finite set Q of states of the economy,
• • (ni
3. the initial endowments e, : fl —» R* for every agent 1 € Af, •'*•«
4. the communication system
5. and utility functions u, : R+*" —• R for every agent i € Af.
A vector of net trades (z,)(es satisfying e, + z, > 0 for all i € 5 and £^<f «i = 0 is
called p/iysiraZ/y /eosift/e for the coalition SC JV. An oZ/ocntion for a coalition 5 in an
economy E is a function x : 5 —• R**" such that the net trades x, - r, are infornmtional
and physically feasible for thus coalition. In this chapter vectors x € R**" arc identified
in the natural way with the space of functions x : n -» R*. Furthermore, the following
spaces of utility functions will be relevant:
:= {« : R**" -* R I u is strictly increasing,
i-e. y > x, y / x => u(y) > u(i)},
:= {u : R**" —» R | 11 is quasiconcave},
:= {u : Rt"" — R I u is concave and u(0) = 0} D (/'"",
:= IV n£/"", and
") := {u:R**" —R|uis continuous}.
3.2.3 The core
An JVTt/-yame in enarocterwhe /unction /orm is a correspondence V : 2* \ {0} -» R^
satisfying
1. V(5) is nonempty and closed for S / 0,
2. if x € V(S) and y € R* Ls such that y, < x. for all i € 5 then y € V(S),
3. for every t € JV there is an m, 6 R with V({«}) = {1 € R" | 1, < "»,}, and
V(JV)n{x € R* I x, > m, V» G JV} Ls nonempty and compact.
The ATt/-0ame <usoctated twt/» an excAonje economy E is defined by
Vk(S) = |x € R" I there exists (z,),es € fl -^f ™^ **>»* «« + 2< > 0,
I .€.S
= 0 and x, < «,(ei + 2,) >
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for each coalition 5^0. The core of this NTU-game is given by ' *:. < •' i = 5 > * '1 --' - • £
(J int(VE(5)). • ='"
The core of the exchange economy with asymmetric information consists of all allocations
for the grand coalition, resulting in a utility vector in the core of the associated NTU-game,
i.e.
C'(E) := {i € R"***" 11 is an allocation for A/ and (ui(zj))i€Jv € C(VE)}.
So C(E) comprises all allocations x for the grand coalition to which no coalition 5CJV has
a deviation, i.e. an allocation y* for that coalition such that u^(yf) > «i(x) for all i 6 S.*
The following existence result for the core from Maus (2002, see Chapter 2) will be of
use.
Theorem 12 Let E 6e an excnan^e economy untn asymmetric in/ormation and trade
6»undcd communication system. Assume t/iat u, 6 (/,r /or ai/ i 6 N. TTien tne AT£/-
rorr o/ V4: i.i no' rmpty.
3.2.4 Competitive Allocations
The information that an agent can use in a competitive allocation is assumed to be P,*'.
This assumption could be viewed as implying that in a competitive equilibrium allocation
the same communication takes places as in the grand coalition. Relations between core
allocations and competitive allocations can in general not be expected if the measurability
constraints for core allocations and competitive allocations are different.
A price system is a function p : $2 —» R*, p ^ 0. Agents make contracts for the delivery
of contingent commodities as in Chapter 7 of Debreu's Theory of Value (1959), i.e. before
the state of the world is revealed to them. Payments are made for contingent delivery and
irrevocable even if another state of the world is realized. Additionally every agent's trades
are restricted by his information.
A price system contains the information
.4 ff-algebra on Q, p ^-measurable}.
It could be argued that agents i such that o-(P,*) ^ <r(p) can observe information from
prices pashxl to them. This leads to rational expectations equilibrium, see for example
Allen (15)84). Radner (1979). We assume that agents observe private price signals, which
then reveal no information to them. This is achieved by the following construction. Let p be
a price system. For an information partition P the price system that can be seen under P
*In tlw previous chapter this was defined to be just the set of utility vectors given by C(Vg). Here we
lmw to consider nllorittions insti'iul of utility vectors because of the way in which we are going to relate
the nw atul the stct of <xiuilil>rium allocations.3.2. PR£L/A//iV/\RiES • H:VVHKH $1
is given by (p(i4))4fp. where p(.A) := X!.« A/K-') Every agent observes (possibly different)
futures prices, namely (p(-4)) *f p> • corresponding to his possible trading, activities. Another
way to view this, is to consider average prices p. which are different per agent. and are given
Under both viewpoints an agent having information P cannot gain information from
the prices seen, as these are a(P)-measurablc. Furthermore, any informational feasible
trading activity z € X** incurs the same cost under both viewpoints, as can be seen from
zp =
.4er.«.4
Note that if we assume that the price system p is set by a Walrasiiui auctioneer who
knows the information that agents have, then we can assign also the tusk of < outputin^ the
private price signals for the agents to him. The least information that the WiiliiLsjiui auc-
tioneer has to have then is the partitions P*' for any agent i € AT. Thus the information 7"*'
that the auctioneer has will satisfy <T(P^) 3 <T(UI€N ^I*) *"d *"'" information constraints
price vectors set by the auctioneer to be «r(P" )-measurable. However, as we shall see,
this constraint holds automatically for the price systems that we construct in our proofn.
These correspond to separating hyperplancs of rr(U.t.v ^ J-nieasurable wts of allocations,
so they can be chosen to be ir((J^^'P,^')-measurable themselves. In the end <*(UitN^i*)'
measurability of price systems is used in Lemma 27 and in Corollary 28, but anywhere
else in this chapter it is not required. Another question, that arises if we assume that the
auctioneer receives signals P,*' from the agents is, whether agents, either individually or
coalitional, can manipulate the price the Walrasian auctioneer chooses by transmitting an-
other information partition P, such that <r(P, ) C <7(P,*) to the auctioneer. This question
is not addressed here. So. when thinking of prices as set by an auctioneer, it is assumed
implicitly that either agents are honest or their information can be verified costless by the
auctioneer.
Example 13 /TOOLTIP f/iat £/WTP arr (/tree state* o/ £/IP u/or/<f fi = {1,2,3}, w/ttr/i
o/ a rommfldtty ^.»ay 1 ts good, 2 is merfittm,3 ia 6od_/. TVou;, romparr' two
in/ormotion partitions {{1.2}, {3}} and {{1}, {2,3}} reapechw/y ^<np/irst a^n< can33 CHAPTERS COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND THE CORE
*cnecn /or 6ad gua/ity and </ie second agent /or good (/ua/itt/y. Assume <Aa( a price system
/or </w< rommrxiity is given oy p = (3,2,1). Then <Ae /trst agent o6serves the price vector
(5,1), u//jere 5 is f/ie price/or contingent de/it/erj/ o/a untf omotmf in state 1 and 2, and t/ie
second agent observers <ne price vector (3,3), where 3 is tAe price /or contingent de/ivery o/
a unit amount in states 2 and 3. // 6oth agents were interested in fcuying on/y good yu<j/t<y,
that wou/d 6e cheaper /or agent 2, a.s agent 1 na.s to feuy t/ie medium gua/ity &und/ed wit/i
t/ie gwx/ (/ua/i/y. Instead, i/ tAe good and t/ie medium i/ua/i/i/ ti;ere appreciated simi/ar/y 6y
tne agents, tnr advantage w/ouM 6e on the side o/agent 1. T/ie average price systems here
are given 6y (25,25,1) and (3, 1±, l|) /or t/ie ^rst and tAe second agent respective^.0 ;t
For a price system p define the 6udget set of an agent i € TV by
B,(p) = {* € R*«" I x - e, e Xf and ^ £p(«)(iM - *M) < 0}
= {z + c, 6 R*"" I z € X," and £ PMM^) < 0}
The budget set contains all contingent allocations that the agent can afford under the given
price system and that result from informational feasible net trades. Now the definition of
a competitive equilibrium can be stated.
Definition 14 A competitive egui/t6rium /or an economy E is a pair (p, 2), where p / 0 is
a price system and x is an ai/<x«tiim such that x, maxtmt^eji u, on £?,(p) /or a//1 € A'. A
competitive a//<raSirm i.s an a/Zoratum J-, /or which there exists a price system p such that
(p, x) ts a <om/;< Mit'i
As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the model considered here is able
to incorporate models which use an expected utility function derived from integration of
state-dependent utilities with respect to a prior on states. This can be used to argue that
Definition 14 covers the notion of Radner equilibrium (Radner, 1968) for pure exchange
economies with private information, and that Corollary 28 is also an existence result for
Radnor equilibrium. A standard assumption made when considering Radner equilibrium,
is that initial endowments are measurable with respect to the information of the agents
in the grand coalition, i.e. that e, 6 X,* for all i 6 /V. The reason that this is not
assumed here is that some of the results, e.g. about the relationships l>etween core and
equilibrium, do not neeil this assumption. However, in the existence result of Corollary
28. there is the condition that the initial endowments of an agent should be measurable
with respect to the information that the agent uses in any coalition that he is in, i.e.
<"* € rU=n** Letting information be private, i.e. Xf = X," = X,*'* for all i 6 /V and
S 9 i, this is just the private measurability of initial endowments assumed in Radner
equilibrium. Hence, Corollary 28 turns into an existence result for Radner equilibrium
in pure exchange economics with private information that meet the assumptions of the3.3. LARGE ECX)NOA«ES s \Jiv> v. •AT
corollary. This demands that expected utility as derived from taking expectations in the
Radner setting is quasiconcave. strictly monotone and continuous. This is mot for oxainple
if the prior is strictly positive, and state-dependent utilities are concave, monotone and
continuous. This is usually assumed when dealing with existence of Radner equilibrium,
e.g. already in the original paper of Radner (1968).
Next the weaker notion of competitive quasi-equilibrium is defined. ••-**><••.
Definition 15 .4 competitive ouosi-eouslifrrium /or an economy E is a pair (p, x) u>Aenr
p ^ 0 is a price system aridx us an ai/oradtm surA tAaf j-, manrni£ci M, ort /i, (/») tn/irrteiTr
^' x € JT,\x > 0} < pe,.
Obviously, every competitive equilibrium is also n coinpetitivo quasi-equilibrium. There
is no difference between these two equilibrium notions if iiifp.Y*'"*" < ;x, for nil » € /V.
When utility functions are strictly increasing, these definitions imply that (p(/t))>», r* > 0
in any competitive quasi-equilibrium and (p(-4)).4epN > 0 in any competitive equilibrium.
Hence, in that case one has de facto 0 = iufpA^-" and the condition infpX*-" < pe,
could be replaced by 0 < pe, (positive income).
3.3 Competitive and core allocations in large
economies
In this section sufficient conditions on the communication system are given such that the
replica theorem holds. So first of all the replica economies E", n € N, are defined.
Definition 16 iet E = (W, ft, (e^Ui, (Pf)<es.scAr).€A') **" "" rrrfcangr economy
»n/ormat«on. TAe n — (/i n?p/»ca
E" = (AT,n,(ei,tt(,(^e5«A,.)«w-).n 6 N,
is tAc Krr/ionje economy untA asymmetric in/ormation, u/Aere tAe «et 0/ a^rnts is AT"
JV x {1,..., n} and /or an agent (i, j) € Af" one
/. e,,j) := e,
2. u,,.j) := u,
5. P*j) := Pf^ , «;Aerc pr' is tAe projection on tAe /irst coordinate.
So the information that agents can use in a coalition in the replica economy depends
only on the type of the agents in that coalition and not on the total number of agentH of
a type in the coalition. Denote the agents of a given type i € Af, which are present in a
coalition 5CiV". by
P»-.(S) := 0 I 1 < J < n and (»,» € 5}.34 CHAPTER 3. COA/PETJ77VE EQl//LIBRJ(/M AJVD THE CORE
Theorem 17 Lc< E 6e on ezc/ian</e economy «ht/i asymmetric »n/ormatton. Assume
e, € X* and u, € t/™nC(Ri*") /or ai/ J € AT. //i € R****« is suc/i t/ia« i" = []"=, * 6
C(E") /or a// n € N, </ien i is a competitive ouast-e^uiiibrium a//oca<ion. A/oreover <Ae
price »j/s(em p decentralizing i can 6e c/tosen <r(|J^jy Pf )-measura6/e. --.-J."I(;I:«SJ«J
Proof. Note that if the initial endowments e^ are P*-measurable, then not only the net
trades (z,),eN leading to a competitive equilibrium or core allocation are P/^-measurable,
but also the final allocation (e, + 2i)>€Jv- Let i be such that i" 6 C(E") for all n € N.
It. haw to be shown, that there is a price system p € R**" such that for any agent ieJV
either inf pA^ '-" = pe,, or x, maximizes u, on jB,(p).
:= ({{, € ti(z,-)} - {e,}) n X*
is the set. of all net trades z, where agent i € AT prefers e< + z to i,, and which are
informational feasible for the agent in the grand coalition. Denote by co(.4) the convex hull
of /t C R*<*" and by I/» the characteristic function of B C fi. Let






on the contrary that there is some z € «KLU;v "(0) ^ ^->
z = V' A,,j/,,, where i4C/V, V^ A,, = 1, A« > 0, {/„ 6 //(n). and
f*,./'I/s «,,/• > 0.
.t,V
It suffices to construct ti contradiction to i" € C(E") for all n 6 N for the case where the
An are rational. In this case let n be so large that r,, := nAn < n is a natural number for
every a € /t. Define an allocation J* for the coalition
i 6 AT}
in the economy E"*' by
< * < fa,a and
This allocation is informational feasible for 5. as P^, := p^''*> = p^. Every member of
S prefers his bundle in .r* to that in x"*'. Furthermore, z* is also physically feasible for S,3.3. LAfiGE ECONOA/JES U •} Atr> 35




ro(M //(i)) is convex and
X_ is open and convex,
there is by a version of the separation theorem for convex nets, a p € R**",p / 0, muli
that
pz > 0 if *€«>((J //(«))
and pz < 0 if z € X_.
This p can be chosen to be <7(U,,= .vPi)-inea8urable, as any i e foCUit/v "(')) ^ ^ *'" P*""
se, \iewed as a function from fl to R*, be ff(UicArP,)-ineaHiirable. To show that (i,p) i« a
competitive quasi-equilibrium, I will need that the price system (p(j4))^fp", that can bo
seen by any agent under his information partition P* in the grand coalition, is nonnc^ative.
Assume to the contrary that there is an A € P* for some t e AT such that />(/l) < 0. Let
z 6 X_ be given by a- ^, = A' and o,.p = 1 otherwise. Then
>€>'
= C -
where the constant C is independent of A', and p(>4) < 0. Therefore choosing A" larger
than j^y will make pz positive, contradicting z € X_. So (p(/t))^epw > 0 for any i € /V,36 CHAPTER 3. COAfPETITJVE EQl/ILJBRIl/Af AND THE CORE
implying that inf pX*'^" = 0 for any i € JV. It remains to be shown that x, maximizes u, oil
#,(p) when 0 = inf pX*'-" < pe,. So suppose there is a y € B,(p) such that u,(t/) > Uj(ij).
Then y - e, € //(i) C co(U,ejv//(»)), which together with y € B,(p) imphes that py = pe<.
A* the income of the agent is positive, y is P* -measurable, and p(A) > 0 for all A € Pf,
it can be concluded from —
0 < pe< = py =
that there must be some A € P* such that y,(A) > 0 and p(A) > 0. So, by lowering
consumption equally in the states contained in A, a nonnegative sequence of y,, converging
to y can be obtained such that pj/n < pe, for all n € N, i.e. y,, - e< ^ #(»)• But then
«<(Vfi) < MXJ), as y,, is not in //(i). Since the utility functions u< are assumed to be
continuous this implies u,(y) < u,(x,), a contradiction to u,(y) > M,(X,). SO J-, indeed
maximizes u, on /i,(p) when agents have positive income. This concludes the proof that
(x,p) is a quasi-equilihrium of the economy E. •
The next example shows that the P,*-measurability of the initial endowments cannot
be dropped from the assumptions. The underlying reason is that an agent cannot use all
of his initial endowment when trading, due to the measurability restrictions on net trades.
However, when his income is calculated that is done by valuing the whole initial endowment,
leading to higher demand than what can actually be achieved by trading. Thus, one could
circumvent these restrictions of e, € A",^ by defining the income of the agents in another
way, taking into account only the parts of the initial endowments which can really be used
for trading. When allocations have to be nonnegative as in this chapter, this would be
endowments «; such that «'^(w) := min^j^^eyfu/) for all u; € ft and commodities j.
Example 18 ConatAr a private in/ormatum economy twtA 3 ayents i € N = {1,2,3},
one rrwnmodity and t/in-e states fl = {1,2,3}. Let *Ae tnthai endotwnents, <Ae
in/orma<ion and <nr uttltty /unctions 6e
r, := (2,1,2), P, :={{1,2},{3}},U, :=x,+xj+3x3,
: I-, :- (2,0,2),Pj:= {{1.3},{2}},U2:=x,+312 + I3,




23 = (3, -2, -2),
/rod /o tne COIT o//oca/ton
10 6
= I 0 3 0 I € C(E).
3 0 03.3. LARGE ECttVOAf/ES
p. one fcas tnat x" € C(E") /or aUn € N. Afewr<nefc\<w. x u no* a cnmpr ft/tt>e
fttast-e7Utit6num ai/ocafton. To sec t/iis. ccmsidpr /irst tnp case when- every a(?f n< nos
positive income, i.e. e^ + Zj maximizes u,. M>te t/iat p = (pi.p-i.ps) > 0, as <ne prices
seen fry an aoent nave to 6e nonnegattve and {3} € Pi. {2} € Pj, {1} € P3. 7Vn one
ca/rtiia/^5 /rom t/ie fettdyet equations p2, = 0 ftnese have to /10W i/»% + z, maxtmizes u,^,
price t>ector t/iouirf ftave to 6e p = (pi.Pi. }Pi)- .4s p ^ 0 tue mttst Aave p > 0. Tne
set 0/ajent 1 ftecofnes {(xi.x-j.Xa) | x — e 1 € A'i and px = pei = 4pi > 0}. But
tAen tne unique maximizer o/ui on fAis 6udort set is (0,0.8) ^ X). //ence, x cannot tell
competitive <7uasi-f(7i4i/i6riurn in t/its case, because appr»< 1 /tas poAi/u>r income 4pi. f>ri f/ir
• /land, i/ t/iere is an a<?prit twt/i zero income, one can distinguils/i tArre r<MM.
1. pti = 0 ==> 2pi + pa + 2p3 = 0 ^ p = 0, a contradiction.
2. pe2 = 0 => 2pi + 2p3 = 0 '4? pi = pa = 0 ^ P2 > 0 => pc;, = 2pa > 0 =» OEJ « (3,0,0)
maximizes U3 on 2?3(p), a contradiction as pi = 0.
5. pe.i = 0 => 2p2 + 2p3 = 0 *=4" pa = pa = 0 *=> pi > 0 =» pra = 2pi > 0 => Xa = (U, J, U)
maximizes u^ on Bj(p), a contradiction <u p? = 0.0
The next theorem points out that under trade Ixnindedness of the romiinmi( atioii HVB-
tem any equilibrium allocation x Is also in the core. Trade boimdcdnew licrc ILSNIIICX that
all possible deviations of subcoalitions SC JV from x are also informational ffitsihlr in the
grand coalition. They are therefore excluded from the budget sets of the agents in S not
for informational infeasibility, but because they cannot be afforded.
Theorem 19 Let E be an ezc/iaru/e economy wit/t asymmetric iri/or7na<if;n and trade
6ouri<ir<i communication system, //x is a competitive «7i»/ifrnum o//rx-rt<ion, t/ien x € C(E).
Proof. Let (x,p) be a competitive equilibrium of E. Suppose that x £ C'(E). As x - f w
informational feasible for the grand coalition that can only be if (u<(ij))i£/v € int V(5) for a
coalition 0 ^ 5 C N, which means that there is an allocation J/* such that ti|(yf) > Uv(x<)
for all. € 5. As (»*'-e,)^s- € n.cs^f «*» E.c«(K-'-'".) = W^)-^) = 0, (yf -
is under trade boundedness also informational feasible in the grand coalition. Thus,
u,(x.) =» yf * Bj(p) ==> pyf > pr,
for all i € 5. Summing up, that leads to
a violation of physical feasibility. Hence, x e C(E).38 CHAPTER 3. COAJPE77T/VE EQl/JL/BJtfl/M AND THE CORE
Again trade boundcdness is a vital assumption. Otherwise economies are easily con-
structed, where {e} Ls a competitive equilibrium, but the core is empty, due to the fact
that trading is only possible in strict subcoalitions of TV.
If x is a competitive equilibrium allocation in E, then it is straightforward that x"
is a competitive equilibrium allocation in the replica economy E". This shows that for
competitive equilibrium the only if part of Theorem 17 holds in economies with a trade
hounded communication system.
Corollary 20 £et E 6e an exr/iange mmomy untfi asymmefrtc m/ormafton and trade
bount/rd ft»mr«unjca<iori sj/stem. // x is a competitive e^ut/ibrtum
a//ocation tnen x" 6 C(E") /or ai/ n € N.
3.4 Equal Treatment
One way to derive an existence! result for competitive allocations in the case of full infor-
mation (or only one state of the world) requires to show that agents of the same type are
treated 'equally' in the core. Then a compactness argument and a version of Theorem 17
are used to show that a suhsequence of the mean allocations x« := £ £)j=i x.j, x,, € C(E"),
converges to a competitive equilibrium. Equal treatment ensures that (x,,)" e C(E"), and
thus x,, € C'(E). I want to use a similar approach in Section 3.5. However, when trying
to carry over the proof of the equal treatment property a problem arises. The enforcement
of equal treatment in all core allocations relies on the possibility to redistribute parts of
the mean allocation of one owns type to all agents of the other types, making them bet-
ter off. Under the mcasurahility constraints on the net trades imposed by informational
feasibility, this can no longer be guaranteed for arbitrary communication systems. In fact,
the following simple example shows a situation, where unequal treatment is present in the
core, exactly for the described reason.
Example 21 Consider a priuite in/ormaiton economy u>itA 3 ayente t € AT = {1,2,3},
one commwiitj/ and t/»»w states (2 = {1,2,3}. Let t/ie intttai endotwnents, tAe
m/of7miht>» arid tAe uti/itj/ /unrtiorw fee
«-, : = (1.1.0). P, :={{1.2}.{3}}.U,(I):=I,
e, : = (1,0,1), P, :={{1.3
net tmdr.i
J(U) = *<i.« = (-1.-1,2).
f-i — -n ' - r-i —
«(s.n = *(M> = (2,-1,-1).i-l. EQI/.4L TR£.AT.\/EJVT "it..4 i'i/U






















77»e agents o/type 2 are not frra/rd eauai/y t'n tAis a//<>r<i/ion. AfefertAe/e&s, tAi<j «//<>r«tion is
in C(E'). To sef tAis. no/f tAat r/raWy J- is tn/ormafiona/ and pAy.sira//y /rasifc/r. Suppose,
contrary <o x € C(E*). tAat tAerr ts a coalition SCi\fx(l,2),i7d, (tmZ «n d/Zocnhon y
/or 5 sucA tAat u,(y(,j)) > U,(JT(,J,) /or all (i,j) € 5.
77te /irst step ts to snow Wot S / A/ x {1,2}. T/IP o//oration I := i(x,, + i«)iew
con east/y 6e seen to 6e in C(E), os any agent oets tne romp/ete endourment «/ t/ie »r.so«rre
ttV»r/i /if prr/prs most. A^otu, t/S = iV x {1.2}. t/ien y := J(y,i +y,v),, v i* «» <«//IM<WHIH/or
N and t/ir /tneahty «/ t/ic uti/tty /uncttons causes y to 6c a dewatton to z in (Ac <conofny
E, contradtcttno J 6 C(E).
Tne neit step is to see t/iat pr'(S) = N. Ot/ierwise oniy aarnM o/ tAe same type can
trade twtA eacA otAer, ui/iir/i twi// not oiwe t/iem tAe possiitii^y to deflate. 5o S ^ /V x {1,2}
andpr,(5) = N.
>ts 5 ^ N x {1,2} tAe inittoi endotwnent o/ tAe roa/ition S satM/ip« «(S) < (5,4,4).
Assume /or t/ip moment tAat tAere ore two agents o/ type 3 in tAe roo/ttion 5. TAen
U3(i/(3,i)) + U3({/(3.2)) > 30 + 30 = 60 and, as tAr utt/tty /unction u.) is /m«jr and monotone,
«3(j/(3.i)) + «:t(Wci.2)) = W3(W(:t.i) + W(3.2)) < «:i(''(5)) < u.-,(5,4, 4) = 58, a contmdiftion.
Wence, twt/tout /oss o/genera/tty 5 C IVx {1,2}-{{3,2)}. TAis imp/te«e(S) < (5,3,3). Z^y
stmtZar arguments one can now continue to sAow tAat SCWx {1,2}-{(1,2), (2,2), (3,2)},
wAicA togetAer witA pr,(5) = A/ tmp/tes tAat 5 = {(1,1), (2,1), (3,1)}.
77ie /ina/ step is now to sAow tAat tAere is no a//o«j<ion j/ = (s/u.i), V(2,i).I/(.I,D) /"r tAe
cooittion S = {(1,1),(2,1). (3,1)} wAtcA is a demotion, i.e. tAat satis/ies M|(J/(I.D) > 20,
"i(y(2.i)) > 2 and UI(U(3,D) > 30. 7"Ae pro6/em o/ /indtng sucA an a//<«/i<ion y fan 6e
rewritten in tAe /o//oiwng way. 77«e avocation y satisA'es
/n/ormationa//easiftt/ity reouirc.s tAat in = Z12, ^21 = ^23 and 232 =
requires tAat ^31 = —2u — 221, 232 = —212 ~ ^22 <"*<^ ^13 = —223 — *:
obtains
C"om6inmg tAis one
1+221 *22 1 + 221
1 — 2| I — 221 1 — 2)1 — 222 1 — 2j| — 2j240 CHAPTER 3. COA/PETJTJVE EQWL/BRJUAJ AND THE CORE
5o tAe rewritten proitem is to/ind (211,221,222) sueA tAat y = y(^ii7 221,^22) > 0, y(5) =
e(S) = (3,2,2) and
«, : =u,(i/(,,,)) = 2+122,, -1022, + 10*22 > 20,
«2 : = My<2.!)) = 2 + 2z2i + IOZ22 > 2, ,
.l)) = 12 - 122,1 - 10221 - 2222 > 30.
TAe ta«( tAree inegua/ittes correspond to so/vtnp tAe /tnear equation system
to Ui > 18, U2 > 0 and S3 > 18. Now so/vino tAts system fcads to
42i — 5S2 — 5uj
*" * ^ 108^ ^
—5Si + 4tt2 — 5C3
108
10«2 +
** " 108 •
imp/irs t/ia< 1 + J^i > 0 <* S2 > ^itMj-108
-'"* > iffl^JB = 18, so 5-, > 18. //enre, y,,,,,., = 222 = *
2W = 2 = *"2(5), a contmdirtion, since no aarnt can Aawe more 0/ a commodity tAan tAe
r»mi;>//'tr rndotfmrnt. 5o tAerr «s no demotion y /or tne coa/itton 5. TAis conr/udes tne
Porttinntrly, what is really needed for the compactness argument is not equal treatment
in all core allocations, but, that there is at least one core allocation J € C(E"), in which
iigonUs are treated equally. This can be guaranteed under the conditions of the following
theorem.
Theorem 22 /,*•/ E 6e an rrcnan<;p economy witA asymmetric in/ormatton and trade
bounded cornmuntcatton system. Assume tAat e, € n^3Sjt ^ <"*^ "< ^ ^J?" /or ai/1 € N.
Tnrn tArrr' ».v an J- € C(E"), n € N. in MI/IICA aoents 0/tAe same type receiw tAe same
romrn<xitty bund/c.
lnsiciul of proving this theorem directly, we prove Lemma 23 for concave utilities, and
explain how to obtain Theorem 22 from this lemma Since this Ls a standard argument, it
is not nivon in detail. The lemma shows, that in the special case of Theorem 22 where the
utility functions are concave and normalized such that u,(0) = 0. even a stronger result
110I1 Is, namely that the mean allocation J" of any core allocation x is also in the core.3.4. EQUAL TREATAfEXT ; >i 41
Lemma 23 Let E be an exWumpe economy witn asymmetnr in/ormatton and trade bounded
communication system. Assume t/iat r, € Hsji -^7* "rid u, € l/^JJ /or aif i € Af. Then x €
C(E"), n € N, impJies tnat x" is aiso in C(E"). & *
&'•' The proof of the lemma relies on some other observations.
Lemma 24 Let E be an ejr/ian^f economy tiitA asymmrrnV- tn/ormnrion and <m<if bounded
communication system. Assume fW u, € f/^. /or a// t € A'. For any oAjnynrnrnf o/
commodities x : fl —» R"** to tne asrnts 1,.... n, n > 2, o/ a yiwn type i € .V. <im/ any
S C {1,..., n}, |S| > 2, tnerc is an / e S suc/i (na/
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
for all / € S. Then quasi-concavity yields
But theoperiind on the left hand side, ™ 5Z/g^- j^rry X)jeS;»«-''j' actually equals the operand
of the right hand side, 4; $3j£<> Xj, * contradiction. •
This lemma allows to order (xi,..., X,,) in a specific way.
Lemma 25 Le< E 6e an exr/ianje economy unt/i asymmetric tn/orrnation anri /rwdr bouru/<'d
communication system. Assume <Aat u, € t/^. /or ai/ i 6 ^V. For any asstonmrnt o/
commodities x : fl —» R""* to tne aaents 1 n, n > 2, o/ a 0it;en type i € N, tnere is a
permutation »r o/(l, n) suc/i tnat /on" := (x»(i),..., x»(n)) tt /w/ds tAat
/or a// m = 1,..., n — 1.
Proof. ;r can be constructed inductively. Apply Lemma 24 to42 CHAPTER 3. C0MPETJT7VE EQUJL/BR/l/M AATD THE CORE
and let ?r( 1) = i. When jr(l),..., TT(J) are constructed for some 2 < j < n, apply Lemma
24 to — i-Ui.-.• -•>..• . ^-=- : w
and let 7r(j + 1) = /. When finally j = n, let TT(TI) be the last remaining element in
Note that the ?r(j), 1 < j < n, obtained in this way are distinct so that the process really
ends with |{1,... ,n} \{T(1), .. . ,»r(n - 1)}| = 1 and ?r is a permutation of (1,.. .,n). The
desired property holds by the construction via Lemma 24. • >•
Now the proof of Lemma 23 can be given.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that i" is not in C(E"). So there is a subcoalition 5 of
the grand coalition TV x {1,... ,n} and an allocation j/*' for that coalition, such that
«i(l/(lj)) > ".(2?.j)) ^ all (t, j) in S. „, ,<j
Using concavity one obtains therefore for
tlial
It in easily seen, that jf" is also physically and informational feasible for the coalition 5.
As T^j, = !£ jj for all it ^ j one can without loss of generality assume that pr,(5) =
{/, n}, 1 < /, < n, i € /V. Furthermore, J € C'(E") implies that for any collection of
permutations (jr,),,^ of (1 n) (x,"'),£^ := (^(i.»,u)))ij is also in C(E"). Additionally
permutations do not change the mean 3^j), so it can be assumed by Lemma 25 that
1 "
^Tf
Hoiur, altogether this yields£•*. EQUAL TREATA/EJVT \ vs fi ;>vu 43
Concavity and Uj(O) = 0 imply that \ r :f
u^(Ax) = u*(Az + (1 - A)0) > Au,(x) + (1 - A)u<(0) = Au*(x) (3.2)
for all A € [0,1]. Equation 3.1 is equivalent to
)) ^ «*(*«J)) for any j € pr,(S),
as Ui > 0 on R*"" (u^ € t^). Note that u,(yj^) > 0, so one can define
and using equation 3.2 one has




Hence, letting for all t € pr'(^)
j€pr.(S) j€pr,(S) j€pr,(.«f)
one has that y[ > 0 and yf € X;""'. Let
The proof is finished, if it can be shown that j/* is an allocation for 5, because then, as
frj)) > u,(x,,j>) for all (i, j) in 5,44 CHAPTER 3. COMPETJTJVE EQl/JL/BRJl/M AJVD THE CORE
y* is a deviation to x. contradicting x € C(E"). y* is an allocation for 5. if it is informa-
tional and physically feasible. Informational feasibility and j/* > 0 follows from
> o.
The remainiiig purt of physical feasibility follows from
To prow Theorem 22 from Lemma 23, use Hildenbrand (1988). p.58. Proposition A.2,
to approximate u € I/™" by a sequence of (tij)^eN such that u^ € (/^J, for all j 6 N.
Then use upper hemirontinuity of the core, viewed as a compact-valued correspondence
from (.V. $].<•. (Pf),t.s-..sc\) x (*/£'")* to R^'»*»». i.e. when the utility functioiLS are vari-
ables with domain t/^". Any sequence of elements from the cores of the approximating
economies yields a sequence satisfying equal treatment by Lemma 23, and thus by upper
hemicontinuity a core element of the quasi-concave economy.
3.5 Existence of competitive allocations
As a consequence of Theorem 12 oue obtains in combination with Theorem 17 an existence
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Theorem 26 Let E 6e on fjr/ion<jf economy «tt/» asymmetric in/ornidtton «w<i
6ounaW rommunicotion system. Asstime tAa< r, € f|.s=., -V <"»<* "> € l'£!" n
/or al/» 6 Af. 77ien tAis rronomy Aas a rompehtit'e 9u<fe-i-rautJi6num (p,x). Moreover tAe
price system p con 6e cAosen 0"(Uie v 'P,*)-measuro6/e.
Proof. By Theorem 12 C(E") / 0 for all n € N. By Theorem 17 it sumo* to show
that the set of all x € R****» such that x" € C(E") for all n € N is not empty. To see
this, let !„ € C(E") be a sequence of core elements from the replica economies E", » € N.
By Theorem 22 it can l>c assumed that agents of the same tyj>o ar<> treated equally, i.e.
Xn = (j/n)" for all n € N and allocatious {/„ in the economy E. FiirtlnM-morc. j/,, 6 C"(E)
for all n 6 N, because any deviation to y,, in the economy E would al*o In ,i deviation to
(y,,)" in the economy E". As C(E) is compact, there Ls a convergent sul>w<«|uence (y,,Ji,
rik —» oo, of (yn)n- Let y bo the limit of this subsequence. If it is shown that y" e C(E")
for all n € N the proof is finished. Assume to the contrary that y" is not in C'(E") for some
n€N.
So there is coalition 5 C TV x {1,... ,n} and an allocation J*" for that coalition such
that
! ,r,,s: «W)(*W>) > «(M)(V(ij)) ^ •" (»• J) 6 5. , , ^
As |S| < oo, there is an f > 0 such that •' * '
On the other hand. usiiiK continuity of utilities and y,,, —» y, there is a Mi. Htic-h that for all
But then, as
> e + (-e) > 0 for all (i, j) € S. .., ,„,.
Hence, x* is also an allocation for 5 in the economies E"*, A: > A<>, n* > n, such that
««j>(*W)) > «(M)((W(M)O ^ all (i, j) € S.
However, this contradicts (y,,J"* € C(E"»). • : i A;,<r?*}
Next situations are identified, where inf pX,*'-' < pe, is true for all i € A^, so that
Theorem 26 turns into an existence result for the competitive equilibrium. As inf pX,,
must be equal to 0 for strictly increasing utilities, it is the same to identify when every
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Let the tn/ormation matrix I(S) of a coalition 5 be the matrix in {0.1} *"•** ', where
the entry I(5)^^j is equal to lU(w), i.e.
This matrix maps '{ w>;.-. ^ :" .-'•; ' .- .• ' •; '-. '• ' '•• u ;;t?8v«^ •'< .'I>XYT*I
A% := {x € R**" 11 is ff(Uj,=,vP,)-measurable and x,, > 0 for all A € U.g
to R*"^"'''in the following way. Let .;;.,
The 8et of all elements in A+ mapped to the zero matrix in R**u,e,vP. jg
A'(I(5)) := {x € X+ | il(5) = 0}.
Lonuiin 27 Lf< E V an exrnani/e economj/ un</i asymmetn'r in/ormat»on. Assume
c, e A,^, r, / 0, £,f.tfP, > 0, nnrf u, € f/'"" /or o// t € TV. EarA o/ ft/ <o ftwj ts a
«u^irien( ronrfi<»on /or et;erj/ a^rnt <o /jot)f positive income m a guasi-egut/iftrium (x,p) o/
iai economy, u//iere p u ffdJ^^P^
ft) 77>e romrnuntratton system w .symmetrir /or </»e grand roa/thon. i. e. P,^ = P^ /or
a//1 € N.
f«ij pr, > 0 /or jiome ajen< i € N, and a// ot/ier a<?enis /lave positive intttai endowments.
^ssa^ A'(I(5)) = {0} /or somr rrxi/i^ion 5, and o// agents nave positive initial endowments.
ftv,/ A'(I(5)) = {0} /or some coa/ition S, a// agents in S nave positive tmhai endowments,
and this c<x«/ifion Jtnoui.s ro//ertive/y more tnan tAe agents in Af \ 5, i.e.
Proof. IAH (X, p) be a quasi-oquilibrium of the economy E.
(i): In such a communication system the set of all ff((Jie\ Pi)-nieasurable price systems
p / 0 such that p(.4) > I) for all .4 € P, is equal to the set A',*'"" \ {0} for any « € AT.
So, as £2,t\rt > 0, at least one agent t has positive income. But then p(A) > 0 for all
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(ii): As pe, > 0 leads to p{A) > 0 for all /I e P,, it can bo concluded that />(U) > 0.
But then, as e^ is o"(Pj^ )-measurable and p(.4) > 0 for any A € Pj*, j ^ »,
r>
"'--""' *' '" = p(fl) min e>(i4)
Vi
hence any agent has positive income. '• ' "" *•*"' '"• ' ' '
(iii): I show that A'(I(S)) = {0} implies that one agent In 5 has positive income then
(ii) can be used. So suppose to the contrary, that
pe, = ^ p(A)e,(A) = 0 for all i 6 S.
Then, as p(i4) > 0 and e,(A) > 0 for all .4 € Ujg/yPj, one obtains that
p(/l)e,(A) = 0 for all /4 € U^sPj.
As e,(/l) > 0 for all A e U,e.s£\ this leads to
p(>l) = 0 for all A € U.gsP,,
or, because p(>4) > 0 for all A € U^yvP, and p is a(U,eArPj)-mea«urable,
p6A'(I(5)) = {0}.
This contradicts p / 0.
(iv): As in (iii), one agent in 5 must have positive income. But then p(H) > 0, HO
all agents in 5 have positive income, showing that p(.4) > 0 for all /I € U,,.sP,. AH
U.E.SPI 2 Uig,v\.s-P, and e, > 0, e, / 0 for all i e N \ S, this means that the agents in JV \ S
also have positive income. •
Note that the situations described in (i), (iii) and (iv) are independent of the given
quasi-equilibrium (ar,p). So the following corollary to Theorem 26 can be stated.
Corollary 28 iX E (f an eic/ianpe economy wi</j asymmetric tn/ormaiion an<i
founded communication system. Assume <Aa< e, € Qs-^i -*? ""^ "• ^ ^^" ^ C(R**")
/or a// i e ./V. Let the assumption.? and one o/ t/ie situations ^, ^i'*x^ or ^it/^ ptv^n in
Lemma 27 /JOW. Then this economy has a rompefitive e^ui/iftrium, and any competitive
is a/ready a competitive e^ui/ifrrium.48 CHAPTER 3. COMPE7777VE EQl/IL/BRTl/Af AND THE CORE
' As stated after Definition 14, this corollary is able to cover existence of a Radner
equilibrium without free disposal. Other existence results are contained in Einy et al.
(2001), for the case of a non-atomic measure space of agents, and Radner (1968. 1982),
for the case of a finite number of agents. All of these papers assume some degree of
disposability, in Einy et al. (2001) and Radner (1982) free disposal, and in Radner (1968)
production sets have a nonempty relative interior, which translates into disposability of at
least part of the endowments in a pure exchange economy. It is known that if one wants to
dispense with free disposal one has to allow for negative prices. An example of an economy
without free disposal such that equilibrium prices are negative can be found in Liu (1992).
The prices as defined here are consequent ly also allowed to be negative. Nevertheless, in
equilibrium all prices* seen by agents will have to be positive, so that nobody can exploit
the existence of negative prices. In contrast to the machinery of proof used in this chapter
the mentioned existence results are not obtained by appealing to a limit theorem for the
core. Moreover. Radnor has to assume concavity of state-dependent utility in order to
achieve concavity of expected utility. This corresponds to concavity of the utility functions
Uj : R**" —» R used here. No such assumptions are necessary in Einy et al. (2001), as they
arc dealing with a non-atomic measure space of agents.Part II
Partially defined games
49ITS '•••«tirft3 * he !i>.i--hssi-~i \Chapter 4 «
The expected Shapley value
A method to allocate the benefits to the players of a cooperative game is the Slmpley value.
Its computation demands the knowledge of all coalition worths with certainty. This chapter
introduces the expected Shapley value, an extension of the Shapley value to games where
not all the worths are known with certainty- The expected Shapley value is clmracii-n/rd
with adapted versions of Young's (1985) and Shapley's (1953) properties. It is shown
how representation with unanimity games, dividend nnd potential generalize when not all
worths are known with certainty. We relate the expected Shapley value to the reduced and
the normalized Shapley value introduced by Willson (1993) and Housman (2001) for games
where some coalition worths are not known.'
4.1 Introduction
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is a method to allocate benefits to the players of a
cooperative game. However, the Shapley value requires a large amount, of information,
since it takes into account the worth of any coalition. As the number of coalitions glows
exponentially with the number of players, one might want to consider cooperative gamra
where only a part of these worths are known. Such games are called partially defined
games, and the coalitions whose worths are known in that game are collected in a coalition
list, which is a subset of the set of all coalitions.
Willson (1993) and Housman (2001) characterized extensions of the Shapley value to
partially defined games with symmetric coalition lists: 6-weighted Shapley value, reduced
Shapley value and normalized Shapley value. These extensions are base/I on extensions of
axioms of efficiency, anonymity, linearity and dummy-player. The original axioms charac-
terize the Shapley value for cooperative games. Housman (2001), however, obtains several
impossibility results, in terms of coalition lists admitting such extensions of the Shapley
value. These impossibilities suggest that the axioms used axe too strong, which is made
'The author thanks particularly Hans Peters and Ton Storcken for helpful (mggefttionii. The remilU in
this chapter were first formulated in Maim (2003).
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more explicit by an example in Section 4.2. In particular linearity is too strong, as stated
already in the conclusion of Housman (2001). The reason is that any extension of the sum
of two games can arise in multiple ways from extensions of the two original games, but for
some extensions of the sum there are more such ways than for others.
The path we take in this chapter differs somewhat from that of Willson (1993) and
Housman (2001). We use their concept of a partially defined cooperative game with coali-
tion list. Additionally we assume that players have a belief on the underlying cooperative
games, where all worths are known. This belief could arise from players who believe that
they arf playing a game of a certain type, for example a superadditive game, and consider
any underlying superadditive extension a pnon equally likely These beliefs in turn allow
us to characterize the expected Shapley value. This value of a partially defined cooperative
game can be argued to arise in the following way. First, given the belief of the players,
compute the Shapley value of any of the games that could be the underlying cooperative
game. Integrate these values with respect to the probability distribution given by the belief
of the players. The resulting value is the expected Shapley value. The expected Shapley
value encompasses the reduced and normalized Shapley value as special cases, i.e. for a
certain type of belief. The approach used here also allows for any coalition list, possibly
asymmetric, containing the empty coalition. The price we have to pay for the expected
Shnpley value is, that, compared to the reduced Shapley value and normalized Shapley
value, more information is required since l>diefs about the underlying games are needed.
But this is still a weaker requirement than knowing all worths with certainty. A common
assumption in practise might be to take uniform distributions over games with standard
properties, such its convexity, supcradditivity or monotonicity.
In the next section the relevant definitions are given and an example of a nonlinear
solution is discussed. Section 4.3 contains a characterization of the expected Shapley value
with a standard set of pro|>erties a /a Young (1985), of which actually only monotonicity
has to be ndupted to take into account beliefs. After that Section 4.4 explores a weaker
form of linearity, which is used in another characterization of the expected Shapley value,
this time with a standard set of properties a /a Shapley (1953). Then Section 4.5 explains
how games with beliefs can be represented by unanimity games, and how the concepts of
dividend and potential extend. In Section 4.6 we show how to obtain the reduced and the
uoniuvli/ed Shapley value as expected Shapley values. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes the
chapter.
4.2 Partially defined cooperative games
Throughout, when vectors are compared, this is done coordinatewise.
A set of piuj/rrs .V is a finite nonempty subset of the natural numbers N. A subset 5 of
/V is called a coalition, and we write |5| for the number of players in the coalitions. Next
we introduce the class of partially defined cooperative games. Let .M C 2\0 € A1 be a4.2. PARTMLLV DEF/.YED CXX^PER-ATAT C.AMES S3
subset of coalitions, then -M is called a oooitbon /ulm N. A pair (N,v) consisting of a
function t- : .M —• R such that t'(9) = 0 and a player set JV is called a /xirtioi/y dr-yinflrf
f jam? with coalition list Af. We will also call it an X-pomr. Wo call r(5) the
of coalition 5 if 5 is in AC. If S is not in A< then the interpretation is that the worth
of this coalition is
not known. It might lie that worths are costly to tit•loimnu-. for example. A cxmlition
list A( is symnwrric. if for any S € X, any coalition of tin- ».wn. < .mlinality is also in
Al. It is easily seen that if Af is symmetric, then then- i- -i M-I of Jtuuuni ruaiiftofi «i;r*
A' C {0,.... |Af|} such that ,.,
A! = A<(A0 := {S C AT | |S| = it for some Jt € *}.
If there is no confusion the Af-game (W, t>) is referred to by v. Note that it is not iteOMttp
to define a partially defined cooperative game as a triple (N, AO), ainoe A< - <fc»»(«') is
given by the domain of i;.*
The set of all partially defined gaiiifs with player wt .V is denoted by PG^. So
{t-:A^-»R|A1i8a coalition list in player set N, t'(0) =0}.
A eooperaiiw pame with player set iV is a partially defined cooperative game (N,w).
where u- has domain .M = 2^. Since then all coalition worths are known we will also
refer to cooperative games as ./«% <fr/inr<f games The set of all cooperative games with
player set ]V is denoted by G*. A tWtw ,so/«t«on on G^' is a function / : G* -« R'^. The
number /,(«;) is interpreted as the share of player i in the game u> € C*. The Shapley
value S/i: G" -* R* for a cooperative game «> e G" is definetl by
for all i € Af. In this chapter we aim to extend to Shapley value on G* to partially defined
cooperative games. The set G* of fully defined games with player set TV is a wilwct of
PG*. The set of all fully defined games is given by
G := |J{G" | 0 / TV C N, |AT| < oo}.
Likewise, the set of all partially defined games is given by
| 0 / JV C N, |TVj < <x-}.
Again, G is a subset of PG.
Let (N. v) be a partially defined cooperative game with coalition list At. Any fully
defined game w € G* satisfying U;|,M = i; is called an «z<fn.iton of u.
'Any function is also a relation, nvC2'"xl and the domain of v is given by the projection on the
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:r Some important mibspaces of the set of all fully defined games are the monotonic (fames
'*' . , A/0* := {u> € G* | u;(5) < u/(T) for all 5, T e 2* with 5 C T}.
the
and the convex pome* *^-
CO* := {w€G"| u>(S) + w(r) < w(5 UT) + w(5 n T) for all 5, T € 2*}.
We proceed with an example, where players believe that each game from a certain set
of extensions to fully defined games has equal probability to be the underlying game. This
given rise to a nonlinear solution to the allocation problem. Thus the example shows that
linearity cannot be adapted in a straightforward fashion. The reason is that when two
games are added, any extension of the sum of these games can be expressed as a sum of
extensions of the two gamre> added, but some extensions are 'more likely' than others to
arise in this way.
Example 29 V7»m' «rt- J/mr p/aypr* /V = {1,2,3}. 77ie coairtton /ist is
M = {0,{1},{2},{3},{1,2},JV}.
5o on/j/ </»«• wortA.i o/ <Ar roa/i<tons {1,3} and {2,3} arp unJtnoum. LF< t»
«({1.2» = 0.
orr p/rtt/»np a conrei jarac 77»e constraints /or
pj:<pfwion« «> dprtvprf /rom <AP convexity conditions ore
«>({l,3})>0 ond«t({2,3})>0.
Wenre, the set o/ convex extensions o/ r con 6e idpnti^ed untA t/»p set
W:={(x,y)|x,y >0 andx + y< 1}.
Let P 6P ar» yVf -(/(tmc twAicA Pi/uaZs r except /or r({l,2}) = j. 77»en /or any convex extension
ir «>«• /idtr t/iaf 0 < (r({l,3}) < j and 0 < u"({2,3}) < j. TA«s set o/ extensions con 6c
id<-riti/ifd untA tAr set
V? := [0,1]».4.2. PARTIALLY DEFINED COOPERATIVE GAMES 55
TAe p/ayers consider ear A </amr e?ua//y /t£e/y so tAey mioAt aoree to nompute tAe ejrperted
: E,. and E,-. under tAe uni/orm <ius<ri6ution on H' and H', respeetiw/y. and distribute
7 to tAe SAap/ey vaiue o/ tAese expected aarnes. Let A' be tAe two-dimeristonai
measure onRl As tAe area o/W is J, tAe deruity / o/ tAe uni/orm </i,\7n6ution
F on If twtA respect to A* is atven by
For symmetry reasons tue Aat'e E,.({1,3}) = E,.({2.3}). We obtain, using tAe rfrnsity /
and standard inteoration ter/iniaues,
_ 1 • . • i,I
3"
For Ef. we Aave o6tnou.s/j/ E,,({1,3}) = E,-.({2,3}) = j. On tAe set o/Jbnoum roafittoru A1
tAe expected aames eatia/ tAe ;wrttn//t/ de/ined oames. /t i.s fd>i; ^ii sn t//dt tA»' .sr7 o/ conj/ei
extensions o/ tAe sum o/ tAe Moo aarnes r + ? is tAe s»7 H • II /'MHJ; tAat tAe arra o/




7%e SAap/ey va/ues o/ tAe oames E,,, E,-, and E,,+p are
5A(E,) = (|,|,J) and
&, SA(E,,) + SA(E,-,) = (g, fi, |)
We extend the model in such a way that players have a belief about the likelihoods of
the underlying fully defined games. First of all we need to formalize the concept of a belief
in this context. Let AT be the set of players. The set (7* of fully defined gameo with player
set iV is isomorphic to R*"\(*>. Let .4 be the Lebesgue-Borel rr-iilgebra on R''' '*'. This
turns G* into a measurable space (G^,>1). The 6e/ts/ of the players can be expressed an a
probability measure P over (G",.4). It is reasonable to restrict attention to those beliefs,
of which the support
Supp(P) := {«.' € G" I P(A) > 0 for each open A 3 «;}56 CHAPTER 4. THE EXPECTED SHAPLEY VALUE
contains only extensions of the game v. Furthermore, we assume that any coalition is
expected to have a finite worth. For any .M-game t; let II" be the set of all such probability
measures P over (G*,-4), i.e. that satisfy • , e
... >.,. ,.v a
Supp(P) C{i»eG"| u/U, = v} ^
and
-oo </ u/(S) dP(w) < oo for all S C JV.
/
We arc now ready to define the set of all partially defined cooperative games untA 6e/te/s
and player net A/ by
" := {(t>, P) 11> € PG" and P € IT}.
Let v be a fully defined game and for all A 6 .4 let
,.(A) = { ' " " * *
1 0 otherwise.
Then tf,, in the probability measure assigning probability 1 to the game r itself. Such
measures are called Dtrar measures. Note that IT' = {rf,,} for any fully define<l game. This
embeds G* into PGB* by identifying IIJ with (if, £„,) for any fully denned cooperative
game (in /V. Let
/Y,7J :--- |J{PGB^ | 0 / ^ C N, |N| < oo}
bf the set of nil partially defined cooperative games with beliefs. A calue .so/ulion / for
partially denned cooperative games with beliefs is a function
/: PGB* -R\
4.3 Extending the Shapley value: The expected Shap-
ley value
Next wo present an extension of the Shapley value for fully defined games to partially
defined games with beliefs. Young (1985) characterizes the Shapley value for fully defined
games with efficiency, anonymity and strong monotonicity. We adapt these axioms to
partially defined games with beliefs, and show that these adapted axioms give rise to a
unique extension of the Shapley value to these games. As pointed out in Example 29,
linearity, especially lulditivity, may lx> troublesome to use in a characterization of such an
extension of the Shapley value. An adaptation of linearity is discussed later on in Section
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Let / : PGB^ —• R* be a value solution. We rail / rrper/ohonaHy «-jf/irit^i( if it does
not distribute more than what the grantl coalitioit A' will get in expectation, i.e.
for any game (t>, P") in PCBV If the worth of the grand coalition is not known, thon
rr-posf. i.e. when a fully defined game «? has been drawn from the carrier of P*, ex-post
efficiency
can be violated. Players could insure against this with a risk-neutral insurer who also
beliefs that the true game is drawn from P*'. It might also be that the game is played
repeatedly and all realizations are independent . Then excesses and shortfalls of (he worth
of the grand coalition will cancel out in the long run. Then zero cost for insurance and
equal interest rates to finance shortfalls and invest excesses have to 1K< assumed.
If ^V 6 JM only extensions u- where ti'(JV) = t>(/V) are in the carrier of the measure P",
and the integral on the right hand side equals t'(N). So in that cane expectations I etlieiency
reduces to the equation
•e.v
So we will haw ex-post efficiency in that case.
It turns out that all we need for our characterization is rj^irirnry /or/«//(/ <ir/mc<i (
i.e.
for all i' G PBG* with coalition list .M = 2'\ Hence, accepting efficiency for fully dclinexl
games along with the other axioms used, implies acceptance of ex)>ectatioiial efficiency.
Let T : JV —» TV be a permutation of the player set N. For any fully defined game
u» € G* the permu<«/ game o/ w, u;' is the fully defined game given by
uTfS) := UT(T'(5)) for all 5 C N,
where
r-'(5):={r-'(i)|«eS}.
Let i4 € A then the permuted se< .4' is given by
For the pprmuiai <T-ai0e6nr» >f := {i4^ | >4 € >*} we obviously have .4' = ^4. So, if P is
a probability measure on (G\.4) we can define the prrniu/rrf prwfcafei/jty mffMiirr' P' on
(G-\>t)by
"') for all >4 € A58 CHAPTER 4. THE EXPECTED SHAPLEY VALf/E
Furthermore, we can also permute partially defined cooperative games, but then the coali-
tion lint has to be permuted also. So for any coalition list A4, let A^ be the permuted
eoa/tfton /wt given by
AT := {T(S) I S e AC}.
If Al is a symmetric coalition list, then AT = «M, and the set of known coalition sizes K"
will not change Let w € PC^ be a partially defined cooperative game with coalition list
A(, then the prrm«<r</ ^ame u' of t; is the AT-game given by
t/(S) := t/(r '(5)) for all 5 € AT.
Finally, for any game (t/, P*') 6 PGB*, we call (tT, (P")*) the permuted game of (t;, P")
under r. Obviously, wo have (t»',(P"n € PGB^.
We call the value solution / : PGC^ —• R^ anonymous if
for liny permutation r of the player sot and all (r, P") 6 PCZ?*. Wo call / anonymous
/(>/• /u//y (ic/iricJ yamcs if we only demand this property to hold for fully defined games.
Note that |IT'| = |{<S,,}| = 1 for all such v € G", so /lew does not depend on the belief.
Hence, anonymity for fully defined games is just the usual anonymity condition for a value
solution # : G* -• R'\ i.e. g(u»') = ((/r '(.(("OJieAr for all u> € G* and all permutations r
of the player set N.
In order to define strong monotonicity for Af-games with beliefs we use the man7tnai
rrmtriAutiorM oprrntor A,(w) : 2^ \ {0} —» R of a player «' 6 Af for fully defined games u;
given by
A,(t/0(5) := u-(S U {.}) - w(S), S e 2" \ {0}.
For a game (t», P") G PG/?^. and a player i 6 N, let the (ezpectedj marptna/ rontributt'ons
o;«7Ti/«f A,(i;, P") : 2^ \ {0} —> R be given by
A,(f, P")(S):=
The expected marginal contributions operator extends Aj to partially defined coopera-
tive games with beliefs. Using the (expected) marginal contributions operator for Af-
games with beliefs, wo say that the value solution / is .sfrong/y rnonotonir if for all games
(t>, /"),(P, P') e PGtf* wo haw that if
for an t £ .V. then
The cxprrrrt/ 5/»np/ry I'tt/ur S/i(v, P*') of a partially defined game (t\ P) € PGB^ is the
value solution giwn by
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Given any A-f-game v with belief P' we can define the wqwctod game E» of t> under that
beUef by
f t-(S) for all S€ At •
" 1 /«>' "'(^) <"*"(«') otherwise.
Then the expected Shapley value of (r,P') equals the Shapley value of the fully defined
game E,. This follows by the linearity of the integral and the linearity of the Shapley
value for fully defined games. Furthermore, linearity of the integral and of the marginal
contributions operator for fully defined games imply that A,(t»,P*')(5) = A,(E,)(5). We
haw P' = <5, for all (i\ P') € G* and so for fully defined games w<> obtain r = E,.. Thus
the expected Shapley value equals the Shapley value for fully defined games. Note that we
write SA(t\ P*'), v € PGZ?* for the expected Shapley value, and SA(u'), u> € G* for the
Shapley value.
Theorem 30 if/ / : PGB* —» R* 6r a t>alur so/u/ion t/ia( is r/firirn/ /or /i*//y rfr/inrrf
games, anonymous /or /ui/y df/inprf games, and .ffnong/y monofonir. T/irn / M t/ir rxprrfrrf
S/iap/py t'aiue.
Proof. We use the characterization of Young (1985), who showed that any value solution
for fully defined games satisfying efficiency, anonymity and strong monotonicity is the
Shapley value on G*. So
Let E,, be the expected game of (u,P"), (v,P") € PBG^. This defines a fully defined
game. Let t € TV. As
we obtain by strong monotonicity and equation (•), that
= SMB.).
As noted when defining the expected Shapley value we have by the linearity of the Shapley
value and the linearity of the integral that
•
The expected Shapley value Ls not only efficient for fully defined games, but also expec-
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Lemma 31 7ne expected S'/wpfcy value is expeclatuma//{/ ej^ctent and anonymous.
Proof. Ix-t («, P") € PGJ3\We have S/i,(u, P") = S/i,(E.) for all j € W, and by expecta-
tional efficiency for fully defined games we obtain
ME,.) = E,(AT) =/*«;(AT) dP»(u,). . 'f
For anonymity, note that by anonymity for fully defined games, the substitution rule and
u^ ), we have that
= / aw*-
•'•'
4.4 Linearity of the expected Shapley value
In llii.s set-lion we shall define a weaker form of linearity, and give a characterization of the
expected Shapley value with that weaker form of linearity, dummy player, efficiency and
anonymity. First we note that partially defined games with the same coalition list can be
iul<l(*<l rniilitioiiwiMo. The value solution / : P(7#* —» R* is said to be strwwj/y /inear if
for nil o, J 6 R tuid Af-ginnes i\r we have that
Example 29 showed that the expected Shapley value does not satisfy strong linearity.
However, taking beliefs into account may result in a linearity condition which is satisfied
by the expected Slmpley value. Moreover, we can define an addition operator on PGB*
also for names with different coalition lists.
For any o € R and any partially denned game (r, P") let P°' be the probability measure
defined for A € >t by F" (A) = P(^ A) if a ^ 0, and F"" = <5Q. if Q = 0, where 0 is the
fully defined zero-game, in which all coalitions receive 0. For any two partially defined
games (i>. /"'), (r, /"'). let F ' be the probability measure obtained by ront>o/u<tn</ P' and
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where ^*- *>>-- • • • ••• -••,;•- s ;-.;.••> w h :?,•>.»$> :ii •>&'
fl ifx + y€A, -\ n vt
W' + »>-\0 otherwise. - >
In words, P** (A) is the probability that the sum of two extensions of UwgMMi (v, P*)
and (?, P) respectively is in .4. given that the extensions are inde|x>ndently distributed
according to P and P respectively.
Let (r, P), (v, P) € PGB* and Q € R. The games »> and ? can bo added coalit ionwi.se
where the worths of both games are known, i.e. on the coalition list .M := dom(t>)ndom(w).
We define an addition in PG0* by . ,,»«>,.
(», P) © (t?, P') := ( )
The «ra/«r mM/^p/ira/ton in PCB^ is definwi by '"' '•**'•*
We call a value solution / wraJUy /mrar if
/(a (4) («, P*) 0 0 0 (5, /*)) = Q/(V, P*) + /J/(v, P*),
for all a, d € R and (v, P"), (r, P') € PGB^. So the additional constraint weakening
linearity is on the belief for the game OV|JK + /JP|AI-
Next it is shown that the expected Shapley value satisfies weak linearity.
Theorem 32 77if expected 5/iap/py i»o/ue is u^eaWi/ /meor.
Proof. Let (D, P'), («.-, P" ) € PGB^. The expected Shapley value satisfies
S/i((t>, P") 0 K P")) = / 5/i(x) dP"*"'(x)
- y + ») dP (x - y) rfP»(v)
i - y) + 5A(y)) ^P(x - y) <*P"(
^ft(J) dP(i)) +S/i(y)] dP"(y)
= jf f (jf^ ]63 •-•»•.) .1* CHAPTER-!. THE EXPECTED SHAPLEY VALUE
Let Q € R. We are done if we can show that the expected Shapley value also satisfies
S/I(Q ® (t/, P")) = aS/i(t>, P"). This follows as for a ^ 0 we have
S/i(a ® (r, P")) = / i dP^(i) , j
j
v io "• ' . :; if. i
« '. •. • :.•'•, •• IB
QI </P (x) ' • • • j 1
r
• • . '••!?/
= a / idr(i) •'/
= aS/i(f, P'),
mid for « = 0 wo have
S/i(a ® (t>, P")) = S/i(0, <5Q) = (0 0) = 0S/i(i>,
The expected Shaplcy value can also be characterized with weak linearity. One of the
Htiiiidard axioms that we will need is the null player axiom. Let (r, P") € PGB*. We
call a player ieiVa nui/ p/ayer in (v, P") if the (expected) marginal contributions of that
plnviT arc 0. i.e. if
A.(t>,/"')($) = 0 for all SCAT.
We say thnt the viiluo solution / : P(7/?^ —• R^ satisfies the nuil p/aypr property, if for all
(t\ /"') 6 P6'W^'. and all null players i in the game (i\ P''), we have
/.(»', P')=0.
Theorem 33 /-<7 / : P(7/?^' —» R^ 6e a t>a/«f so/u<ion .mtts/ytnj e^fienry, anonymity,
ts tAe ejywtcd 5ftap/ey vo/ue.
Proof. For fully defined games weak linearity and strong linearity are the same. Shap-
ley (1953) ha>s characterized the Shapley value for fully defined games with efficiency,
anonymity, null player and strong linearity. So
/IG* = S*IG«- H
Let (r. /"') be a partially defined cooperative game with coalition list A4. Let (5E, be the
Dirac measurt^ on the expected giune E,. of (r, P'). The expected game Ej of the game
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satisfies •<->*#
E,(5) =
/ (E,, - y)
= 0
for all 5 € 2\ As A,(v, P) = A,(E.) thus shows that all players in (J, P') are null playonu
Hence,
/(=,P') = (0 0).
As (r. P*) was defined to be
this implies by weak linearity that
As (E,.,<JE.) can be identified with the fully denned game E,. € G* we have proved using
(*) that
Again, S/I(E,,,($E,.) equals the expected Shapley value 6'/i(«>, P"). •
The proof uses efficiency and anonymity only on fully defined games. Weak linearity can
be weakened to weak additivity, just as in the corresponding theorem of Shapley (1953).
4.5 Representation, Dividends and Potential
Some important results for fully defined games concern representation by unanimity games,
dividend and potential. This section will show how to extend these results to partially
defined cooperative games with beliefs.
First we look at the representation by unanimity games. For nonempty sulwetH T of ,/V
the T-unammify game is a fully defined game, say u-r, defined by
1 if T C S,
0 otherwise.
For any fully defined game u> we have the representationM CHAPTERS THE EXPECTED SHAPLEY VALl/E
where - •• - • -• ••.••••••..••• •:-- - ^ •--••• ••• &
' --:'•• S:SCT 5
The set {ur | T € 2* \ {0}} is linearly independent, so it forms a basis for the set of fully
defined games. The question arises whether a representation with unanimity games is also
possible for partially defined games with beliefs.
Let C : G* —» R2"\W be the mapping given by C(u;) = (er)re2«M»). whenever
j« = JZ^-gj/vw(i Cr«T- Then C Ls bijective and measurable as a mapping from (G*,.4)
to (R*"^*',.4). Let (v, P") be a partially defined cooperative game with beliefs. The prob-
ability measure P*' on (R^*^*',.4) given by P*' := P"oC"', represents P' in the following
sense:
P"(/l) = (roC-'
= P^'(C(,4)) for all /I e A
So, l>eliefs about the underlying fully defined game can also be seen as beliefs about
possible representations of these underlying games by unanimity games.
Next we want to extend the concept of a dividend to partially defined cooperative games
with beliefs. I,et w> be a fully defined game. For each coalition T, Harsanyi (1959) defined
a real number (iy, the Jiw<i<7«i, in a recursive manner as follows.
j 0 if T = 0.
''*"•'* "" \ |T|-' ((T) E
) = c-/ for all T / 0 and S/i,(u>) = Er.eT^(w), i.e. the
Slmpley value of a player is the sum of all dividends of coalitions to which the player
belongs.
TukiuK, into luroimt the beliefs of the players about the underlying games, will turn
dividends into random variables, with a probability measure depending on the beliefs of
the players. Let (i;, P") be a partially defined cooperative game. Let C : G^ —» R^W and
P*' be as denned alwve. Let D : G* -» R'^\'*> 1H^ the mapping given by D(u') = (dr(«'))r-
Then /> is bijtvtive iu«l measurable as a mapping from (G\,4) to (R^ ^'**,<4). Defining
P" as the probability measure on (R*"^*',^4) such that P" := P*'o£)"' gives the desired
analogy for the random dtfide-nd D : (G^M) — (R'^<*>,.4) distributed according to P".
As tlu^ reader can verify using the corresj)onding facts for fully defined games we have
1. the mapping F : R^<*> -* R»"^»> giwn by F(rf) := (|T|</r)r€R'^<») » *>ijective
and niriusurable as a mapping from (R*' ^*',^4) to (R*' ^*'.^).
2. F(D) = C. i.e. P"(M) = P^"(F(.4)) for any M € A5. REPRE5EJVTA77OiV. DA7DENDS AND POTE.VTJAL
where the measure P^ on R is the image of the measure P" undor the projection
on the coordinate (coalition) 7\ i.e.
P^(B) = P"({x e R* I arr e B})
for all Ijebesgue-Borel measurable sets B C R. ^
The last extension concerns the potential of a game. A po<rr»<i>W (Hart and Mas-Colell,
1989) is a real valued function Q : G —» R such that ^,,
= 0
for all w € G". (0-«"5ir
Here Ag(^V,«;) = Q(N,u>) - Q(N \ {t}.«'j/v\{,})- If (? is a potential then the ynuftent
V, u;) := (D,Q(N,w))icjv is an efficient payoff vector for the game. By Q-officiency
i^| ^ \ {«}-
So the potential of w e C»^ can be determined by the potentials of the mihKiimcs. By
Q(0, w) = 0 it is therefore uniquely defined. The potential is connected to the dividends
and the Shapley value of fully defined games in the following way (Hart and Mas-Colell,
1989):
Let (r, P") be a partially defined cooperative game with player set ,/V and coalition list .M.
The rcstrirtton of u> to the player set A^ C /V is the partially defined cooperative game
(r|^, P"l^) with player set A^, coalition list Al = .A4 n 2^ and belief given by
for all A in the Lebesgue-Borel cr-algebra on R^ ^*'. A potential on the set of partially
defined cooperative games with beliefs is a real valued function Q : PC/?—• R. The result
for fully defined games can be extender] to hold also for partially defined gamrw wlicn
requiring instead of Q-efficieny
V D.QfA', I;. P*-) = / u>(AT)dP"(u')
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for all partially defined games (v, P") with player set TV. Define D,Q(W,t>, f*'),
0ra<fQ(/V,v, P") just as for fully defined games. The gradient gives us by expectational Q-
efficiency an expectationally efficient payoff vector. Furthermore, the potential is uniquely
defined, extends the potential for fully defined games and can be connected to the expected
Shapley value and expectations of the random dividends for partially defined games in a
similar manner as for fully defined games.
4.6 Reduced and normalized Shapley Value
This section shows how to embed the reduced Shapley value (Willson, 1993) and the nor-
malized Shapley value (Housman, 2001) into our model. Both these values are only defined
for symmetric coalition lists containing the grand coalition, and do not depend on the
belief. So we can restrict attention to
PG := {r € PG* | dom(u) is a symmetric coalition list, N € doro(r)}.
Let n := J7V| be the cardinality of the player set AT The reduced Shapley value of a game
v in PG is given by
te.s
for any player i€ JV, where A' are the known coalition sizes. This can also be written in
terms of marginal (known) contributions. Let
/»(m) := max{Jfc € A' | Jt < m}
bo the largest known coalition size smaller than m € A'. The marginal known contributions
of a player i € N to a coalition 5 9 i, |5| 6 A', are then given by «-(5) - «•(/?) for
any KS- {i}, |/?| = p(|S|). Willson (1993) characterizes the reduced Shapley value
by a strong monotonicity condition based on these marginal contributions, together with
efficiency, strong anonymity and strong linearity. Housman (2001) notes that it can also
be expressed using these marginal contributions as
for any plawr i € N. Willson (1993) and Housman (2001) also note that the reduced
Shnploy value of t' € PG txjuiUs the Shapley value of tin- extension u\ where the unknown
coalition wortlis are set equal to a constant which is allowed to depend on the size. i.e.
«|.M = t> and u-(S) := C|st for all 5 ^ X. where a e R for all Ar € {0,.... n} \ A'. The4.6. REDUCED AiVD XOflAMLJZED SHAPLEV vaLl'E 67
Shapley value will then be independent of the chosen constants, the corresponding terms
cancel out and only the terms forming the reduced Shapley value influence the value. Using
that, we can express the reduced Shapley value as an expected Shapley value.
—- v
Lemma 34 Lei u € PC . Let P* e IT 6e a belte/ Jeaciwi^ to an expected yarnr E,.
j E,(T) . ^
/or o// S, T C JV «irA t/uit |S| = |T| € {0,..., n} \ A'. TOrn S/»(r, P")
Proof. This is just another way of saying that the unknown coalition worths are equal to
a size-dependent constant. • , .;,,„•,.,.,,
It is not hard to find beliefs satisfying this lemma .lust take the Dime measure on
an extension where coalitions of the same size haw the same value if their worths are
unknown. The lemma says that the reduced Shapley value amounts to assuming implicitly
that players believe that extensions, which are constant across unknown wortlis of coalitions
of the same size, give good estimates of the missing values. That this can be problematic wiw
already known to Willson (1993). who notes that usually such extensions will not satisfy
properties such as monotonicity or superadditivity. Housman (2001) gives an example
where the reduced Shapley value of a game is not among the Shapley values of any of its
superadditive extensions. So, if players have such beliefs about the underlying game it
might not be reasonable to use the reduced Shapley value.
Housman (2001) defined the normalized Shapley value for player i € N by '
as an alternative if 1 € /C. If 1 £ A' then the normalized Shapley value is defined to equal
the reduced Shapley value, i.e. the last line of the sum disappears. The following lfrmmft
shows that the normalized Shapley value can also be obtained as an expected Shapley
value, and to which estimates of the missing worths this amounts. It is stated only for
symmetric coalition lists where 1 6 A' (individual worths are known), as the normalized
Shapley value equals the reduced Shapley value for games where 1 £ A".
_ . •.^ AT
Lemma 35 Let t; € PG and suppose t/iat 1 € A'. Let P" € fl" 6c a 6r/if/ /ea</tr»ji to an
eipected oame Ei. satis/ytng
E,(S) =
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Proof. Straightforward but tedious. • *.„.;, ,*.«,(..»?.: .,.,.:-,.-•
»•• Using Dirae measures as beliefs it is not hard to specify beliefs satisfying the lemma.
But again the expected games will usually violate common assumptions players might have.
However, in a sense the lemma reveals that these estimates are a bit more sophisticated.
They take into account at least the individual worths of the players, will in general not
be constant across coalitions of the same size, and grow with coalition size if individual
worths are positive. This method is appropriate for example if players believe they are
playing additive games, and could probably still be used for l>eliefs, which are 'not too
far away' from the belief to play an additive game. However, there is no intuitive reason
why these wortlis should be used in every case. One could imagine many other, even more
sophisticated estimates, e.g.
u>(S) = mai{^ t/(T) | P any partition of S into sets 7\ T €
w(S) = min{^ r(T) | P any partition of S into sets T, Te A1},
or UJ(S) being any weighted average of the sum of coalition worths in such partitions. All
of these can be accommodated as expected Shapley values with respect to specific beliefs.
Whether there are axioms characterizing the corresponding Shapley values on PG in the
spirit of Willson (lfMKl) mid Housinttn (2(K)1), i.e. without beliefs, is an open problem.
As mentioned already, lloiisman (2001) gave an example where the reduced Shapley
value does not equal t he Shapley value of any of the supcradditive extensions of the partially
defined ri>u|iriative game under consideration. It is not hard to imagine that the same
problem arises with the normalized Shapley value. There the extension which is implicitly
assumed In be the expected game might not be superadditive. The expected Shapley value
behaves better in that sense, i.e. it picks a value from the set of values of the extensions,
if one imposes a restriction on the support of the beliefs.
Lemma 36 L< f (r, /"') <x <i pnrita//y dr/mrd cooperative jamf. Suppose /Aai tAf support
o/ P*'w ront»«. 7Vn tAr rrperied SAap/ry wo/ue o/ (t\ P") is egua/ to t/w SAapiey woiuc o/
an fxteruion u> 6 G* o/t>, constdfrrd posstft/r 6y tAe p/oyers, i.e.
SA(t>, P») € {SA(tr) | a- € Supp(P")}.
Proof. As the support i'«pp(P'') of P'' is convex we have Ev- € Supp{P''). Hence,
SA(i-, P") = S/»(E,.) € {5A(u>) | ti- € SuppfP")}. •
This restriction is not unnatural and satisfied in important situations, such as mono-
tonic, supcradditive and convex extensions, or any other set of extensions arising from 1
homogeneous linear inequalities.
//«• > 0. // € R'**"W,J any nonnegative integer,
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4.7 Conclusion
Adding belief to Willson's (1993) and Housman's (2001) definitions on partially defined
cooperative games was shown to evolve into the existence of a natural and unique extension
of the Shapley value to such games. It is defined for any coalition list and anv belief having
finite expectations of coalitional worths. It can be characterized by propcitic> ,m.il.>r,. >u> io
these of Young (1985) or Shapley (1953). Representation with unanimiu !\.inn-s. dividend
and potential can be extended to partially defined cooperative games with beliefs. The
reduced Shapley value and the normalized Shapley can In- incorporated as special caws.
Housman (2001) already concluded, future research might consider situations \\ Inn- pl.iMis
have the option to choose among several coalition lists. This might be the rase in practise,
if players can, due to cost and complexity, only determine a limited number of worths. In
that case it is of interest to investigate which worths should be determined. Another topic
could be to extend the core to partially defined cooperative game*.
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This chapter is concerned with the number of profiles at which a uondictatoriiil ><>< i.il < he net-
function is maiiipulahle. For three or more alternatives the lower IKMIIKI is derived when the
social choice function is nondictatorial and unanimous. In the cane of three alternatives the
lower hound is also derive*! when the social choice function is nondicttitoriiil and surj<vtivr\
In l>oth cases all social choice functions reaching that lower bound are clmtiutcri/ed when
there are at least three agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice
functions are only a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.'
5.1 Introduction
A well-known result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) shows that any surjective
nondictatorial social choice function with more than two alternatives must lie manipulahta.
However, little is known about the degree of manipulability of nondictatorial social choice
functions. An investigation was pioneered by Kelly (1988). who gave the minimal number of
manipulable profiles for social choice functions with three alternatives and two fluent*, mid
formulated several conjectures about the general case. This line of research was continued
by Fristrup and Keiding (1998), who gave the minimal number of manipulable profiles for
two agents and any number of alternatives. It was also conjectured in their paper, that
there is hope that the social choice functions they use also give the minimum in the general
case.
We prove their conjecture if surjectivity is replaced by unanimity, but show that it is
not true with only surjectivity in the case of three alternatives. The minimally manipulable
social choice functioas given as examples in Fristrup and Keiding (1998) can 1M- describe! as
almost dictatorial social choice functions. We show that tlHwe form the set of all minimally
manipulable nondictatorial and unanimous social choice functions in the cane of three
agents or more, and a subset of this set in the case of two agents. Example 4 in Kelly
(1989) shows a unanimous two person social choice function hitting the minimum, but
'The results in this chapter were first formulated in Maun et aJ (2004b).
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which is not almost dictatorial. In the case of three alternatives almost dictatorial social
choice functions lead to 2n — 1 manipulable profiles where n is the number of agents and
there are at least three agents. We present six social choice functions that are manipulable
at n profiles. We characterize these social choice functions as all minimally manipulable
social choice functions for three alternatives and more than two agents. For n = 2 these
social choice functions reach the minimum of 2 manipulable profiles, but there are many
other such social choice functions that do this, again see e.g. Example 4 in Kelly (1989).
We mention that an optimization program we wrote shows that there are 135 social choice
functions reaching the minimum of two manipulable profiles in the case of two agents and
three alternatives.
Another surprising feature of the minimally manipulable social choice functions charac-
terized in the three; alternative surjectivity case is that they are anonymous. Considering
the distribution of power among agents, anonymous social choice functions are rather far
away from dictatorial or almost dictatorial social choice functions. However, we did not
find a generalization of these social choice functions to more than three alternatives that
beats almost dictatorial social choice functions in that case. In fact, in Maus et al. (2004b,
see Chapter (i) we show that any surjective and anonymous social choice function has more
manipulable profiles than an almost dictatorial one if m > 4 and » > m + 2, where m is
the number of alternatives. So the conjecture of Fristrup and Keiding (1998) can still be
true for more than three alternatives, and as mentioned above we show that it is true if
one replaces surjectivity by unanimity.
First, Section 5.2 is on notation and model description. Section 5.3 introduces the
concept of manipulation and some basics about it. After that Section 5.4 concerns well-
known results on minimal manipulability. Section 5.5 contains the result for unanimous and
nondictatorial social choice functions, and Section 5.6 contains the result for surjective and
nondietatorial social choice functions with three alternatives. Finally a conclusion is given
in Section 5.7. 'The appendix is on unanimous and nondictatorial social choice functions
for the special three agents case.
I
5.2 Preliminaries
We denote the cardinality of a set S by |5| and its powerset by 2^.
Let A be a finite set of alternatives,m := |A| > 3, and /V a finite set of agents,
n:=|/V|>2.
Let r C A x A. We call f rornp/rtr if for all J, y € A (z,y) € « or (y,x) € t. Note that
completeness of * implies (.r,.r) € f for all r € A. We call f rmnsi/it'r if for all r, y. j € A
(j, y) 6 / and (j/.;) € / implies (r.;) € A. We call f anttsymmrfrir if for all J.y € A
(x, y) € f and (y, J") € f implies that x = y.
A prr/rrmrr f C A x A is a /inrnr ofTfrnnj (complete, transitive, antisymmetric) on A.
Let P denote the set of all preferences. Suppose that A = {J-|, 12.... x™}. By completeness.5.2 PRELIA//.Y.4RJES -< rfi a n V'^S • 75
transitivity and antis>iimietry \w> can write conveniently 'S» • !;.-.•.;: '•'
" for the preference < such that (xj,x^) € t if and only if t > j, t, j € {1,2,... ,m},
if we want to express only that .r is strictly preferred to y. and
, 'fi'
I = X... •;
if we want to express only that x is preferred to all other alternatives. Furthermore we ii.se
...x...!/...«..., xy... and
wfaon meanings can be easily deduced.
A pro/i/r p is a map from AT to P. Let P* denote the set of all these nm|>s. Thus,
a profile assigns to every agent i a preference p(i) over the alternatives. For a nonempty
subset 5 of Af we denote by p|»,- the restriction of the map p to the domain 5. By (p|#.,s, (*')
we denote the profile 9 such that
_ f p(«) for all i € JV - S,
"~ I t for all i € 5.
In the particular case 5 = {i} we write (p_i,<) instead of CPAf-(i}i *'*')> *uid if p(N — {«}) =
{t} we write (p^^>, <). For a profile p € P" and alternatives x, y € /I let S'*">(p) := {i €
AT I (x, t/) € p(»)} be the set of all agents that prefer x to t/.
For two profiles p, 9 € P'^ we define the distance between p and 7 by r/j«/(p, 7) := |{t G
A' I p(i) / g(«)}l- A finite sequence r", ...,r' € P such that /(r") = p, /(r') = r/, and
dist(r'. r'"*"') = 1 for all i = 0,...,/— 1 is called a pat/i from p to 7. A path r",..../' such
that / = dist(p, 7) is called a s/ior<pst path from p to 7.
For a profile p and a set of profiles Q we define the dtAlanrr between ;> mid (^ by
A sorja/ c/iotcc /unction is a function / : P*' -• /I. Hence, a social c:hoice function
selects a unique alternative /(p) at every profile p.
A social choice function is called sur/'ective if any alternative in >4 is cho»en at least
once, i.e. if /(P^) = -4. In literature this is also known as citizen-sovereignty. A social
choice function is called unanimous if /(p) = 1 for all profiles p 6 P* such that p(i) = x...
for all i e AT, i.e. for all profiles in <op(;r) := {p € P" | p(i) = x... for all i € A'}. Clearly,
unanimity is stronger than surjectivity. Throughout this chapter we assume that any social
choice function is at least surjective.
For a permutation <r of W and a profile p € P* let po<r be the profile given by (po<r)(i) :=
p{ff(i)) for all i 6 N. A social choice function is called anonymous if /(/>) = /(/>o ^) for76 CHAPTER 5. IWANIAfJTY AJVD ATONDJCTATORSHJP
all permutations a of AT. Thus, anonymous social choice functions are symmetric in the
arguments. In a sense they treat agents equally.
' In contrast to anonymity, the following dictatorial social choice functions rfirtj respect
only the preference of one single agent d € N, the dictator. For any profile p dic*j is defined
by
where i is such that p(d) = x So, dictd(p) is the most preferred alternative of agent d
in p(d). A social choice function / is called nondictatoria/ if there is no agent d such that
/ = dirt,.
5.3 Manipulation of social choice functions
We are interested in strategic behaviour of individuals when facing cooperative decision-
making as captured by social choice functions. This is formalised by the following defini-
tions. Lot / bo a social choice function.
A social choice function is said to be jn<«nm'dia<s mampu/a6/e at a profile p (by coalition
S C yV, 5 ^ 0), if p(.S') -- {/} for some < € P, and there is an 5-de»na<«on q, i.e. g|/v_s =
p|jv. .s and <7(S) = {F}, such that (/(p),/(tf)) £ <• We call p intcrmediote manipulate
Ifltimnii (/. Let
/A// := {p € P* | / is intermediate manipulable at profile p}.
An iS'-drviiitioii where 5 = {i}, i 6 /V. is called an i-drmarion. If it is not important
which set of agent deviates from p to 9 we call 9 a deviation from p. A profile p Ls called
findimdmW/j/,) mantpiWafe/r (under /) if there is an agent that is better off by being dishonest
about his preference, i.e. if there is an 1 e N, and an i-deviation 9 such that
We call p mampu/a6/r fou/unis </. Let
A// := {p € P^ I p is manipulable under /}.
A social choice function is called siratr^jz-proo/ if .\/^ = 0, otherwise it is said to be
(individually) m<w»ipu/rt6/r Note that A// = 0 for all dictatorial rules /. The prominence
of the dictatorial rules arises from the following impossibility result due to Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975).
Theorem 37 trt .4 <*• n ./imrr srf 0/ n/fpmrtftuM. |A| > 3. f*f / : P* -« A 6e a nondtc-
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We show some useful connections lietween intermediate manipulahility and manipula-
bility. Clearly. A// C /.V/^. If p € /A// — Afy is interutediate mituipulable towards q, the
following (standard) lemma holds. ;•
Lemma 38 Let / : P* —» .4. />t p 6r intrrmrdia/r mampuia6/r iouxmts q, 6ut >it>(
rn<uiipu/a6/e. Let r",..., r* 6c a sAortfjst pain /rom p to q. Tnrn tAftr id a it € {1,...,/- 1}
sur/» tAaf r* is manipu/aft/r towards r*"*"'.
Proof. Let D = {i € N | p{i) / <?(•)}• Since / is intermediate ninuipulnhle at /> by D
towards q, we have p(D) = {t} for some t € P, so p = (<^,p|/v-o) and (/(p). /(<?)) ^ '• As
r°,..., r* is a shortest path from p to q, r*+' is a j-deviat ion from r* for every fc € {0,...,/}
for some agent j € D. and r*(j) = t. By the transitivity of / and (/(r"), /(r')) £ t =• r*(j),
there must be at least one A- € {0,...,/ - 1} such that (/(r*),/(r**')) g t. Then r* ifl
manipulable towards r**'. As r° ^ A//, Jb > 1. •
Each set of dLsjoint shortest paths from p to g contains at most f/i.st(p,<j) elements. So
we can state the following corollary to Lemma 38.
Corollary 39 Lrt / : P* —» A Let p 6c tntcrmcdiotr rnampuia6/r touwrtii q, 6«t no<
manipu/afc/c. T/tcn t/terr are at /ea.st <i»st(p, <j) pro/iips in A//, rar/i o/ (Arm on a .t/jortrat
patA /rom p to q.
Let p, o e /A// - A// be such that p is intermediate manipulnhlc towards o and vice
versa. Suppose that there is a shortest path from /> to <y that contains only one manipiilaMe
profile. Then we can state the following about the preferences of the manipulating coalition
5 in p and o.
Lemma 40 LPt p. <7 G /A// — A// 6e suc/i t/tat p is intrrTnfrfirttr mantpu/a6/r fci/ .S'
9 and q is intermediate mantpu/a6/e 6y 5 towards p. Suppose tnat tne»c w a js/iortrst patn
r",... ,r* yrom p to q sucn t/iat {r" r'} n A// = {r*}. Let i := /(p), y := /(q), 2 :»
/(r*). T/ienz € >4-{x,y} andp(S) = {t},q(5) = {t), are aurn tnat t = .. .y... x ... z ...
andT= ...i...j/...z /n partirtWor, i/rn = 3 tnen t = j/zz,F= xj/z, and/(r') - i /or
a//i G {0 it- 1}, /(r') = j//or a«i£ {it + 1 /}.
Proof. Note that r°,..., r* is a shortest path from p to q and r',..., r" i« a shortest path
from q to p. By the intermediate manipulability of p towards <•/ arid <y towards p we have
t = ... y... i... and t = ... i... j/..., x ^ j/. As { r",..., r*} D A// = {r*}, we have t =
... /(r')... /(r'+')... for all i e {0 it - 1}. As /(r») = /(p) = x and t = ... y... ar...
this implies that /(r'+*) ^ y for all i € {0 A: - 1}. Likewise /(r' ') ^ x for all i € {* +
l,...,n}.So, z = /(r*)€ A-{x,y}. Now, if t = .. .z.. .x... then {r°,... ,r* '}OA// ^0,
a contradiction. Sot = ...y...i...z Likewise T = ... x... y... z. In particular if
m = 3 then t = yxz.?= xyz. Then {r",... ,r*"',r*+',...,r"} n A// = 0 impli<w that78 CHAPTER 5. IWAA7A/ITY AND iVOND/CTATOfiSMP
- Note that any interme<Jiate manipiilable profile of a unanimous social choice function
must contain at least two different preferences. We show that furthermore any p € /A//
that is intermediate manipulable by a coalition 5 C ./V such that p = (<^,F^~^) can be
manipulated by using a preference £ ^ {M}-
Lemma 41 Z«< / : P* —» A 6c unanimous ana* /e< (£*,F^~^) 6c intermediate manipu/a6/e
fry 5. TTien </iere w a pre/erence t £ {<,F} «uc/i </ia< (/(**, ?*"•*),/(?*,<*"*)) £ <.
Proof. By the definition of intermediate manipulability there is a < / < such that
F* *),/(i\F" •*"')) g «. If I! ^ F we are done, so suppose that if = F. Then
<*"")./(<*)) £ <• Let ! ^ < be a preference with the same top as F. Such a
preference exists if m > 3. Then /(< ,F"~*) = /(F^) by unanimity, and thus the coalition
5 can also manipulate (<\F*"•*) towards (< .P'"*'), t f^ {<,F}. •
5.4 Minimal manipulability of social choice functions
Let F be a nonempty set of social choice functions. For any / € F we measure its
manipulability by the number of manipulable profiles |A//| that / has. We call /* 6 F
minimtt//j/ mttntpu/nMr in F if | A//. | < |A//| for all / € F. Let F* be the set of all minimally
manipiiliilile .social choice functions in F. If /* S F* then in./.- := |A/y.| Is a lower bound
on the number of manipulable profiles that any social choice function in F has.
Let F be the set of surjective nondictatorial social dioice functions for fixed m > 3,» >
2. Then the result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) says that m/. > 1, but it
does not say what the actual minimum is. This question has been solved by Kelly (1988)
for two agents and three alternatives, and by Fristrup and Keiding (1998) for two agents
and any number of alternatives larger than three. For reference we summarize their results
in the following theorem.
Theorem 42 Lrf n = 2. 7%en
i/m = 3,
•{*
For the general case of n > 2. Fristnip and Keiding (1998) conjecture that m/. =
(n - 1)(~ - 1) + 1 if (n,m) ^ (2,3). We describe a class of functions that attain this
number if (n,rn) ^ (2,3). A social choice function / is called nirno.<( rf»r<a<orioi if there is
a profile p" € P'^, IUI alternatiw J- € A. and an agent d € A' sudi that (x, dirt^(p)) € p(i)
for tilt t € AT-{d}.iu>d
-{r;
/(P) = < •*" .; _ (5.i)
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Proposition 43 LW / 6P an airnosi dictaforta/ soetai c/iotce /unction and /rf p. x 6c sucA
r-ouaison 5./ /io/ds. Tnen
and tAttf |A//| = (n - 1) (f - l) + 1.
Proof. Suppose that p and a arc i-dcviations such that (/(p), /(fl)) ^ p(«)- This implies
that if i = d then p = p and if i ^ d then <? = p. We show first that p is mnnipiilnhlc and
treat then the case where g = p. If agent d deviates to </ by changing his preference in />
to another preference with the same most preferred outcome we haw (/(</), /(P)) € p(d)
since agent d is a dictator at 17. Thus p is manipulahlc. Suppose that 1 € N — {d}, i.e.
9 = p. Let p = (p_,, f), f ^ p(t), be an i-deviation of 7 sucli that (/(</). /(p)) € p(») Thus
(1, dirfd(p)) € f. As (x,d»rfrf(p)) € p(i) there are y - 1 such preferences / for every agent
i € AT - {d}. This proves that A// = {(p_,,<) | i € Af - {d}, (j,du-<rf(J))) € /, / / p(»)}U{p}.
•
We show that the conjecture of FVistrup and Keiding cannot be true for m = 3. Consider
the following social choice functions if m = 3. Let A = {a,6,c}, < = xyz € /' I-«t
m' : P'^ —» {a, 6, c} be the social choice function given by
!
ifS<">(P) = 5("'>(P) = /V,
y if 5<»-'>(p) = A' and S"'"'(p) # N,
Observe that m' is surjective but not unanimous. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 44 /yf< < = zyz. T/ten A/m> = {(arj/2* ~<'',xz?/) | i £ JV} and </iu.» |A/,,,.| = n.
Proof. No agent will want to manipulate when /(p) = x. Suppose that /(p) = j/. Then
(y, i) S p(i) for all i 6 A^, so no agent can manipulate to a profile 7 where /(</) = *.
Furthermore there is an agent t € A' such that (x,.y) ^ ;<(i). This agent has no int-entive to
manipulate to the profile <*, which is the only profile 7 where /(</) = x. On the other hand,
as p(t) / <, this agent would have to change his preference in order to manipulate to the
profile $*'. So / is strategy-proof at all profiles p € P* where /(p) 6 {x, y}. Suppose that
/(p) = 2. Then there is an agent i € Af such that (z.y) € p(i) This iigent has no incentive
to manipulate to a profile q where /(q) = y. Again, on the other hand, a« (y, 2) € (7(1)
for such profiles, this agent would have to change his preference in order to manipulate
to such a profile. The only place left where manipulations can occur is from p to <*. If
p and <* are i-dcviations we have that p = (<*""''',p(i)). If agent i has an incentive to
manipulate to <* we must have (1.2) € p(t) and as /(p) = 2 we must have (2,y) € p(i).
Hence, .*/„,, = {(<"-<'>,X2y) | i € N} and |AO| = n. •
Note that n < (;i - 1)(^ - 1) + 1 = 2n - 1 for all n > 2. Hence, the conjecture of
Fristrup and Keiding cannot be true for m = 3. We will show however that it is true if we80 i CHAPTER 5. IWAN/M/TY AND NONDJCTATORSH/P
replace F by the set of unanimous nondictatorial social choice functions GcF, i.e., we
show that m« = (n — l)(y — 1) + 1. Moreover, we will show that then for n > 3 <? € G* if
and only if g is almost dictatorial. ...
For the case m = 3, n > 3, we have thus nif < n < me = 2n - 1. This will allow us to
show that m/. = n in this case, and that / € F* for n > 3. if and only if / = m' for some
5.5 Minimal manipulability with unanimity
Let n > 3. To show that in<; = (n-l)(y-1) +1 we will use the results of Kelly (1988)
and Pristnip and (voiding (1998), summarized in Theorem 42, applied to two agent social
choice functions derived from / € G. The first step is to embed the domain of two agent
social choice functions into P*\ depending on some 5 € 2^ — {0, TV}. This is achieved by
the map n.y : P<'*> — P" given by Ils(r) := (r(l)V(2)"~*) for all r € P<'•=»>. Now, for
/ € G. define />• := / o fl*. then /> is a unanimous two agent social choice function.
Clearly, any profile in H.s(A//J is in /A//. Lot A/1J := fI.,(M,J n A/;. We make the
following important observation, which holds by unanimity.
Lpmmn 45 // ,S\ T € 2" - {0. N},5 / 7, are ««:/» tW Af? n A/|- ^ 0. f/irn T = N - 5.
Proof. Let /> € Af.i|nA/f Thenp = (<?,<?"*') = (<[,t? ^) for some «,,<; € P. If T / N-S
then, Hinoe 7' ^ .S', this implies tlmt p = <^ for some / € P. But by unanimity such p are
not intermediate manipulate. Hence, T = N — S. •
Lot 6* : {{l.i} | » € N}. Then, if S.T 6 5 are such that 5 / T. also 5 ^ TV - T. We
will show that for ivll / € G
|A/,| > / 2" Ifm = 3
" \ (n-l)f ifm>4
(
if /s is nondk-tatorial for all 5 € S. The simplest case is covered by the following lemma.
Lemma 46 5'uppoar t/ui< oM /.s, 5 € 5, an- nondtrtatonai and (Aa< I1.,(,V//J C A// /or a//
5 €5. 77»rn
(
2n i/ m = 3,
fn t/m>4.
Proof. In this case, for all S € 5. A/? = Il.s(A//J n A// = II.s-(Af^), and thus by Theorem
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By Lemma 45. A/?n A/£ = 0 for all pairwise different S.T € 5. Since, |5| = n this implies
the lemma. •
Suppose that we cannot use Lemma 46. i.e. there are S G 5 such that n.s(A//<) - A// j*
0. If there is only one such S we can show the following. Note that r ^ A£{ for all r € P"
such that |r(A0| ^2.
Lemma 47 Suppose tnat a// /<;. S 6 5, are nondsrratona/ and tAa/ (Ar?c « a T € 5 ntcA
/Aai n.s(A//,.) C A/, /or a// S € S - {T}, IMA//,) - A// * 0. 77irn
|A//|>< H!^'!.^ jjj|j>j'
Proof. For m > 4 this follows in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 46. Suppose that
m = 3. There is a p € Ilr(A//,.) — A//. Then p is intermediate manipulable towards some
o € P*, and by Lemma 41 we can assume that |p(N) U g(/V)| = 3. By Corollary 39 there
are at least di.sf(p. (/) > 2 (otherwise p 6 A//) manipulable profiles r £ {/•». f/} <>u a shortest
path from p to g, say r|,r^. As |p(A/) Ug(JV)| = 3 and |p(Af)| " l</(^)l = 2 we must have
|r,(/V)| = |ri(Ar)| = 3. But then {r,,r.,}nA/i! = » for all S € 5. By Theorem 42, |A/iJ| > 2
for all S € 5 - {T}. Hence, by Lemma 45, |A/,| > |{r,,rj}| + J]^^ |A/i|.| = 2n. •
If there is more than one S € 5 such that n.s(A//J - A// ^ 0 the mauipulable profiles
that we find by the intermediate manipulability of the p € FI.s(A//,) - A// can Iw the same.
The following lemma combines Lemma 41 and Corollary 39 to ensure that we are then still
able to find sufficiently many manipulable different profiles r G P^ such that |r(A^)j = 3 if
there are more than three agents.
Lemma 48 LW SJf 5 and /<* » > 3. 6'uppM.tc </»a< //ir;r- arr' p G n.*(A//J - A//
andp g n-r(A//,.) - A/;,p / p. Tnen <Aere an- q € n.s(P''-*»),5 € n,(P<'^>). '«f« <"«<
|p(^V)Ug(N)| = |p(W)U7(7V)| = 3 andn;'(p) w manipu/aft/p toward.* riv'(<7), n^'(p) M
mantptda6/f <oward.s n^' (g). Suppose <Aa< <Aprr is an r £ {p.p} ^»«< i» on a ,<r/iorir.*< pa</»
^rom p to 7 and on a .s/ior<r,s< pa/A /rom p lo| 77irn:
/. //n >4 andS,Te5- {{1}}, tVwn S = T, p = § andp = a.
2. Suppose tna/ S = 7\ 77ienp = 9 andp = o. FurtAfrmorp, i/m = 3 and </ierr 1.1 a
6etu;een p and (7 t/»a< contains on/y one mantpii/ai/c pro/i/e t/ien p or p i« interrnediatr
man»p»i/n6/p 6y 5 and 6y AT - S and .so n > 4. On tnr o</jer /land, i/n = 3, t/i»-n «//
pro/iies on s/ior<es< patA^ between p and </ arf manipuiaWe.
Proof. The existence of such q and q Is an immediate implication of p € n.?(A//,) - A// and
p€ rir(A/^)-A// and Lemma 41. Then p = (f£.£ ^ and p = (tj,^ ^) and there are
preferences V?p € P such that 9 € {(£.£'-*). «*J, ')} and q € {(^.^ •'), (£,** ')}.
By our assumptions there Ls an r £ {p.p} that is on a shortest path from p to o and on82 CHAPTER 5. IWANJAfJTY AND NONDICTATORSHJP
a shortest path from p to g. Then, either r = (*£',$'"*"''', tjf*) for some i/p^JV-S,
1 < |f/pl < |JV| - |5| - 1, or r = (£-*', ?*',«*-*) for some V,$5,l< |V,| < |5| - 1.
Similarly, r = («J,«J'~'"~'\£') for some [/,$JV-7,1< |ty| < |JV| - |T| - 1, or
r = (£"*.#.?'"'•) for some Vp £ T, 1 < |Vfc| < |T| - 1. So, {i,,Fp,?p} = {tp,Fp,<p}. As
|{<p,?p, <p}| = 3 this implies that 5 € {T, N - T - C/p, C/^} or 5 e {T - Vp, Vp, N - T} or
JV - 5 6 {7\ TV - T - t/p, f/p} or N - 5 € {T - Vp-, Vp, N - T}.
Proof of (1): Then 1 6 5 and 1 € T and |S| = |T| = 2 imply that only the first and the
last case is possible, and both cases lead to 5 = T, p = </ and p = g as n > 4.
Proof of (2): If n > 4 the first part of (2) follows by (1) if S 6 5 - {{1}}. If n > 4
and 5 = {1} or if n = 3 then p = q and p = g follows in a similar way using the
extra assumption that 5 = T. Let m = 3. Let i := /(p), y := /(p) and 2 := /(r).
Then by Lemma 40, p = (yi*",t"-") and p = (xyz",t"-") for some {/ € {S,N - 5}.
Unanimity of / implies that t € {ziy, zj/x}. Without loss of generality ( = zyx. Then p
is intermediate inanipultihlo towards (yxi' , yiz* ' ) and towards p, i.e. by 5 and N — 5,
and so |.S'|, |N - 6'| > 2 implying that » > 4.
On the other hand, if n = 3, then on any shortest path between p and 9 there is only
one clement, which is manipulable by Lemma 38. •
Now, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 49 SM;>;WW </ia< /orra > 4 a// /.s-,5 € 5 - {{1}}, are nondictatoria/, and/or
m = U a// /s\S € 5, arr r»ondir<a<oria/. 77ien
Proof. We distinguish two cases. If ?i > 4 we can ase Lemma 48. This case is presented
here. The case » = 3 is presented in an appendix because of its different and rather
elementary technique. s«r Propositions 52 and 53.
So, let us assume that n > 4. For each i" € 5 and p € IIs(A/^.) - A// let
#(/') : = {'/ € Il,s(P"•'•") | n;'(p) is manipulable towards n^'(ff)
and |p(N) U q(/V)| = 3}.
Dy Lemma 41 (^(p) / W. iuid by Corollary 39 there are at least di.sf(p.q) > 2 manipulable
profiles for each 7 € Q(/>) on shortest paths between p and o. Let W(p, o) be the set of all
these umnipulahlo proKles for given p € II.s(A/^.) - A//.S 6 5, and o 6
For all .S' g 5 let
W":= U U
Let SJ65- {{!}} aiidpen.s(A/,J-A/|,<7eQ(p). p€n.v(A//,)-A/,.fl€g(p). By
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impliesthat 5 = r and p = g.p = g if n > 4. Hence, if 5/ 7\ then HA
and for each 5 € S one p € !!.,•(A//_.) — A/j can be assumed to yield at least two now
manipulable profiles in some /?(p, g),g € Q(p), and thus
for allS €5. //
By definition A/| n A/£ = 0 for all S, T € 5. Hence, *
A// 2 U A/.?U U A/?
.VCS.A>II| se
and all these sets are pairwise disjoint, so
.S€5..S>(I)
|n.s(M,,)|
If m > 4 this proves the theorem, as |A//J > ^ for all 5 € 5 by Theorem 42.
So, suppose that m = 3. For all 5 € 5 by Theorem 42 |A/,_| > 2. If |A/i{| = |II.s(A//jn
A//| = 1 then there is a p € IIi(A//^.) — A// and 7 € Q(p) and thus
If |Af|| = 0 then |n.s(A/,,) - A//| > 2. Let p,p € n.,(A#/J - A//,p ^ ?, q e g(p),? €
Then, either
/?(p. 7) n /?(p, 9) = 0
and thus
or
and without loss of generality part 2 of Lemma 48 yields that p is intermediate manipulable
by 5 and TV — S. So there are g.s,g,v-.s- € (?(p) such that p is intermediate manipulable
towards qts by S and intermediate manipulable towards tyv-s by N — S. Clearly, fl(p, <7.v)n
f-s) = 0 and thus
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Altogether, for all 5 € 5 either ' . «... ^ ^ , . , . ^^,
' |jw|| = |ns(A/y,) n A/,| = |ns(M/,)| = 1A//J > 2, \ '
1 "f
|JW|| = 1 and (A/|| > 2, :,..;,,_,;-.-..
or
|M|| = 0 and |Af|| > 4. '
We diHtingui.sli four eases, which show altogether that |M/| > 2n.
Caae 1: There are (/, V e 5 - {{1}}, 1/ / V, such that |A/£| = |M^| = 1.
Then
,)+«, + IK'I +
2 j + 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 = (n - 3)2 + 6 = 2n.
CMfi_2l There is a f/ e 5 - {{1}} such that |A#| = 0.
Then
S€5..sy(i)
> I ^ 2 J + 0 + 4 = (n - 2)2 + 4 = 2n.
\.s-6S..s-«(i).r) /
CMC 3: There us a (/ € 5 - {{1}} such that |M|| > 2 for all 5 e 5 - {{1}, t/}.
Consider Afj*,,, Aff,,. By definition also A/,*,, U A/j*,, C A//.










Case 3.3: |A/f,,| = 1 and |Af^,| = 2.
Then
> 1+2+
= (n - 1)2 + 1 + |Af» - A#f,,| + |Alf,| > 2n,
if |A/^,| / 0 or A/;', g A/j\,. But suppose that |A#| = 0. Tlicn |A/»| > 4 and HO A//», 5 Af,',,,
«» |A/j*,j| = 2. This finishes case 3.3, thus case 3, and prows tin- theorem. •
Let / € G. We use Theorem 49 to conclude that there must he a dictatorial /s, A' € 5,
if |A//1 < (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1. With the help of this /„• we can show that / must he almost
dictatorial, and thus m^ = |A//| = (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1.
Theorem 50 For a// n > 3, m<; = (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1 and C = {/ € G' | / w a/m<M<
Proof. We want to prove the theorem by induction. Our induction basis is Riven by
Theorem 42 and our induction assumption is as follows. Let n > 3. ASSIIIIH' that it has
been shown for all * 6 {2,... ,n - 1} and * agent unanimous nondictatorial social choice
functions p that
I 2 if(A,m) = (2,3).
and that equality holds for Jfc > 3 if and only if 9 is almost dictatorial.
Induction Step:
Let / € C be such that |A//| < (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1. Under the induction assumption
we show that then |A//| = (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1 and that / is almost dictatorial. This proves
the theorem by the induction principle.
By Theorem 49 there must be an S 6 5 such that /* is dictatorial. If m > 4 this 5
has to be in 5 - {{1}} Let D := 5 if agent 1 is the dictator in /s, and D := AT - 586 CHAPTER 5. IWAJVJAflTY AATD NOND/CTATORSH/P
if agent 2 is the dictator. Let t e Af and t € P. We define (n - l)-agent social choice
functions $,,, : P"H'> -» A derived from / by p,.,(p) := /(p, <W),p e P"-<<>. Now, for all
i € Af — D / 0 and < € P, (?,.< Ls unanimous. If such a ^,i is nondictatorial, then by the
induction assumption
(n — i)(-j-— lj + 1 it (n,m) ^ (J.o).
2 if (n,m) = (3,3).
Furthermore, if such a 3,., is dictatorial then the dictator d must be in £>. Let T, be the
set of < e P for which 9,, is dictatorial. Now. if p € A/,,, then (p,<'"') € A// and clearly
these profiles are different for different t. Hence, as |A//| < (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1,
f |P|-1 if (n,m)# (3,3),
'*'-]_ |P|-2 if (n,m) = (3,3),
as each <;,,,,< € P - T<, is nondictatorial and yields |A/j,,,| different manipulable profiles.
We show that there is a d 6 D that is the dictator for all g,./,f € T,. Suppose to the
contrary that there are d|,d^ € D,di ^ dj, and <|,<2 € T, such that y,,,, is dictatorial
with dictator d| and </,,^ is dictatorial with dictator dj. Then, agent t can choose a
dictator to his advantage. Let p be a profile such that (dirtd,(p),dic<rf.,(p)) € p(i) = <2 or
(dirt,/, (p), dirt,/,(p)) € p(«) = <|. Each such profile is manipulable by agent i, and there are
1 ml
^ !)-> = (2(m - l)(m - l)!(m!)-») y > «y (n.m > 3)
Mich profiles, (m — 1 )!•*(»«!)" ' oiu« ft>r every of the "*{""'? pairs (1, y) € pfO'-r ^ S/>
a given p(i) G {<i,tj}, |{<i,<a}| = 2. This contradicts |A/,| < (n - 1)(^1 - 1) + 1. Hence,
every </I,I,< € T,, is dictatorial with the same dictator d € D.
As / is nondictatorial. there must be a p € P* such that /(p) ^ dirfrf(p). Then, for all
t € T, sucli that (</i(t,(p_,,O./(p)) ^ ', (p.,,0 is manipulable. For all p e P* let
then lx<<-aus*< of reflexivity of < /(p) / d«c<d(p^,,r) and (p.,.0 € A// for all f € £/(p).
FlirtIwrmorr, |(/(p)| > ^ - |P - T,| = |T,| - f for all p such that /(p) ^ dirt^p) and
the manipulablc profiles (p ,.0.(q.,,0 that we find for such p,g € P* are different if
p., ^ (^^,. Hence,
(
whert' ti is the number of p having different p_, and satisfying /(p) ^ dirfrf(p). If (n.m) =
(3.3) this implies 5 > 2 • (6 - |T,|) + t*(|T",j - 3) which, as |T,| € {4,5}. shows that u = 1.
On the other hand, if (n, »n) / (3,3) we use |T,| = m! - 1 and obtain (n - 1)(^ - 1) + 1 >
(n - 2)(f - 1) + 1 + it(f - 1), which also implies that u = 1.5.6. AffiVJAfAL AfA.V/Pi;LABJLJTY W7TH StRJECTATTY 87
Now. note that u = 1 implies that /(p) = dirtrf(p) for all p e P* such that p , ^ p ,. We
show that p,.p,,i is almost dictatorial. Clearly, pis manipulahlc l>y agent «'• 1-et j € N —{i,d}.
Then all (p_,,0 such that (d»cMP)./(P)) £ r / pO) are manipulate. This yields
^, y - 1) + 1 = (n - 2)(y - 1) + 1,
where equality holds if and only if (/(p). d»rfj(p)) e p(j) for all j € TV — {», rf}. Hence, ff.
is ill most dictatorial. If (n, m) = (3,3) this implies that |T,| = m! - 1 as otherwise
a contradiction.
Finally,
(n - l)(y - 1) + 1 > |A/,| > |M^J + |(/(p)| > (n - 2)(y
shows that |f/(p)| = (=2 - 1) and so (/(p),rf«rtd(p)) € p(i) and / is almost dictatorial. •
5.6 Minimal manipulability with three alternatives
and surjectivity
Theorem 51 Let n > 3, m = 3 and tet F 5c fAe se< o/ surjwtiw non<ftrta<oha/ «ocio/
choice/unctions. 77ien m/.- = n anrf F* = {m' | < € P}.
Proof. Let / € F*. Since m' is surjective and nondictatorial we have |A//| < |A/,,,<| = r».
If / is unanimous then by Theorem 50 |A//| > 2(n - 1) + 1 > n, a contradiction. So / w
not unanimous and there are a: € A = {a, 6, c} and p € top(x) such that /(p) ^ x. Fix Hiich
an x and p. and let {i/, 2} = A — {x}.
Claim 1: a € /(<op(a)) for all n € A.
To the contrary suppose a ^ /(<op(a)). We deduce that |A//| > n. As / is surjective
there exist p € P^ such that /(p) = a. Then a £ /(top(a)) implies that for some j € /V
we have p(j) £ {aftc. act}. Without loss of generality j = 1. Furthermore, let p be chosen
such that for all 7. with /(q) = a we have rfi.s/(iy, /«p(«)) > JiAf(p, /op(«)). For i > 2
let P := (t,p_,), where ( e {abc,ad>} - {p(i)} and let F' := (aft<-,r'_,). Furthermore let
r' := (aic,p_i) and r* := (ad>,p^i). As for i > 2
and
<fis«(r'.top(a)) = di.<f<(?\<op(a))
we have/(f") ^ a for 1 > 2./(f') ^ a and/(?') /a. So?',?* € A//and AZ/Dfr,?}
for all :> 2. Hence |A//| > n + 1. the desired contradiction, and claim 1 is proven.H CHAPTER 5. l/JVANJM/TY AND NOJVD/CTATORSH/P
Let V := <op(i) n A//. Claim 1 shows that there exist 9 6 <op(j") such that /(g) = x.
Now consider a path from p to 7 through top(x). On this path at least one profile is
manipulable. So, V / 0. Let W := {p € top(*) | /(p) 5* x}. Obviously, KW. f T
Claim 2: I1VI > rt.
To the contrary suppose |W| < n. Consider / : P* -• X defined by
•( /(<7) otherwise.
We show that |A/^| < |A//| and have a contradiction with minimal manipulability of / if /
is surjective and nondictatorial.
• / i*> Hurjectivo By claim 1 j/ € /(<«p(l/)) for all 1/ € A. So / Ls surjective.
• 7 i* nondictatorial Suppose to the contrary that / is dictatorial with dictator rf. There
ii» a p € IV with /(p) ^ x. By the definition of / we have /(p) = 7(p) = d»r<d(p) for all
p £ IV. For » g TV - {<f} consider i-deviations </ of psuch that (x, /(p)) £ 9(1). Then /
w manipulable at <y by t towards p, as </ £ W and thus /(g) = rfjei^g) = dirtrf(p) = x.
A.s t here arc three preferences f in P at which (x, /(p), x) ^ < there are at least 2(n — 1)
of thesr 7-profiles. Since, 3 < n we obtain |A//| > 2(r» — 1) > n, a contradiction with
llic iixsiiiiiption 11 wit I A//1 < ». Thus / is non<li( tutorial.
• |A/J < I A//1 By th<> assumption |W| < n, there Ls for all 7 € II' an adjacent r 6
top(.i), i.e. </!.•<<(>•,7) = 1, such that /(r) = x. So / is manipulable at all 9 6 VV.
Therefore, V = W. We show that the transition from / to / repairs more manipulable
profiles than it creates. All the manipulable profiles in V are not manipulable in /
iMivmorc Lot (/ 6 A/y — A// be a manipulable profile that was created by the transition.
Then there is an agent » and a profile p 6 U' such that p and 7 are j-deviations
satisfying (/(</)> J') ^ </(<) £ {j"!/2,xzy}. This leads to the two possibilities /(q) = 2
and </(i) = yxz or /(</) = y and 9(1) = zxy. Then q #• A// implies in the first case that
/(r) = j / x and in the second case that /(r) = y ^ x for all i-deviatioius r from 7. If
r(i) ^ p(i). r is also an i-deviat ion from p. Hence, for < € {xj/;,xcy} - {p(i)} we have
/(p.,.f) ^ x. As (p ,.<) € V = IV, (p,,0 ^ p. there are at most (|V| - 1) agents i
such that there Ls a g € A/7 - A// manipulable by « towards a profile p in IV. Let m<
be the number of such profiles </ for agent 1. As q(i) = yx; if /(g) = ; and <j(i) = ;xy
if /(</) = y. wt> haw m, < 1. So. |A/j| < |A//| - |V| + (|V| - l)m, < |A//| - 1. This
proves claim 2.
Claim 3: |V| = n.
By claim 2 |IV| > n + 1. By claim 1 rop(x) - H' / (J. So. there are p.7 6 P* such
that p € IV and 7 € f«p(x) - IV. Hence, /(p) ^ x and /(q) = x. Without loss of generality
let p € W - V, if such p does not exist we have |A//| > |V| > n + 1. a contradiction. As5.6. AffWAML A/.4NJP17..4B7L7TY U7TH SFRJECTIYTTY 89
p ^ A// all profiles r', r^ r" adjacent to p in fop(z) are in H". Consider a path from
H to 9, say r{ r^ € «op(j). Then V D {r{,..., rj _,} ^ 0. So, if we can find disjoint
paths for even* j from H to <? we have |Vj > »». We show how to construct such paths.
Without loss of generality there is a Jt € N such that
p<0 = g(i) for n > i > *,
p(i) / <j(i) for 1 < i < fc,
and the r',r* r" are such that H = (p^,,f),f € {XJ/I.JZJ/} — {/>(,;)} for all j €
{1.2,.. ,n}. Hence, H(i) = p(t) if i * j, r»(j) = ?0) * J < *. and r»(/) ^ <?U) - p(j) if
j > A:. Let 1 < ji < n, 1 < ja < it. For j, < Ar, jj < it, let
u ji < i < ji + ja < * or
r£(«):={ **'' i<j,+ja-fcandj,+>j>A;
p(i) otherwise,
and for ji > A:, ja £ A:, let
1 p(») otherwise.
Then these arc disjoint paths r", 1 < ji < n, between p and 7. So, |K| > n and since
IVI < IA//| < n this proves claim 3.
Now, n = IV| = |M/ n <op(x)| < |M/| < n. So, A// C <op(j). By claim 3 |W| > n + 1.
So, there is a profile p € W - V.
Claim 4: / '({1}) C <op(j).
Suppose contrapositive without loss of generality that there is an r € P^ such that
/(r) = a: and r(n) ^ {IJ/Z.IZJ/}. Then
p(«) otherwise
defines a path from r = r" to r" = p outside <o;^(x), i.e. r* ^ 'f^(j-) for all A' < «. Since
A//n {r",r',...,r" '} / 0, we have a contradiction because A// C (f>p(x). This proves
claim 4.
Let {/ := P'^ - fop(x). Then f/ n A// = 0 and /([/) = {;/. z}.
Claim 5: For profiles p € P* and q e L' such that /(p) = y and 5'"-'(p) C 5'""(</) ^ 0,
we have /(<?) = j/.
By claim 4J^ /(10- so 7(9) 5^ 1. Without loss of generality p,g are i-deviation« and
?(t) 6 {yxi.yzx}. As 9 ^ A//, /(^) = y. This proves claim 5.96 CHAPTER 5. UNANIMITY AND NOND/CTATORSH/P
K.I. Nowfixj/,z€ A-{x}. Let .•*••>--'..•• ..,...- ^. .-,^. "* •• "-...•-...,. s. ,y i ^
]^t !' *lr^ i = {S C N | for all p € P* : /(p) ^ x and S<"-">(p) = 5 ,'. . ,''„.,,
implies/(p) = j/}, ;;
W : = {5 C N | for all p € P* : /(p) j* x and S<*'">(p) = 5
implies /(p) = z}.
Then JV € W« by surjectivity and claim 5, as S<»*>(p) C N = S<»'>(<7) for all p such that
/(p) = y and ry 6 <op(y) C £/. Likewise, /V € W-".
Claim 6: /(xyz*\ xzy"-*) = x implies S = N or 5 = 0.
To the contrary let i € 5 and j € /V - S. Consider r = (j/xz*'*,xyz^"''',xz{/"~*).
As r € {/, and therefore r ^ A//, we have /(r) / z. But similarly /(F) ^ y, where
r = (zxyl-'>,xj/z''',xzy^ ^'^)). By claim 4 /(r) / r. Thus /(r) = ly and /(r) ^,fg[/.
As 5'"'"(r) = S'<«*>(F) / 0 we have a contradiction with claim 5. So 5 = N or 5 = 0,
proving claim 6.
But then W» = 2*\{0} and W* = {N} or IV" = {N} and W* = 2"\{0}. Moreover, we
have either /'"'({i}) = {xyz^} if W* = 2^\{0}. or /~'({^}) = {^^V^} if W" = 2^\{0}.
So, / = m' for some f e {XJ/Z,X;J/}. •
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have found the minimally manipulahlc surjective mid nondictatorial
social choice functions with three alternatives and more than two agents. They turn out
to be anonymous. This is in contrast to the social choice functions attaining the global
minimum 0 in the class of all social choice functions, which are the dictatorial ones. The
second smallest value that the function A'(/) := |A//|, / a social choice function for three
alternatives, take is n. This value is not attained, as one might expect, by the almost
dictatorial social choice functions that give the minimum in the case of two agents and four
or more alternatives, see Frist nip and Keiding (1998), but it is attained for all numbers
of agents larger than two by six anonymous social choice functions similar in structure.
For the case of two agents these six social choice functions are only part of the set of all
minimally manipulable social choice functions, see Kelly (1988) for other examples of social
choice functions attaining the minimum in this case. For more than three alternatives it is
not clear whether the almost dictatorial social choice functions are minimally manipulable
for more than two agents. We show this however if surjectivity is replaced by unanimity.
In that case almost dictatorial social choice functions are the minimally manipulable social
choice functions if in addition n > 3. The case of four alternatives and three agents is after
this chapter the smallest unsolved case with surjectivity, and for two agents the minimally
manipulable rules are not characterized. It would be of interest to see whether only almost
dictatorial social choice functions are best in the case of two agents and more than three5.7. CX)NCLt/SION 91
alternatives, as this might help with an induction. The following table summarizes th«se
results about minimal luaiiipulahility. FK (195)8) stands for Frist rup mid Keidiug 11998),
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We relate the result in Section 5.6 also to a conjecture made in Kelly (1988). The
Kciueny distance between two preferences / and f' is defined to be the minimal number of
transpositions of adjacent positions in the preference / necessary to obtain the preference
*'. Local strategy-proofness is said to hold if there is a <5 > 1 such that to manipulate, an
agent always has to change to a preference t' that has a larger Keineny distance from his
true preference f than rf. In the minimally maiiipulable social choice functions characterized
here, the manipulating agent changes from j-y; to xcj/. So the Kcmeny distance is 1. Now,
in Kelly (1988) the conjecture was that local strategy-proof social choice functions and
minimally maiiipulable social choice functions have a nonempty intersection. So instead of
looking for minimally maiiipulable social choice functions one can look for local strategy-
proof social choice functions, which might be easier. The result from Section 5.G says that
this is not true for three alternatives and more than two agents. This relation is also
not true for almost dictatorial social choice functions and two agents. But since Fristrup
and Keiding (1998) do not prove that these are all minimally maiiipulable social choice
functions for two agents, this does not say that the relation is not true in this cuse. So, it is
of interest not only to find the minimum in the other cases than the OIK* considered here,
but to characterize also all social choice functions that give this minimum, as was achieved
here. In the case of three alternatives and two agent* the conjecture will remain true of
course, since this was the example given in Kelly (1988).
In another interesting paper by Kelly (1993), a computer draws social choice functions
uniformly from all social choice functions satisfying axioms like anonymity, neutrality and
Pareto optimality, or combinations thereof. He then investigates the sample distributions92 CHAPTER 5. UNANIMITY AND NONDICTATORSH/P
with respect to the number of manipulable profiles of these social choice functions. One
sees thut imposing anonymity in the case of three alternatives causes a shift towards social
choice functions with less manipulable profiles, compared to the sample obtained without
any constraints. We saw here that the minimally manipulable social choice functions for
three alternatives are anonymous. So in this sense anonymity is for three alternatives a
good property when looking for minimally manipulablc social choice functions. It would
be interesting to see what the distributions look like for more than three alternatives, to
see what the effect is there.
5.8 Appendix
In this appendix we study the cane where n = 3 and so Lemma 48 cannot be used to show
that Mi} n M£ = 0 if 5, T € 5, S ^ T. Instead we use even more elementary techniques.
Proposition 52 Lr/ / : pl'-'^-O _» {x,j/,;} ir « unanimous and nonrfictatorta/ socia/
c/ioire /unrftcm. .S'tippaie t/»o< a// /«,•, 5 € <S, are nondictatoria/. T/ien
|Af/| > 6.
Proof. Uy Theorem 12 there arc pi.p-j € A//,, ,,,,p;i,p4 € A//,, „ and p.vPt, € A//,.,.,, such
that
Pi = (/i.<i,<"i),P:. = (<:». <3.<:i). ** = (<*. <'••''.)•
and />, / p,n.» 6 {1,3.5}, f, ?* <",,! e {1.2,3,4,5,6}, as otherwise these profiles cannot be
luiinipuliibU' because of unanimity. This also implies that |{pi,P2,p.t,Pi,p.vP(i}| = 6. since
otherwise (, = f, for some i € {1,2,3,4,5,6}. For each p, there is a E, € P and an 5 € 5,
such that p, £ A// and p, is iiuuiipultible towards ^, := (t| ,Tj) by 5 or p, € A// and p, Ls
manipulnble towtirds (/, := (C',/,) by N - 5. If p, ^ A// then t, ^ <, and if p, € A// then
t, ^ <„
Clajin: Let ;>, £ A//. Then |A//| > 6 or ;>, is nmuipulable towards some 9, = (t, ,<i),S €
5, such that /, ^ {f,.r",}.
As p, ^ A// a (7, = (f, ,T,) towards which p, is manipulable mast exist and as p, / 9,
f, ^ ?,. .Suppose to the contrary that |A//| < 5 and ?, € {<,.<i}, i.e. 7, = £. Without loss of
generality let S = {1,2}, i.e. 1 € {1.2}. We omit the subscript i. Let 11 := /(p),t> := /(?).
Then »• / 1/ and (i\ t/) 6 f. As 7 = T and /(</) = /(?.?.?) = f unanimity implies that
f= 7 6 {t'tiii, run}. Then, f = tern as by unanimity and /(p) ^ r f € P - {ru-u, rtiti'},
nnil (r. 14) € /. This in turn implies that T= 7 = rutr as otherwise p = (UTM, trt'u, t-u-u) is
inmiipuliiltio under / by {3} towards (icfn.irfu.icru) by unanimity. Hence.
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Now. unanimity implies that p is also manipulable towards (rati, rtcti. rtitr) by tho coalition
{1,2} and so, asp g A//.
Consider p3.p4.p-i and p«. Then |A//| < 5 implies that |A// n {p3.p4.pn.Pe}| < !• So.
without loss of generality Pa,p4 £ A//- But then
A// 2 {(<3-r3,<3),(?3,r3,ts),(N,r"4.?4),(?4.
and |A//1 < 5 implies that without loss of generality {(fj,ts.?.i). (f.i.'.i.
{(?, f.F).(i'UTi.f.F)}, since (/, i, t),(iii>u, i.t) are the only profiles in
where the second agent has an identical preference. But this implies that f;, = f f i, a
contradiction. This finishes the proof of the claim.
Now, we consider three cases.
Case 1: There is an » € {1.3.5} such that |),.)'.M £ A//.
Without loss of generality » = 1. By the claim there are tj.tj € P such that |{<i,fi,/|}| •«
We show that |{(fi,?i,t"i), (t^fi.Ti), («a,ta,<2>, (<a, <a,«a)}| = 4. So, suppose coutrapositivc
that |{(«,.«,,r,),(?,,t,.r,),(ta,?a,r2),(?2,^.?2)}| <3. As
and pi ^ p^ this implies that f, = ?2,<i = tj and T| = T^. Hence, if we let ^ - /,, ?| =7 and
Ti = Tthen pi = (/, /, T) = qa and P2 = (<, <,?) = qi- An application of b-miiia <l(l yields (hat
( = uvu' and < = VMUJ where r = /(pi) and « = /(pz). By unanimity then < € {mur, vim}.
But then, if f = u'l/r pi € A// by unanimity and if < = u»ru p-^ 6 A// by unanimity, a
contradiction. Hence,
Note that we are now in a similar situation as in the end of the proof of the claim, except
that we have additionally that |{f|,r~,,?i}| = 3 and Ktj.^t.^}! = 3. So, by considering
P3TP4.PS and pr,, we can obtain the same contradiction. This finishes case 1.
Case 2: There is an i € {1.3.5} such that p,,p,,i € A//.
Then |A//| < 5 and case 1 implies that without loss of generality either pi,P2,p»,p.', € A//
P4,PB £ A// or P1.p2.P3.P4.Pr. € Af/ and pe £ A//. In both cases we can choose
6,£i € P by the claim such that KMe-MI = 3 and &,<«,<«),(?•,,,<»,*«) € A//. Then
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contradicting |A//| < 5. This finishes case 2.
Case 3: For all t € {1,3,5} either p, € A// and p, • i £ A// or p, £ A// and p,+i € M/.
Without loss of generality pi,p:i,po € A//. By the claim there are (,,<,,'i G P,i 6 {2,4},
such that
and |{t,,?i,?<}| = 3 for all i e {2,4}. Then |A/,| < 5 implies that
and HO ?2 = <4 = £j< a contradiction. This finishes case 3.
All three cases together show that under the assumptions of the proposition |A//| < 5
lends to ii contradiction. Hence, |A/y| > C, proving the proposition. •
Proposition 53 /W / : />( i-2-**> —» ,4 6f a unanimous and nondirfaforia/ soctai cnoice
/unction. 6'uppoAf! t/»at a// /s,5 € 5 — {{1}}, arif nondtc<a<ohaZ. T/ien
Proof. As A/ = {1,2,3} we have 5-{{1}} = {{1,2}, {1,3}}. By Lemma 42 |I
^ for all 5 € 5 - {(I}}. Without loss of generality fc := |n,,,2,(A/,,,J n M,| <
IFTji,:i)(A//|,.,,) n M/|. If the following claim is proven the proposition follows immediately,
as then
Claim: To each p € ri(i,a}( A//,, ^) - A// we can associate two profiles r^, r^ e A// such that
IrJWI = kJ(Af)l = 3 and {r^rj} n {rl,r?} = 0 for all p 6 n,,.a,(A#/,,.,,) - A//, p / p.
Let p = (<p,<p, Tp) ^ A// be intuiipulahle towards (j = (tp, <p, Tp). By Lemma 41 we
can assume that ?,, £ {'(>.'»>}• For all such p by Lemma 38 rp := (<p,tp,tp) € A// and
r» :- (?p,fp.f,) € A/,. If {r,',,rp} n {r!. r^} = 0 for all p,p 6 IVa»(A/,,,.,,) - A/,, p / p,
we are done.
So. suppcx^ that there i.s an r € {r^, r^} l~l {r^, r?} for some p.p € IL,i.2)(A//,,,,) - M/,
p / p. By Lemma 48 then p = (f, f, r) = ^ and <j = (t, (, t) = p for some ^, T, < € P such that
|{f,r.r}| = 3. b-t J := /(;») and /(p) = y. Then x ^ y. (y.x) € r and (j.y) 6 f becaase /
is manipiiltible from ;> to p and frtnn p to p. Without loss of generality we may assume that
(J\ y) € f. As / is unanimous and /(p) = y either f ^ x... or t ^ x.... As. m > 4 there5.8. APPEND/A' ,i 95
are (m - 2)! > 2 preferences Tsuch that F= xy hence we can choose such a T^ {f*,F}.
Letp = (F, T, t) and
F* =
V ' = (M,t),F = (M,t). .,.,>, ,
\ •."•• r <•;••'• ''''"*»
We need the fonowing subclaim concerning these profiles. "
Suhclaim: Let P £ A// for some t 6 {1.2}. Then F € A// and ;? £ ri(i,j)(A/;,,.,,) - A//.
Furthermore then for all j/ € n^i.aj(A//,, „) — A// such that ;/ is manipulahlc by {1,2}
towards q' with |p'(A/) Ug'(N)| = 3 and P or F\t € {1,2}, is on a shortest patli from p' to
9', p' = p or p' = p respectively. . .i,,„,,
Without loss of generality i = 1. If /(r*) € A — {x, y} then agent 1 can manipulate at
F" towards p, contradicting r* ^ A//. If /(r*) = x then p is manipulablo by agent 1 towards
r*. contradicting p ^ A//. Thus
/(?*) = »•
^ /(p) = !/- <!«*» P 6 A'/ a" agent 3 can deviate towards (F, ^, f) and (J, jy) € '• If /(p) €
/I - {x, y} then p e A// as agent 2 can deviate towards f and p(2) = T= xy If /(p) = x
then p ^ II(i,2)(A//,,,,) — A// as p({l,2}) = t = x..., so coalition {1,2} has no incentive
to manipulate. Hence, for all values of /(p) either p € A// or p ^ IIj|,a)(A//,, ^) — A//
implying in particular that
If /(f') = x then agent 2 can manipulate at f towards f', contradicting r' ^ A//. Hence,
/(f') / x. But then agent 1 can manipulate at f' towards p, so
f' e A//.
Now. to end the proof of the subclaim let // € FI(|,2)(Afy, .^) — A// be such that // in
manipulable by {1.2} towards (/' with |p'(N) U(?'(A')| = 3 and f* or F,i € {1.2}, is on a
shortest path from p' to qr*. Then P (F) is also on a shortest path from p to p (p to p)
and p ^ p* as p ^ n,,.2)(A/,,, ^) - A// and p* € II(,.2)(A//,,_„) - A//. Hence, by part (2) of
Lemma 48 p* = p (p* = p). This proves the subclaim.
Now we consider three cases.
Case 1: {r'.r'} fi M/ = 8.
Then by the subclaim r'.r'' € A//. By the furthermore part of the Hubclaim F',f^ can
be uniquely associated to p. Then r£, r| can be uniquely associated to p.
Cj|se_2: {r».r*} n A/, = {P}.i € {1,2}.
Without loss of generality i = 1. By the furthermore part of the claim we can uniquely
associate F*, rp to p and F', r^ to p.
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Now suppose, otherwise we are obviously done, that there is an r",j 6 {1,2}. and a
p' € II(i,jj(A/y,, ,,) - A//, nmnipulable by {1,2} towards qr' with |p'(JV) U^(N)| = 3, such
that f is on a shortest path from p' to g*. Then, by part (2) of Lemma 48 {p\ q^} = {p,p}.
If p* = p for all such p* we are done, since we can uniquely associate f*,r* to p and
Tp,Tp to p. So, suppose that p' = p and ^ = p, i.e. p = (M, <) is manipulable towards
p = (t,f,T) by coalition {1,2}. As /(p) = y this implies that (y,/(p)) € Tand /(p) ^ y.
Since £ = xy... and /(p) = x, p = ((, <, <), it follows that p is also manipulable by
{1,2} towards p. As p = p* € II{i,2)(Af/,,,,) - A// this implies that r',f* € M/. So,
we have found six manipulablo profiles {r^r^F'jf'.F'.f*} for the three distinct profiles
p,p,p € ri(].2j(A//^, ._,j) — A//. We are done if we can show that these six manipulable
profiles are uniquely associated to p,p,p. The profiles r',rp,r',r* are by construction not
associated to any p" G fl{ ».2> (-^/(i aj) ~ A//iP" ^ {PiPiP}- Suppose that f,i € {1,2}, is
associated to p" e ri{i,2}(A//,,,,) — A//, i.e. on a path from p" to g". Again then, by part
(2) <»f Lemma 48 {/'".f/"} = {?<?}• and this finishes case 3.
C'IINCH 1 to 3 show that the claim is true, and this proves the proposition by the remarks
before the claim. •Chapter 6
Surjectivity and Anonymity
Gibbard's (1973) and Satterthwaite's (1975) result implies that anonymous surjeotive so-
cial choice functions on more than two alternatives are manipulablc. Placing some mild
constraints on the number of agents compared to the number of alteruat ives, we show what
the minimal number of manipulable profiles of such social choice functions is. Moreover,
all such social choice functions attaining the lower bound are characterized. They show a
trade off between minimizing manipulability and treating alternative* neutrally.'
6.1 Introduction
A well-known result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (197.1) states that any strategy-
proof surjective social choice function on more than two alternatives is dictatorial. Thin
implies that anonymity and surjectivity are not compatible with strategy-proofness. Here
we investigate how incompatible these are, i.e. how much manipulability we have to allow
at anonymous and surjective social choice functions.
There are a few studies on the degree of vulnerability for strategic behaviour of classical
social choice functions, such as Borda, Plurality, etc.. For example, Aleakerov and Kurbanov
(1999) contains simulation and enumeration results on 26 different social choice, functions
for different indices of manipulability. Slinko (2(X)2) counts the number of instabli- profiles
of classical social choice functions, which is an upper bound for the number of manipulable
profiles of these social choice functions. On the other hand, little is known about the extent
of manipulability that social choice functions satisfying certain properties must admit.
Results on this may provide lower bounds to which then all social choice functions satisfying
these properties can be compared. An investigation was pioneen-d by Kelly (1988), who
gave the minimal number of manipulable profiles for nondictatorial surjextivc social choice
functions with three alternatives and two agents and formulated several conjectures. This
line of research was continued by Fristrup and Keiding (1998), who gave, the minimal
number of manipulable profiles for two agents and any number of alternatives. Maw* et al.
'The results in this chapter were first formulated in Maun et al. (2004c).
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(2004c, see Chapter 5) consider the three alternative case and show that for any number of
agents larger than two there are six minimally manipulable nondictatorial surjective social
choice functions, and these are even anonymous. However, they also consider minimally
manipulable unanimous and nondictatorial social choice functions. These turn out to be
nondictatorial only in a minimal sense, namely at only one profile.
Here we will exclude such social choice functions by demanding that agents are treated
anonymously and we replace unanimity by surjectivity. In particular, anonymous social
choice functions are nondictatorial. So, we are interested in the minimal number of manip-
ulable profiles that an anonymous surjective social choice function has to admit. It is well
known that in caw of two alternatives any monotonic social choice function is strategy-
proof. As inonotouicity and anonymity are compatible (see e.g. May (1952)) in case of two
alternatives this minimal number is zero. In case of three alternatives the minimal number
is (x|iinl to the number of agents. This follows from Maus et al. (2004c, see Chapter 5).
Actually, if there are more than two agents the only social choice functions reaching this
minimal number are anonymous. To the best of our knowledge only so far the problem
to find the minimal number of manipulable profiles of anonymous surjective social choice
functions is completely solved. Although here for four or more alternatives this minimal
number is determined for many cases, there are still some cases which are completely open.
Due to the combinatorics used in the proofs only the following cases are solved: The four
alternatives and at least five; agents case and the five or more alternatives and at least two
more agents than alternatives case. So, roughly speaking, the problem is not solved if there
are at least as many alternatives as agents. Up till now we could neither solve the problem
for any of these cases by a different proof nor could we find counterexamples. Therefore
the problem is completely open for these eases.
The characterization we provide is unified for all numbers of alternatives. Interpreting
the definition with two alternatives boils down to a strategy-proof social choice function
for two alternatives called status-quo voting. In the three alternatives case it defines the
minimally manipulable nondicatorial surjective social choice functions, as found in Maus
ot al. (200 le, see Chapter .")). In general the characterized social choice functions show how
one can (but probably would not want to) minimize inauipulability while treating agents
anonymously. They minimize also surjectivity. meaning that except for two alternatives,
say fe and r, for all other alternatives there is precisely one profile at which they are chosen.
At the remaining profiles the choice between b and r is on a unanimity basis: r is chosen
unless ft is unanimously preferred to ft. So, alternatives are treated in a nonneutral way.
which will usually be just as undesirable as treating agents unequal. Nevertheless the result
shows what is possible if wo want to minimize manipulahility.
It should be noted that the way in which wo measure manipulabilitv. namely by counting
manipulable profiles, is not the only possible one. In fact there are a lot of variations of
this, where for example profiles are counted by the number of agents that can manipulate
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achieves with and without manipulation is taken into account. Aleskerov and Kurbanov
(1999) contain an overview of such variations and numerical results on the nuuupulahility
of 26 social choice functions according to these measurements. "'• - «ni: ?
Within the restrictions pointed out we show as a main step of our proof of the main
result that strategy-proof and anonymous surjootive social choice between imw than two
alternati\TS is not possible on subsets of the whole domain satisfying a certain diversity
condition, namely on subsets where agents hold at least A- € N different preferences We
point this out here since this is an impossibility result on a restricted domain that is of
interest on its own. It says, that the impossibility result of Gihbard-Sattcrthwaitc cannot
be resolved by demanding diversity of preferences. The reader who is familiar with a proof
of Arrow's theorem (Arrow, 1963) and a proof Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem building
on Arrow's theorem will recognize a lot of similarities. The basic idea is to show that the
steps taken there can be adopted to go through also on the restricted domains considered
here. To ensure that these steps can be adopted we need the restrictions that then cause
the restrictions on the main result.
In the next section the relevant definitions are given, anil the relation to Gibbard (1973),
Satterthwaite (1975) and Maus et al. (2004c. see Chapter 5) is made more prei isr S< < lions
6.4 and 6.5 link strategy-proofness to monotoiiititv. Parcto optinmlitv and deeisivenesH
on sets of profiles where agents hold at least A- different preferences. Then, Section (i.fi
combines this to show that there are no strategy-proof and anonymous surjeetive social
choice functions selecting among more than two alternatives on these restricted domains.
After that. Section 6.7 characterizes the minimally inanipulahlc anonymous surjective social
choice functions selecting from more than three alternatives.
6.2 Preliminaries
We denote the cardinality of a set 5 by |5|.
Let A be a finite set of alternatives, m := |i4| > 3, and /V a finite set of agents,
n := |AT| > 2.
Let f C v4 x A We call / comp/etfi if for all x, y € .4 (x, y) € < or (y, x) € <. Note that
completeness of < implies (x, x) € * for all x 6 /I. We call / tran/rittve if for all x, {/, z € J4
(x, j/) € < and (j/. J) € < implies (x, 2) € A We call * an/uymmrtnr if for all x, y € /i
(x, y) € f and (y, x) € f implies that x = y.
A pfr/err-ncc t C i4 x /t is a /inear entering (complete, transitive, antisymmetric) on A
Let P denote the set of all preferences. Suppose that .4 = {xi, xj,.. • x^} • By completeness,
transitivity and antisymmetry we can write conveniently
f = X,X2. ..X,,,
for the preference < such that (ZJ,X^) € t if and only if i >./', i,j € {1,2,.. .,m}, and100 CHAPTER 6. SI/RJECTIV7TY AND ANONYMITY
if we want to express only that x is strictly preferred to y. -^ .* ^= •• *• •' - -.,«
^ A prw/ifc p is a map from TV to P. Let P* denote the set of all these maps. Thus,
a profile assigns to every agent i a preference p(«) over the alternatives. For a nonempty
sulwet 6' of iV we denote by p|,y the restriction of the map p to the domain 5. We denote
a profile such that all agents have the same preference < € P by t*.
A soria/ choice /unrhon is a function / : P* —» A. Hence, a social choice function
selects a unique alternative /(p) at every profile p. • ••>
A social choice function is called aur/erftw: if any alternative in A is chosen at least once,
i.e. if /(P*) = A. Iu the literature this is also known as citizen-sovereignty. Throughout
this chapter we assume that any social choice function is surjective, and do not mention
this anymore explicitly. , i
For a permutation <7 of N and a profilep e P'^ let po<r be the profile given by (po<r)(i) :=
p(ff(i)) for nil i 6 iV. A social choice function is called anonyrnoiw if /(p) = /(poa) for
all permutations <7 of N. Thus, anonymous social choice functions are symmetric in the
arguments. In a sense they treat agents equally.
In contrast to anonymity, the following dictatorial social choice functions dirtj respect
only the preference of one single agent <i € N, the dictator. For any profile p dirtrf is defined
by
d»t«rf(p) := I
where ,r is such tluit p(d) = i.... So, rfirtrf(p) is the most preferred alternative of agent d
in ;>(</). A social choice function / Ls called nondictatoria/ if there is no agent d such that
/ = dirt,,.
6.3 Manipulation of social choice functions
We me interested in strategic behaviour of individuals when facing cooperative decision-
making as captured by social choice functions. This is formalized by the following defini-
tions. Let / : P* —> .1 be a social choice function. Let p 6 P* be a profile. Then each
profile (/such that, for some i 6 N, </|N {•) = p|\ (i) and<j(i) ^ p(i). Ls called an i-rfrin'a?ton
from p. Letting f :---- </(i) we use the notation <j = (/)-,./). If it is not important which
agent deviates from p to (/ we call q a drtinfion from p. A profile p is called rriarupuia6/e
(under /) if there is an agent that is l>etter off by being dishonest about hus preference, i.e.
if there is an i € .'V. and an t-deviation 9 such that
In this rase we say that /> is m<mi/>u/<iM< /ot/'unis q (under /). Let B C P* an<l
A//(fl) : = {p € B I p us manipulable towanls
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A social choice function is called strategy-proo/ on 0 if A//(B) = i, otherwise it is said to
be mantpuia6/f on B. When 6 = P* we omit B and write A// := A//(P*). •, r ?
The prominence of the dictatorial rules arises from the following inuxvisibility result
due to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975).
Theorem 54 Z^i A 6«> a /inifr «•< o/ aifrrnatwcs, |A| > 3. Lrt / : P" —• A 6r o nonrfir-
tatonai soctai c/iotcr/unrtion. 77irn
"" However, this theorem makes no statement about the number of tnanipulablc profile*
such social choice functions admit. This question has been solved by Kelly (1988) for two
agents and three alternatives, and by Fristrup and Keiding (1998) for two agents, and
any number of alternatives larger than three. In Mans et al. (2001c. siv Chapter Ji) it is
shown that for m = 3 and any number of agents larger than two, (he following social choice
functions are exactly the minimally manipulable ones among the nondictatorial social choico
functions.
Definition 55 CTioose 6,c € A,6 ^ c, and /et A = {ai,. ..<!„,-2,6,r}. (7/iwwr m - 2
dt/ferent prr/erenres t, € P, j € {1,2,... ,m - 2}, sucn tAat t^ = ...«,... 6... r... /or ai/
j € {1,2,..., m - 2}. Let m : P^ -• A 6r (Ae «octal rnoicp /iincfion ytven 6|/
{
a, i/p = <^ /or .some j € {1,2,..., m - 2}
6 »/ (6,c) € p(«) /or a//« € N aruf p fl {<^,... #_,}
i/ </irrr i.s nnie JV ,s«r/i tAat (r, fc) G p(t).
Note that the social choice functions given by Definition 55 are not only nondictatorial
but even anonymous. So, they are the minimally manipulable anonymous social choice
functions for three alternatives. Hence, we do not have to treat the three alternative case
here. We will show that also for m > 4 the social choice functions given by Definition 55
are the minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions. One might hope that a»
in the case m = 3 the minimally manipulable nondictatorial social choice functions coincide,
with the anonymous ones. We will see that this is not so.
6.4 Monotonicity and Pareto optimality on
Let Jt € N and let
be the set of all profiles that contain at least Jfc different preferences. We want to show
an impossibility result for strategy-proof and anonymous social choice functions on /i* for
certain /:. This section contains two ingredients for that impossibility result, a monotonicity
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Let p.r/ € P^,a € .4 C A We say that n u/eaA:/t/ improved from p to q with respect to
y4, if for all alternatives i € .4, we have for all agents t € AT
(a,x) € p(t) implies (a,x) € q(i). .-,,•• !--••;>;•.;•., :, ..?,
Let / : P*' —» .4 be a social choice function and let B C P^. We say that / is monotone
on B, if for all p, q € B such that /(p) weakly improved from p to q with respect to /(B),
we have
/(p) = /fa).
This monotonicity condition corresponds to the one used in Dasgupta et al. (1979) for
social choice rules, and is also known as Maskin-monotonicity. The following lemma links
stratcgy-proofneas to monotonicity.
Lemma 56 Lc< / : P* —• J4 6C anonymous and 3<rn/e<7j/-proo/ on B*,fc € N. 77ien / ts
monotone on fl*.
Proof. Lot p, </ € fl* be such that /(p) weakly improves from p to 7 with respect to /(fl*).
We have to show that /(p) = /(g).
Claim 1: If there are »,j € Af,i ^ j, such that p(i) = o(j), then /(p) also weakly
improves from p to 5 := qo (i,j) with respect to /(B*), where (i j) is the permutation
mapping i to j and j to 1, and leaving all other elements of ;V fixed.
For nil / g A/ - {i.j} we have that
(/(/>).*) 6 p(/) implies (/(p),x) € ?(/) for all x 6 /(B*). (6.1)
IUS q(/) q(/) and /(p) weakly improves from p to q with respect to /(fl ). For / = i we have
p(/) = p(i) = g(j) = q"(i) = q(/), so that statement 6.1 also holds for / = ». For / = j and all
x € /(fl*) we have (/(p),x) € p(/) implies (/(p),x) € q(/) = q(j) = p(i), as /(p) weakly
improves from p to q with respect to /(fl*). Then for the same reason (/(p).x) € p(«)
implies that (/(p),.r) 6 g(«) - g(j) = q(/). Altogether, statement 6.1 holds for all / 6 AT,
HO /(/») weakly improves from p to q with respect to /(fl*). This proves claim 1.
Note thnt /»(•) = q(») for the q constructed in claim 1 and that q € fl*. By repeatedly
appying claim 1 we obtain a $ € fl* such that p(i) / q(j) for all i, j € S := {» € AT|p(«) ^
$(t)}, i.e. p(S)Oq(5) = 0. By anonymity /(q) = /(q), so it suffices to show that /(q) = /(p).
Furthermore, by anotivmity \«> may assume that 5 = {1,2,...,.«}, s = |S|, and we may
number the agents in i» such that for some liugest possible f € {1.2 s} we have that
«0) * q((N - 5) U {1 j - 1}) for all j € {1 f - 1}.
Lot the profiles r' € P^', / € {0 n}, be given by
"" ^'^ •' 1 p(.) • > /6.4. AfONOrON/aTV AND PARFTO OP77.\/ALJTV ON B* 103
fbrallieN. .-. •-,,-.. ..-y^y,, •••• •••• - -•> ••- -' ^ - • "''-, ; •• •' ">v •-->=•;•
Claim 2: r* € B* for all f e {0 a}.
We prow the claim by induction on j. '
Induction Basis: j = 0. Since r" = p € B* this is obvious.
Induction step: Suppose that |r*~'(AT)| > it for some j € {1 .s}. We haw to show
that HN)| > Jt. If j < r, then 5(j) £ g((N - S)U{1 > - 1}). Furthermore, as
p(S) n fl(S) = 0 and > € S we have g(j) ^ p({j + 1 s}). Since
it follows that 50") * r'CV - U})- As H"'(JV - {>}) = H(/V - {j}), ftl) * ^(/V - {j})
and |H-'(iV)| > *, hence |r>-'(N - {j})| > * - 1. it follows that |r»(tf)| > it. Tb end
the proof of the induction step supj>ose j > r. By the maximality of t' we have ?(i) 6
g((N - S) U {1 v - 1}) for all i € {i' s}. So. 5(N) = f/((N - 5) U {1 v - 1}).
But then
and hence qf € 5* implies that r* 6 B*. This finishes the proof of claim 2.
We can now show that /(g) = /(/>). First of all r" = /» and r" = f/. By claim 2 r' 6 B*
for all / 6 {0,...,n}. As / is strategy-proof on B* wo have (/(r'),/(;")) € r'(l) = f/(l)
and (/(r"),/(r')) e p(l). As /(r") = /(p) and /(p) weakly improved from p to iy with
respect to /(B*). (/(r«),/(r')) € p(l) implies (/(r»),/(r')) G 5(1). So,
and
This implies that /(p) = /(r") = /(r'), since preferences are antisymmetric. Repeating
this argument yields
which finishes the proof. •
As a corollary of Lemma 56 we can state the following.104 ' CHAPTER 6. Sl/RJECTJVJTY AND ANCWYM7TY
Corollary 57 Lr< / : P" -. A fe anonymotts and stroteyy-proo/ on 6\f:6N. Let a €
/(/?*) and p € B* 6e suc/j (Aat (x,a) g p(i) /or ail i € iV anda//x € /(B*) - {a}. 77»en
Let x, y € .A, x ^ y. We say that x Pareto dominates y at the profile p, if (x, y) € p(i) for
all»' € AT. A social choice function is called Pareto optima/ on B C P*, if it does not choose
alternatives Pareto dominated by an element of /(B), i.e. there is no x € /(B) - {/(p)}
such that x Pareto dominates /(p) at p.
The second lemma shows that if / is anonymous and strategy-proof on B*. then /
is Pareto optimal on /?*. We have to make restrictions on Jt in order to make sure that
there urc sufficiently many different preferences having the same alternative at the first and
second places.
Lemma 58 For m = 4 /et ifc < m + 1 and /or m > 5 /et it < m + 2. Let / : P" -» A 6c
*<ratr«y-pTwo/ and anon!/T7ioti.f on B*. 77>en / is Pareto optima/ on B*.
Proof. Let p € B*,x € /(B*) and y € A he such that x Pareto dominates y at p. Suppose
that /(p) = y. It is sufficient to deduce a contradiction. By Lemma 56 / is monotone
on B*. As p € B*' and / is anonymous we can without loss of generality suppose that
(J>({1, ,fcl)l = A' I-*'t / = max(fc - fm - 2)!.O}. then by monotonicitv we ran assume
that for / < t < A- wi< have p(i) = xy.... In view of Corollary 57, / > 1. For i € {1 /}
lot Z, := {a € A | (n,y) e p(»)} be the upper contour of y at p(i). There are precisely
(m - 2)! preferences where x is best and y is second best and / > 1, hence A- > (m - 2)! and
{•''..'/} £ ^i for 'ill ' € {1 /}. Consider r(i') obtained from p(i) by shifting alternative x
to the top leaving all other alternatives unchanged:
r(.) = ({x}xA)u(p(,)n(A-{x}f).
For / < i < A- wo have r(t) = p(i). If we show that r€fl* then by monotonicity /(r) = y,
as y = /(;>) improves from p to r.
As {x,y}£ Z, and |{Z, Z,}| =/. |r({l A-})| = it. Hence, r € B*. By Corollary
57 /(r) = x, contradicting /(r) = y.
So, / > 2. But / = ifc - (m - 2)! < (m + 2) - (m - 2)! < 1 for m > 5. So, m = 4 and
/ € {2,3}. Without loss of generality Zi = Zj and let A = {x,y,a,6}. As {x,y} Q Z, for
all i 6 {1,...,/}, there are alternatives Ci € Z| — {x.y} and, if / = 3, J^ € Z3 - {x.y}. If
/ = 3 and Z3 = Z| = Zj wi< must haw |Zj| =4 as |Z|| = 3 implies that without loss of
generality p({1.2,3}) C {ojy6.x«iy6}. contradicting |p{{l it})| = Jt. So. if/ = 3. we
can choose a i;t € Z| - {x, y, ^i}. Without loss of generality suppose that j| = a and. if6.5. DECISIVENESS ON 105
/ = 3. ;j = fc. Consider the profile r defined by
axj/6 if i = 1,
xny6 if i = 2,
j-6j/a if i = / = 3,
r(i) if • > /.
1
Then r € B* and y improves from p to F. Hence. /(F) = y. Let F := (r ,. .r<ito/l By lamina
57. /(F) = r. So. r Ls a 1-deviation from f such that (/(r),/(r)) g f(l). But then r t B*
is niaiiipulable and this contradiction ends the proof. •
6.5 Decisiveness on Z?^ ^,
Let A' C /4 and B* be the set of all profiles in B* where nil alternatives in .Y are strirtly
preferred to alternatives in /I — X,
B£ := {p € B* | for all t € AT and i € X,y € .4 - X we have (i.y) € p(i)}.
Let p € B^jj, a / 6. We say that S C Af drrirfps over (a,6) at p. if /(p) = n and
S = {i e Af | (a,6) € p(i)}. We say that S dwid™ oiw (n,6), if S <le<ide« owr (n,6) at
all profiles p 6 B*,,,, that satisfy 5 = {i G A' | (<i,6) e ;»(()} VVr denote the set of nil .9
that are decisive over (a, 6) by W*(a,fc). The following is an immediate <onm-quence of the
definitions of weak improvement and monotonicity.
Remark 59 for sorin/ r/ioirp /unrhorw / uj/iic/i nrr' mrm«l(mc on B*'. .V rfrrif/ri owr- («, fc)
a< a pro/i/f p € Bf,,,,, t/ and on/y i/S€ W*(a,6).
The next lemma shows some decLsiveness properties of / on B* over triples of alterna-
tives, when / is strategy-proof on B*'.
Lemma 60 Le< it < m t/ m = 4 and It < m + 2 i/m>5. Let / 6P annnymowi ana*
s/ra<«/y-proo/ on B*. /(B*) 3 {a. fc, r} /or rfijflV-rrnt n, fc and r. /.r< .S' € H^(n. /)). 77irn
/. S € W*(c. 6) and 5 6 W*(a, c),
2. S€ W*(6,a) and
5. |5| > in.
Proof. (1): By Lemma 56 / Ls monotone on B*. By the restrictions on * Fj^, is nonempty.
Let p € B^,. be such that 5 is decisive over (a.6) at p. For a permutation r on 4 and a
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For x, j/ € A let (x y) denote the permutation that maps x on y, t/ on x and all other
elements of A on themselves.
' Let p' be such that p'|* = p|.y and p'(t) = (p(t))'° "> for all» € N - S. Then p' 6 B*. By
monotonicity /(p') / 6, as 6 weakly improves from p' to p and /(p) = a ^ 6. As 6 Pareto
dominates all x € A — {a, 6} at p' we also have by Lemma 58 that /(p') ^ A — {a,6}, so
Let p* be such that p^U-5 = p'U-s and p^(i) = (p'(i))""' for all t 6 5. Then p^ € B*.
By monotonicity /(p^) = o, as a weakly improves from p' to p* and /(p') = a.
Let;/' be such that jr'|/v_.s = p*|/v-,s and p-'(i) = (p^(i))'""' for all i e 5. Then p* € B*.
As r € /(/i*) Pareto dominates nil alternatives x € A — {fc. r} it follows by Lemma 58
that /(p') € {6, c}. By monotonicity /(p') / 6, as 6 weakly improves from p' to p* and
/(p*) = a / 6. So, /(p») = c.
Finally, let p* be such that p'U-s = P*U-s and p*(i) = (p^(i))<° *> for alii € 5. Then
p* G ^*6r( *"^ ^ Jiionotonicity /(p*) = c. So, 5 decides over (c,6) at p* and by Remark
59
In order to see that 5 dpcid«w over (a,r) let ;/' be such that p'^.s = p^|s and p''(t) =
(p^(»))""' for all t € N — 5. Then p'' 6 B* and as /(p''') = o we have by monotonicity that
Lot p" be sudi that p"|« = p*|» and p°(i) = (p*(i))<" *> for all» e N -5. Then p° € flf.^
and by monotonicity /(p") = n. So, 5 decides over (a, c) at p° and by Remark 59
(2): By (1) we have 5 C IV*(«, r). Thus, applying (1) to 5 e lV*(n. r) yields S e IV*(6. r)
and then applying the sorond part of (1) to 5 e W*(6,r) yields 5 € ll'*(6.n).
(H): To the contrary suppose that |5| < .JH. By anonymity we have T € W*(n,6) for
all 7' such that |T| = |S|. By (2) also T G W^*(6,n) for all such T. By monotonicity then
T € lV*(6.a) for all T such that |T| > |S|. So, A' - S e W*(6,a) and this contradicts
se il'*(rt.t). •
In the case »r« = 4 and A; = m + 1 = 5, B^ ^| is empty, but an almost similar result can
be nchio\i>d using the following terminology. Let A = {«,6.c.</}. Let Bf^j be the set of
all profiles p in Zi* where nil except one agent i € A' prefer all alternatives in {a, 6} to all
alternatives in {r, </}, and p(i) € {«rf6c.Wnr}. Let p € Bf^, a # 6 We say that SC^
rf-ffrrufe« owrr (o,6) n< p. if /(p) = a and 5 = {i € N | (n,6) € p(i)}«'*r ^ p(S). We say
that 5 <<-rfrt-idr,« otvr (<i,6). if 5 rf-deeides over (n.6) at all profiles p € #£,'(,) that satisfy
S *» {i € TV | («,6) € ;i(0}."'"f ^ p(-!>)- We denote the set of all 5' that are rf-decisivr over
(n,fe) by ir>.,/>).
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Remark 61 For mortal cnoiee /iinrriorw /. whirn orr monotonr on B*. S rf-dcridr.« OIXT
(0,6) at a pro/iie p € B^, 1/ and on/y •/ 5 € H](a, 6).
Now we can show a lemma like Lemma 60 for d-decisivenoss.
Lemma 62 L<"/ A = {a. 6. r. d} and it = 5. J>( / 6<- anonymous and .sfmffyy-pnx)/on B*.
*) 2 {a,6,r} /or pairu-wr dij0V>rrn< o, 6 and r. L<-1 5 € H'^(«i,6). 77»rn
'•rid'
i. S € Wj*(r,6) and S € VV^(a.r)
':
5. |S| > Jn.
Proof. By Lemma 56 / is monotone on B*. Let 5 € W^*(a.6). Then |p(A')| = 2 by
definition, and thus 2 < |S| < n - (Jfc - |p(5)|) = n - 3. Without IONS of generality















































As in the proof of Lemma 60 by these profiles it follows that 5 € W*(e,o) und S €
Wj(a.e).Then (2) follows by applying (1) twice as in the proof of Lemma GO. Furtlicnnore,
if T C AT such that |T| > S and |T| < n - 3. then by anonymity and nioiiotonicity
T € Wj(6.o). Suppose 5 € W*(a.6) and |5| < In. Then |^V - (Su{»i})| = |TV) - |S| - 1 >
in - 1 > |S|. So, AT - (5U {n}) € W^(b,a). Consider the profile « = (p ,,,adbr). By
strategy-proofness /(a) = a. But {« € AT | (b,a) € o(»)} = AT - (S'U {n}) € VV^fc.a), so
/(q) = b. a contradiction. •
6.6 Gibbard-Satterthwaite on £*
We combine the results of the previous sections to show an impossibility result for strategy-
proof anonymous social choice functions among more than two alternatives on the restricted
domain B*. i.e. when agents preferences have to satisfy a minimal diversity.
Theorem 63 // m = 4 /r< it < m + 1 < n and 1/ m > 5
on B* and anonymous. 77ien |/(B*)| < 2.
A: < "i + 2 < ».IIS CHAPTER 6. SURJEC77V7TY AND
Proof. To the contrary suppose that there are pairwise different a, 6, c € /(B*). Note that
by the constraints n > 5. By Lemma 56 / is monotone on B*. Let {S, T, f/} be a partition
of AT, such that for X, V € {5,T,t/} we have 0 < |X| < |V| + 1. Consider profiles p such
that .., ., . ._, .. .... . .. ..... .
C {<€P|< = «6...}, ......... I
C {«€P|< = 6c...}, and
p(£/) C {<€P|r = ca...}.
There are (m-2)! different choices for any p(t), hence we may assume that p e B*. Without
loss of generality /(p) = a. For some S such that |5| < jnwe will prove that 5 6 W*(a, c)
if (rn, A;) ^ (4. 5) and S € W,}(«. r) if (m, it) = (4,5). As |S| < ±n, we have a contradiction
with Lemma 60, or Lemma 62 respectively, and are done.
Case 1: (m,Jfc) ^ (4,5)
Let {S,f,#} be ti partition of TV such that S C S, T 3 7\ t/ D 1/ and for X, V €
{S,f ,£/} we have 0 < |X| < min{|V| + 1, |5|}. Consider g such that
C {<eP|« = ac...},
C {t€ P|c=ra...}and
C {re P|f = ra...}.
A preference <7(i) in S or Tul/ can be extended in (m - 2)! ways. We prove that there are
such <7 € B£,,j. So, we have to show that
A; < min{|5|, (m - 2)!} + min{|f| + |t/|, (m - 2)!} =: «.
Tliore are four caws. If o = |S| + |f| + |f/| = |/V| then o = n > *. If a = |5| + (m - 2)!,
then, i»s |i'| > 2,
Q>2 + (m-2)!>m + 2>ik
if m > 5, and
Q > 2 + (w - 2)! = m > Jt
if in I. siiuv (»n. A) ^ (4,5). If a = 2(m - 2)!, then o > 2 + (m - 2)! and we can argue
as in the previous case. As r> > m + 1 and m > 4. n > 5. So. |5| < |T| + |t?|. Therefore
the cius(< a = (r« - 2)! + T| + |f?| cannot occur. So. we may assume that <? € £tf ^..
I'Yom p to </ o weakly improws, so by nionotonicity /(</) = n. and therefore 5 e VV*(a. r).
By the way ^S was chosen w«> have |S| < jfi. contradicting part 3 of Lemma 60.
CflasLi (m.Jt) = (4.5)
Subcase 2;ii |5| = 1
Then II = 5, and by anonymity we may assume that
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Let
9 = (aftft, oWxi. rtiofc. ro/W, oad6). ) ?;i „ '
Then a has improved from p to g. so /(g) = a by monotonicity. But then {ieAf |(«,c)€
g(i)} = S = {1.2} € lV£(a,c), contradicting part 3 of Lemma 62.
Subcase 2« : |5| > 2
Let p' be such that p'U-s = p|.v-.s- and p'(i) = (p(i))'*^ for all i € S. Then p' € B*.
By monotonicity /(p') = a, as a weakly improves from p to p'. Without loss of generality
1 € 7\ Let p* be equal to p' if there is an agent t € T with p'(i) = 6cda. So, /(p*) =• a.
Otherwise p'lT) = {brarfjand we let p* := (p ;.fc<Wn) for some i € T. Obviously p* € fl*.
Now r Pareto dominates rf at p*', so rf ^ /(p*) by Lemma 58. As / is strategy'-proof
on B*" and /(p*) ^ {b.<"} we obtain /(p^) = a in the case p'(T") = {6au/} an well. Now
consider p* such that JT'|N_T- = P'IN-T, P*(l) = «ia6 and p'(T - {1}) = {«iM}. Then
o weakly improves from p* to p*. and p* 6 B*. so by monotonicity /(p*) •= n- But then
{» e JV | (o,c) € p*(i)} = 5 € Wj(a,c), contradicting part 3 of Lemma 62. •
The theorem says that within the restrictions the impossibility result of CSibimnl Sat-
terthwaite holds already on the smaller domain of profiles that satisfy a certain diversity.
This may not surprise the reader because practically situations with a lot of diversity can
be expected to be suspect to manipulation. At least it confirms this expectation. We did
not think much about the situation when A: exceeds the IH>UII<IS given. This is Iwyond the
scope of this chapter since the result is only a by-product on the way to the main result
contained in the next section.
6.7 Minimal manipulability of anonymous social
choice functions
Before proving the main result we show some helpful inequalities.
Lemma 64 ZW Ar, /, m, n € N. 77ien
J. *!/! <(*: + /- 1)!
2. //2<it<m+l<nandm>4, tfien
Proof. (J_):
*!/!< (it + /- 1)!
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Let o := ^j^"'j;_^. Then we have to show that ^(Q - 1) > fca - 1. ^ ^
Now, for m > 5 we have m! > 3(m +1)^, so it is sufficient to prove that (m+ l)*(a -1) >
fot. In view of ifc < m + 1 it is then enough to show that (m + l)a - 1 > Q <=• ma > 1
which is satisfied, as clearly « > ^. If m = 4 then we have to show that 8(Q - 1) >
jfca - 1 «=*• (8 - *)« > 7.
If jfc = 2 then this becomes 6^^ > 7, which is satisfied asn>5. If 2 < A: < 5 then
also (8 - fc)« > 312^2^2 > 7, as n > 5. This proves (2). •
Now we can prove the main result. It characterizes the minimally manipulable anony-
mous social choice functions for more than three alternatives. <J.
Theorem 65 /yf< / : P^ —» A,m > 4, 6f an anonymous soria/ r/ioics /unrhon. 5«ppo«e
H > m + 1 »/ m = 4 and £/ia< n > m 4- 2 «/ m > 5. 77ien
/•>*r</icr7no;t', cqua/i/y /»oM.s i/ and on/y «/ / ron 6c descrt6ed as in De/ini<ion 55.
Proof. Let P = {r, «,„,} and 0! = 1. Let p 6 P" and let r(p,t) := |p-'(«,)|. i €
{1 n/!}. Tlicii there are
profiles (j e P^ that satisfy r(<j,») = r(p,t) for all i € {1 m!}. Under anonymity
/(p) = /(<j), p e A// <=> q € A// and p € B* <=• q € B* for all such profiles q. Let
(
m + 1 if m = 4
m + 2 if HI > 5.
Suppose that the assumptions of the theorem an' satisfied, and that
|A#/| < n (y - l) (m - 2).
Step 1: 0*nA//=e.
Suppose In the contrary that there is a p € B* n A//. As p e /?'. at least / of the
c(p,i),i € {1.... .m!}, satisfy r(p,i) > 1. Hence, by Lemma 646.7^ AfLV/AML AfAN7PirL.4B/LJTY ' V * 111
where o(l) := {£$.
Now. if m = 4, then as n > m + 1.
1-1
and, if m > 5, then, as n > rn + 2,
;<• .-i; '-1 m+l
II II
S!£> 2(21-1)-<m-2)<!£-1).
••••:. v 4 S»iS
2 - j) = (m + 1)!
This contradicts
(2)(
so step 1 us proven.
Step 2: There are 6,c € /I, 6 / c, such that /(B*) C {6,r}.
By step 1 / is strategy-proof on /?'. So, by Theorem G3, |/(B')| < 2. Let b,r € ^4,
6 / c, be sucli that /(/?') C {ft. r}. Let A- be the smnllost number such that
Then fc > 2 by surjectivity of /, and it < / since /(£') C {ft. r}. We nhow that Jk = 2. A>
/(B*') ^ {6,r}. there Ls a p 6 fl*"' - B*. such that /(p) = a € /I - {6,r}. Furthermore,
as fc < n. and /> € B* ' - B*, there must be agents J. j e Af, i ^ j, such that /<(/) - p(j),
which implies tliat p(/V) = p(N - {»}). Let < be sucli that
{(a,c),(6,c)} C < and ^ ;>(JV).
As |p(N)| = fc - 1. there are at least ^ - (it - 1) such preferences f. Then ^ ^ p(N) implied
that 9 = (p_.,,r) € B*. So /(q) € {6,r}, /(p) = n and (/fa),/(/>)) ^ /. Hence, any wuch <7
is manipulable. So, by anonymity
But, by Lemma 64 the term on the right hand side is greater than n(m - 2)(^! - 1) if
fr - 1 > 2. contradicting |A//| < n(m - 2)( ^ - 1) Therefore, it = 2. This proven step 2.
Let a € -4 be an alternative different from ft and r as in step 2. We define
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Let A = {ai,a2,.. ,am_2,6,c}. As /(#*) C {6,c}, we have
by surjectivity. Hence, for any o,,j € {1,2, ...,m — 2}, there is a £, € P such that
/(<,") = a,. Let p> := t*\j € {1,2,..., m - 2}. Then for any < e /»•>•<»*> - {r,}, IteJV,
?') € {t,c} and /(pO = a,, BO g = (pi*,<) is manipulable for all fc € AT. There are
Mich (/, aw n > 3 these manipulable profiles 4 are different for all j € {1,2,..., m — 2}. So,
, m-2
Now, |P"i-lM - {<j}| > 2! - 1, and equality holds if and only if *, 6 p»>-(M. So, by
inequality (6.2), <j 6 P»J<'"'>, j e {1,2,... ,m - 2},
I A//1 = n(m - 2)(^ - 1)
3
and
Stop 3: Lot t,c be as in step 2. Then
Lotp€ P"-{;»',7»^ p"'-*}. Suppose that/(p) e {o,,oa,...,o™_j}. Thenp€ P^'-B*
and for all « € p/W(i>.-) _ (p(i)} we have /(p_i,<) € /(£*) C {6,c}. So (p_,,<) € A//,
implying t.lnvt. p e {p'.p''' p'""''}, as » > 3. With surjcctivity this proves step 3.
Slip 1: Lot p f! {p'.p* p"' ^} and suppose that (6, r) 6 <j for some j € {1,2,... ,m-
2}. Thou,
/(p) = 6 if and only if (6, c) 6 p(i) for all i € A/.
Let <, ? 6 P lio suoh that < = ... fc... a,... r..., ( = ... c... a,... 6.... Lot fc e .V. As
f,f ^ p»,.(»-.'-), / is strntoRy-proof at (pi^.t) € B* and (p**,?) 6 B*. This implies that
fc,uul /(;»»».?) = r.
Suppuso that thoro is a 1 € /V sudi that (<", 6) € p(i), without loss of generality » = n.
Ltt
p(/) if / < u r"(0 := I
ti € {0 »»} Thou r" = (pi,,,?), r" = p and as « f! p-^t^>,
r" * A// U {p',p> p""- »}. ti € {0 n - 1}.6.7. MINIMAL MAiVJPl7LAB/L/71' ' 113
Suppose that /(r") = c. u € {0 n - 2}. then by r" ^ A/,
As (6,c) € f,, /(r"*«) € {6,r} and /(r") = c it follows that /(r"*') = r. As /(r») -
/(p^-n.f) = c we obtain /(r"~') = /(p) = r by induction. By strategy-proofneaa at
p = r- = (r?;',p(n)),(<\6) € p(n), and /(p) € {6.r} it follows that /(r") - c. This
shows that
/(p) = 6 only if (6. r) € p(«) for all i € N. "' "**..'
Suppose that (6, c) € p(») for all i € .V, so in particular (6, r) € p(l). Ix*t . , ,. , K* «l
uG {0 n}.Then r"=p,r" = (pi,,<). »"'! "« ' ^ P«<•<*•••>,
As r" = (p*_,,r). /(r") = 6. Let u € {1,2 n} and suppoop that /(»") = fc. Then
by r- * A// (/(r-),/(r"-«)) € r"(u) = (pi,,<)(«) 6 {',',} AH (6,r) € «, (6,r) € f,.
/(r"-') € {fc.c} and /(r") = 6 it follows that /(r""') = 6. So, /(r") « /(p.,,«) - 6 implira
by induction that /(r") = /(p) = 6. This shows that
/(p) = fc if (6, c) € p(i) for all t 6 AT,
and we have proven step 4.
Without loss of generality (6, c) € *'. Then step 4 and the well-derinednesH of / imply
that (6, r) € <j for all j € {1,2,,..., m - 2}. This complete* the proof •
Almost dictatorial social choice functions have (n — 1)(y - 1) + 1 manipulable profiles,
see Maus et al. (2004c, see Chapter 5) for a definition of almost dictatorial social choice
functions and a proof of thus statement. As, if m > 4,
n(m-2)(y-l) > "(y-1)
(
the minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions have strictly more manip-
ulable profiles than one has to admit when demanding only nondictatoriality. This is in
contrast to the three alternative case where we have, for m = 3,
n(m - 2)(y - 1) = n < 2n - 1 = (n - l)(y - 1) + 1,114 CHAPTER 6. Sl/RJECTJVTTY AND ANOJVYMJTY
so the anonymous social choice functions outperform the almost dictatorial social choice
functions in terms of manipulability. We conclude this section with some proportions of
manipulable profiles of social choice functions to give an impression in relative terms of
the manipulability that has to be admitted. The following table contains the proportion of
profiles that are manipulahle for the social choice functions characterized in Theorem 65,
the almost dictatorial social choice functions, Plurality and Borda rule. The numbers for
the last two are taken from Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999), where tie-breaking according
to a fixed order of alternatives is used to decide on ties. We restrict the tables to three and
four alternatives. Loosely speaking, these tables indicate that there is still a lot to discover
in the space between classical social choice functions and social choice functions obtained
by minimizing manipulabilitv. To avoid wrong impressions we note that Slinko (2002) has
shown that the proportions of manipulable profiles of Plurality and Borda rule go to zero






































































































\\V show t hat a Ciiblmrd-Snt torthwaite like result holds also on sets of profiles with a certain
diwrsity. This is used to characterize the minimally manipulable anonymous social choice
functions for more than three alternatives. It turns out that these generalize strategy-proof6.S. CX)NCLUS/OiV 115
two alternative imputation status-quo voting, and the minimally manipulahle three alter-
native nondictatorial social choice functions. However, contrary to the three alternative
case they are not less manipulable than the almost dictatorial social choice functions. So,
they do not constitute the set of minimally manipulable nondictatorial social choice func-
tions. Moreover, the way in which they achieve minimal manipulability is at the expense
of treating alternatives unequally. This suggests that a property ensuring a more equal
treatment of alternatives should be added. The natural candidate is neutrality, but unfor-
tunately anonymity and neutrality exclude each other whenever the number of alternatives
can be written as a sum of non-trivial divisors of the number of agents. scv Moulin (1983,
p. 25). Nevertheless, this will be an issue for further research, either drnuuidmg weaker
axioms than neutrality to ensure a more equal treatment of alternatives, or weakening
anonymity and demanding neutrality. Also other principles of voting could lie added an
properties, such as respecting unanimity. Pareto-optimality, absolute plurality, plurality or
Condorcet- winners.116
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Unanimity and Anonymity
This chapter is concerned with the minimal number of pro tiles at which a unanimous and
anonymous social choice function is manipulate. The lower Ixnmd is derived when t hore are
three alternatives to choose from. Examples of social choice functions attaining the lower
bound are given. We conjecture that these examples are in fact all minimallv maniptilahlc
social choice functions. Since some of those examples are even I'aroto optimal, we have also
derived the lower bound for Pare to optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Some,
of the minimally manipulate Pare to optimal and anonymous social choice functions can
be interpreted as status quo voting.'
7.1 Introduction
A well-known result of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that any strategy-
proof surjective social dioice function on more than two alternatives is dictatorial. This
implies that anonymity and unanimity are not compatible with strategy-proof ness. Here
we investigate how incompatible these are, i.e. how much manipiilability we have to allow
at anonymous and unanimous social choice functions.
There are a few studies on the degree of vulnerability for strategic behaviour of clas-
sical social djoice functions, such as Borda, Plurality, etc.. For example, Aloskerov and
Kurbanov(1999) contains simulation and enumeration results on 2fi different social choice
functions for different indices of manipulahility. Slinko (2002) counts the number of insta-
bile profiles of classical social choice functions, which is an upper bound for the number
of manipulable profiles of these social choice functions. On the other hand, little is known
about to what extent manipulability has to be admitted by social choice functions sat-
isfying certain properties. Results on thus may provide lower bounds to which then all
social choice functions satisfying these properties can be compared. A first investigation
was pioneered by Kelly (1988), who found the minimal number of manipulable profiles
for nondictatorial surjective social choice functions with three alternatives and two agents
'The results in this chapter were first formulated in Klaus et al. (2004d).
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and also formulated several conjectures. This line of research was continued by Fristrup
and Keiding (1998), who determined the minimal number of manipulable profiles for two
agents and any number of alternatives. Mans et al. (2004c) consider the three alternative
case and show that for any number of agents larger than two there are six minimally ma-
nipiilablc nondictatorial surjective social choice functions, and these are even anonymous.
However, they also consider minimally manipulable unanimous and nondictatorial social
choice functions. These turn out to be nondictatorial only in a minimal sense, namely at
only one profile.
Here we will exclude such social choice fimctions by demanding that agents are treated
anonymously and choice is unanimous. Maus ct al. (2004b) contain results for this case
if unanimity is replaced with surjectivity. In particular, anonymous social choice functions
arc uondictatorial. So, we are interested in the minimal number of manipulable profiles that
an anonymous unanimous social choice function has to admit. It is well known that in case
of two alternatives any monotonic social choice function is strategy-proof. As monotonicity
and anonymity are compatible (sec e.g. May (1952)) in case of two alternatives this minimal
number is zero. We consider the three alternatives rase and show that the minimal number
is 2" - 2. Furthermore, we give examples of social choice functions reaching that lower
bound and point out that some of these examples are even Pareto optimal. So, 2" - 2 is
also the lower bound for Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. After that
we argue that status (|iio voting is an example of a Pareto optimal and anonymous social
choice function that is minimally inanipulable for three alternatives.
It should be noted that the way in which we measure manipulability, namely by counting
manipulable profiles, is not the only possible one. In fact there are a lot of variations of this,
where for example profiles are counted by the number of agents that can manipulate them,
or ihe severity of the manipulation is taken into account. The severity is measured by the
distance in the agent's ranking between what he achieves with and without manipulation.
Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) contains an overview of such variations and numerical
results on t he manipulability of 26 social choice functions according to these measurements.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 contains the basic definitions. Then,
Section 7..'< shows some special results about the manipulability of two and three agent
social choice functions that will be used in our proof of the main result. The main result,
saving that any unanimous and anonymous social choice function over three alternatives
has at least 2" - 2 manipulable profiles, where n is the number of agents, is proven in Section
7.4. After that we provide examples of social choice functions attaining that lower bound
in Section 7.r>. In Section 7(> we see that some of the examples from Section 7.5 are even
Pareto optimal. Pareto optimalitv is a stronger requirement than unanimity. This shows,
giwn anonymity, that though Pareto optimality is stronger it does not raise the number of
manipulable profiles one has to admit compared to imposing unanimity. Finally, we show
that the minimally manipulable Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions have
a nice interpretation as status quo voting rules.T2. PREL/M/\ARJES *-f/^ a«!frt! 119
7.2 Preliminaries , ^ ,«* >.«4> r , ;.
We denote the cardinality of a set S by |S|. Let N be the set of natural numlwrs, and let
No := N U {0}. Let |"| denote the upper entier. So for n € No [jj] := min{/ 6 N,, | / > !j}.
Let /4 be a finite set of alternatives, m := |J4| > 3, and A/ = (1,..., n} bo a finite set of
agents, n > 2. ,
Let < C i4 x A We call f complftf if for all x. y € 4 (x, y) € « or (y, x) € f. Note that
completeness of f implies (x. x) € f for all x € A We call / fran.<ifur if for all x, y. J € J4
(x,y) 6 f and (y, c) € r implies (x,;) € A We call f artfwyfumrfnr if for all x,y € v4
(x. y) 6 r and (y,x) € f implies that x = y.
A prr/prrnrr < C .4 x ^t us a /inrar order (complete, transitive, antisymmetric) on A Let
P denote the set of all preferences. Suppose that .4 = {xi.Xj,.. x,,,}. By completeness,
transitivity and antisymmetry we can write conveniently
for the preference t such that (x,, x,) € f if and only if i > j, i, j € {1,2,..., m},
if we want to express only that x is strictly preferred to y, and
if we want to express only that x is preferred to all other alternatives.
A pro/i/p is a map p : A' —» P. Thus, a profile assigns to every agent ( a preference p(j)
over the alternatives. For a nonempty subset 5 of .V we denote by ;»|s the restriction of
the map p to the domain 5. The set of all profiles is denoted by P'V
For a permutation rr of N and a profile p € P* let p o IT be the profile given by
(po(j)(i) := p(<r(i)) for all i € Af. Two profiles p, </ e P* are called <monymou.i/j/ r^uti/a/rat
if there is a permutation <r of Af such that 9 = p o <r. Then |p '(t)| = Iff"'(01 f'"" '^"
< 6 P. We denote anonymous equivalence between p and 7 in P* by p ~ 7 and write
[p]:={7€P*|7~p}- For all p € P\
A sociai r/iota? /unchon is a function / : P* —» A Hence, a social choice function
selects a unique alternative /(p) at every profile p.
A social choice function is called surjec<i«c if any alternative in >4 is chosen at leant
once, i.e. if /(P*) = A In literature this is also known as citizen-sovereignty. Moreover,
a social choice function is called unanimous if /(p) = x for all profiles p € P* such that
p(t) = x... for all t € AT Clearly, unanimity is stronger than surjectivity. Throughout this
chapter we assume that any social choice function is at least surjective.120 CHAPTER 7. IWAMA//TY AND ANOJVYA/JTY
A social choice function is called anonymous if /([p]) = {/(p)} for all p € P*. Thus,
anonymous social choice functions are symmetric in the arguments. In a sense they treat
agents equally.
: In contrast to anonymity, the following social choice functions respect only the prefer-
ence of a single agent. Let d € N and for any profile p let
:= i
where i is such that (i, y) 6 p(<f) for all y € A. So i is the most preferred alternative of
agent d in />. The social choice functions / = dicfj, d € N, are called dirtatoria/ social
choice functions, and agent d is called a dictator. A social choice function / is called
nnndtWatoria/ if there is no agent d such that / = dirfj.
We arc interested in strategic behaviour of individuals when facing cooperative decision-
making as captured by social choice functions. This is formalized by the following defini-
tions. Let / : P* —» A be a social choice function. Let p € P^ be a profile. Then each
profile- r/ such that, for some i € /V, oj,v (,) = p|/v-{,) and <;(i) / p(»), is called an t-drvatton
from p. Letting / := </(») we use the notation o = (p ,,r). If it is not important which
agent deviates from p to </ we call </ a deviation from p. A profile p is called mantpu/afc/e
(under /) if there is an agent that is better off by being dishonest about his preference, i.e.
if there is an i € /V, and an i-deviation g such that
In I his ca.se we say that p is mamp»/a6/r' t»u;ani.s (/ (under /). Let
A// := {p € p^ | p is nmnipulable under /}.
Note that p € A-// implies that [p] C A//. A social choice function is called *-trat«7j/-proo/ if
A// = 0, otherwise it is said to he maritpu/<i6/e. Let F be a nonempty set of social choice
functions. We call /" minima//;/ rfiarupu/a6/r' if/* € argmiii/«^- |A//|.
The |)iuiiiinciH(- ol the dictatorial rules arises from the following impossibility result
due to Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975).
Theorem 66 /W .-I 6c a /ini/r »pt o/ a/trmativr.f, | A| > 3. i>t / : P* -• A 6r a nondir-
tatona/ .iMfjwtii'r .tM'in/ r/ioicr /unction. Tfcrn
IA//I > 1.
However, this theorem makes no statement about the number of manipulable profiles
such social choice functions admit This question has been solved by Kelly (1988) for two
agents and throe alternatives, and by Fristrup and Keiding (1998) for two agents, and any
number ot alternatives larger than three. Maus et al. (2(K)4c, see Chapter 5) consider the
case of unanimous and iiondictatorial social choice function for any numbers of agents and7.a SPECIAL RESULTS FOR n\'O AND THREE AGENTS 121
alternatives larger than or equal to three, and the case of surjeetive and nondict atonal
social choice functions for three alternatives. Maus et al. (2004b. see Chapter (i) consider
the case of anonymous and surjective social dtoice functions, but haw to leave some cases
open.
Here we address the case of unanimous and anonymous social choice functions ovpr
three alternatives. So. let F be the set of all such social choice functions with i> set of
agents Af such that |N| = n > 2. We will need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 67 J>r it,/€ N.
*M!<(* + /-1)!
Proof.
7.3 Special results for two and three agents
Since the connection of the results of this section with the main result is far from obvious
we sketch the proof of the main result beforehand.
Let / 6 F. We will prove that there are natural numbers A,"|,A^ such that !J < &| <
*2 < n, and profiles </f € A// for all = < it < Jfc, - l.Ar € N,i € {1.2} with the following
properties. Each such qr* shows that there are at least (£) manipulable profiles in A//, which
can be equal to the ones from another gf only if it = j for both profiles. Furthermore, we
» i
show that if A;, < n, t e {1,2}, then there is a p, € A// that yields at least another ^ (")
different manipulable profiles in A//. Altogether we will have that in any case
which is our main result. We find the </* by applying Theorem 68 to two agent social choice
functions /»...!} < it < itj, defined from /. To show that the manipulable profile* arising
from the same /t.it / !j, are different we need the statements of Lemma 69. To apply
Theorem 68 and Lemma 69 we need that the /*,it < Jt^, are nondictatorial. This will be
shown by applying Lemma 70 to three person social choice function 9 defined from /. This
will also show that the p, exist if Jr, < n.
Now. we present the mentioned results for two and three agent social choice functions.
Throughout the rest of this section let ^V = {1,2} if there are two agents, and /V = {1,2,3}
if there are three agents. Two agent social choice functions can be depicted in 6x6 tables,
since we have only six preferences. We let agent 1'a preference IK; constant in rows and
agent 2's preference constant in columns. The following result is taken from Kelly (198b).
It can also be proven by considering 6x6 tables.122 CHAPTER 7. l/NAN/M/TV AND ANOIVYA/ITY
Theorem 68 /,P< / : P* —• A 6e o «tir/«:tive too agent soctai c/iotce /unction. Then / is
ei</»;r rfirtutoria/ or |A//| > 2.
Let D/ : A// —• 2**'' be the correspondence assigning to each manipulable profile the
set of agents that can manipulate and the preferences they can use to manipulate, i.e. for
allp€ A//,
J>/(P) := {(*. 0 € JV x P | (/(p), /(p.,, 0) * p(t)}.
The first result shows some properties of £>/ for unanimous and nondictatorial two agent
social choice function.
Lemma 69 /,r< / : P* —» A 6e a unanimous and nondirfatoria/ too agent SOCJO/ r/ioice
/. 7Vwn/or ai/p,a € A// </»en> are (i.tp) € £>/(/>), (j, <,) € /?/(?) s«r/i «/ia< ^,, ^
). Furt/iermorc we can c/»oose i, j, <p and <, in sudi a way t/»at, eitfter
U{f,}. or,
^r^ </«-TT' i.s a /aftr/iny o/ </JP a/<rr7»a<i»;ps in A
p = (6ca,ca6),(i,c6a) € D/(p)
a = (coa,6ca),(i,cab) € £>/(<?)
/(P) = a-
Proof. By Theorem 66 we cnn find /,>, (/ e A//. First of all we show that for any p 6
A// mid (A,(p) 6 /?/(/>) such that <p € p(N), there is a preference ^ ^ p(N) such that
(A:,f,,) € /^/(/')- This shows that we can choose («,*,,) 6 D/(p). (J, r,) € £)/(<?) such that
'»• ^ /»(^V).'« ^ '/(^)- Suppose that without loss of generality Jt = 1. So (1,/,,) € D/(p)
and f,, e p(/V), hence p = (p(l), tp). Let Tp ^ tp be the preference such that tp = i... and
<,, = .r.... Then /(*",„ «p) = /(ip, tp) by unanimity of /. So (1, T,) 6 I>,(p) as (1, «p) € D/(p),
Note that in (a) ;> — </ is not excluded. Suppose that (a) and (b) are not true. Then all
p,9 € A// are manipulablc by the same agent t. without loss of generality let i• = 1.
Lot Oj(<) := {/(p) | p(l) = t} be the set of all opportunities that agent 2 has when
the preference of agent 1 is fixed to f. Let A = {x, y, z}. Consider < = iyi in P. Then
•«' € Ou(f) by unanimity. Note that fixing agent l'.s preferences corresponds to looking at
rows only in the tables describing /. Agent 2\s inability to manipulate implies then that
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; Similar tables hold for any O^f), r e P.
Now. we hx {x. y. c} such that p(l) = xj/2. Remember that p,<j € A// an- such that
agent 1 manipulates at p and <j and that ' ''
Step 0: x € O?(xy2).
This Ls a consequence of unanimity.
Step 1: O.(jy>-) / {x}.
If C>2(xyi) = {x} then agent 1 cannot manipulate at p.
Step 2: Oj(x2y) ^ {x}.
Suppose contrapositive that Oj(xry) = {x}. By step 1 there is an ti e Oj(xy:)-{x}. Let
t| / f.> be the two preferences such that <, = u i = 1,2. Thou /(xy;.f,) •- ii,i € {1,2},
since agent 2 cannot manipulate, and so (xj/r, f,) is iimnipulahlc by agent 1 towards (x;y, f.)
for i € {1.2}. But then (b) holds, contradicting our assumptions. Hence, 0j(x:y) ^ {x}.
Step 3: r € 0;j(x2y).
In view of step 2 suppose contrapositive that Oa(x;y) = {.r. y}. Then /(x;y, 2y.r) = y,
since agent 2 cannot manipulate, and /(cxy, cyx) = ; by unanimity. So r = (xcy, :y.r) is
manipulable by agent 1 towards (;xy. :yx) = (*r,r(2)). As p(l) = xyz ^ r(AT) U {^,} thin
contradicts our assumption that (b) does not hold.
Step 4: c 6 C^(Ji/r).
In view of step 1 suppose eontrapositive that O.»(.ryi) = {J\{/}. Then /(j-iy, :xy) = i
and /(xy^, ;xy) = x, since agent 2 cannot manipulate. Hence, r = (xsy, zxy) is ma-
nipulable by agent 1 towards (xy*, zxy) = (<r.r(2)). As (b) <locs not hold we have
p(7V)U{U = {xyz.p(2),«,,} = r(7V)U{fr} = {aT/«,«V.«^tf}- If 7'(2) 6 {xyj.xjy} then
/(p) = x by unanimity. If p(2) = jxy. then /(p) = x because O^(xyr) = {x. ?/} and agent
2 cannot manipulate. But /(p) = x contradicts the manipulabilitv of p by agent 1. Hence,
* S CMxys).
Step 5: z € O2(yxz) and z € 02(yzx).
Suppose eontrapositive that there is a < € {yxz.yjx} such that i ^ Oj(f). so Oj(f) C
{x. i/}. Let r' = (xyj, 2x.y). r^ = (xj/2. 2yx). By step 4 2 € O-jfiyz). and so /(r') - /(r") =
2. But then /(r^,,<) 6 {x,y} and /(r^,,0 € {x,y}, so r' and r^ are manipulable towards
(rL,J) and (r^,,<) respectively. Clearly, this contradicts the assumption that (b) is not
satisfied. This proves step 5.
Step 6: OJUJ.V) = {-r. z}
Suppose eontrapositive that in view of step 0 and 3 02(x2y) = A. By step 0 and 2 either
Oj(xy2) = {x, 2} or 02(xy2) = A. Consider first the case in which (-M^y*) = {x, 2}. Let
r' = (i2y,yx2),r* = (i2y.y2x). Then /(r') = /(r>) = y, whereas /(r' ,,xy2) = x and
/(ri,.xy2) = 2. Hence, r' and r^ are manipulable by agent 1 towards (r' j,xy2), (r'"* ,,iyz)
respectively. But then (b) is satisfied a contradiction. So. suppose that O^J/*) = A. We
know that p is manipulable by agent 1 and that p(l) = xy2. By steps 3 to 5, unanimity and124 CHAPTER 7. l/NAJVJAfJTY AJVD ANOJVYA/JTY
because agent 2 cannot manipulate /(P x {zary, ZJ/I}) = {z}, hence no manipulation by
agent 1 can occur if p(2) 6 {zxj/, zj/a:}- By unanimity agent 1 has no incentive to manipulate
if p(2) € {xj/z,izy}. Hence, p(2) e {yxz.yzz}. Then /(p) = y and /(tp,p(2)) = x, since
agent 1 manipulates p towards (tp,p(2)). As 02(zzy) = A implies that /(xzy,p(2)) = y
(agent 2 cannot manipulate), and unanimity implies that /(yxz,p(2)) = /(yzx,p(2)) =
y we obtain <,, € {zxy, zyx}. As /(<,,. p(2)) = x the profile r = (xzy,p(2))./(r) = y
(0;i(xyz) = A and agent 2 cannot manipulate), is also manipulablc by agent 1. Clearly,
then with p and r (b) is satisfied, a contradiction. Hence, Oj(xzy) = {x, z}.
Step 7: y £ 0-,(zyx).
Suppose contrapositive that y € (^^(zyx). Then r = (zyx, yzx),/(r) = y (agent 2
cannot manipulate), in manipulablc towards (xzy,yzx) = (<r,r(2)), as /(xzy,yzx) = z by
step 6 and .since agent 2 cannot manipulate. As p(l) = xyz ^ r(A') U {<,.} this contradicts
the assumption that (b) does not hold.
Step 8: Oa(zya;) = {z}
By step 7 y £ Oa(zyx). So suppose contrapositivc that O.^V*) = {*'*}• Then r =
(zyx, yxz),/(r) = x (agent 2 cannot manipulate), is manipulablc towards (yzx, yxz) =
(<r.r(2)), an /(yzx, yxz) = y by unanimity. As p(l) = xyz ^ r(7V) U {£,.} this contradicts
the assumption that (b) does not hold.
Step <l Oj(*X») = {z}.
Suppose rontrapositive that there is an I 6 P such that /(cxi/,f) / z. Because of
unanimity / ^ {;xy, ;i/.i}. Then r = (zxy, t) is manipulablc towards (zyx, r) = (<r.r(2))
by step K. As p(l) = xyz £ r(JV) U {r,-} this contradicts the assumption that (b) does
not liold unless p(l) = t = xyz and {p(2),t,,} = {zxy, zyx}. But in that case /(p_i,*p) =
/(/,,,/i(2)) ; by unanimity, but agent 1 in p = (xyz,p(2)) has no incentive to manipulate
to a profile (/; |J,,) where outcome z obtains. So, this contradicts the assumption that
agent 1 manipulates at p towards (p-i, tp). This finishes the proof of step 9.
Step !l): Oj(yzx) = {y-*}'
In view of step 5 suppose contrapositivc that Oa(yzx) = A. Then r = (yzx, xzy), /(r) =
,r (agent 2 cannot manipulate), is manipulablc towards (cry. x;y) = (/,..r(2)) by step 9.
As /i(l) rye ^ r-(JV) U {^} 'his contradicts the assumption that (b) does not hold.



































We finish the piool by coiiMiienii); the two cases for (^(xy;) 6 {{x, ;}. A}.
If Oj(xy;) = {x, z} then r = (xy;,yjx),/(r) = c. is uianipulai>le towards (yxz. yzx)7.3. SPECML RESl/LTS FOR TWO AND THREE AGENTS 125
(tr. r(2)). and r is the only manipulable profile such that r(l) = xy;. Hence, p = r. If (b)
is not satisfied we must have g(.Y) U {/„} = {rj/cj/xcy:/}. Since </(l) ^ xyj we have
9(1) 6 {J/TZ.j/;x}. Since 4 has to be manipulable this leads to 4 = (yxi,xy;),J, = y«.
But then (c) holds, letting i = 1. x = 6, y = c and J = o. , . iiiii.
On the other hand if Oj(xyz) = A. then r = (xy2.yx;),/(r) = y, is manipulahle
towards (x;y.yxs) = (f,.,r(2)). and r is the only manipulahle profile such that r(l) - xy:.
Hence, p = r. If (b) is not satisfied we must haw (/(A) U {*„} = {xy;.x;y,yJi}. Since
9(1) ^xyz and clearly also 9(1) ^ izy (otherwise 9 € {(x2y,xy*),(x;y,yx;)} =* /(?) »
x) we have g(l) = yxj. So, 9 € {(yxz,xyz), (yiz.xzy)}. Now, if </ = (yxz.xyz) then
t, = xjy, so agent 1 manipulates </ towards (xzy, xyr), where he obtains the outcome
1 = /(xjy.xy;). This implies that x is preferred to /(</) under the preference </(l) = yxj,
hence /(g) = ;. This is a contradiction, since then agent 2 can manipulate 7 as well. So,
only the case 4 = (yxj,xzy), t, = xyr, remains. For the same reasons as in the other cane
the manipulahility off towards (xy;,x;y) by agent 1 implies that /(</) --- c. But then (c)
holds, letting 1 = 1. x = c, y = 6, ; = n, and exchanging the roles of /» and f/.
This finishes the proof of the lemma. •
Furthermore, we need the following result about the manipulubility of unanimous three
agent social choice functions where coalitions arc dictators. Let SCIV be a nonempty
coalition of agents. We call S a dtcta/or if for all r = xyz € P and q. * € P^ * we have
= x.
In this case we call / S-rftr/(i<ona/.
Lemma 70 /,rf / : P'^ —» A 6P a unnntmotw </inec Ojjfnf sorin/ r/ioirf /tmrtion. Suppose
/ is {1, 2} — dir<a<oriai anrf {1,3} —dtrfatono/. TVirn, onr 0/ </»• /o/Zou/inj w <ru«.
^ Ayen< 1 is a dictator.
f&j T/IPTTP arr anonymotw/y inf^uimlcnf p.</ e A//, marupttinfr/r toward*
(p_,.«p).(q_j,«,),t,j € {1,2,3}, reapprtiw/y, sur/i «/m« |p(/V)| = MAT)| = 3
Proof. Let /* : P''-^' —» A, f € P, be the two agent social choice function given by
/?(P) := /(P(1)-P(2).O for all p € P<''*>. I^?t /;' : P('-'> — A, < € P, be the two agent
social choice function given by /,'(p) := /(p(l).(.p(3)) for all p € P''••'*'.Suppow tlmt (b)
is not true. We show that then all //* are dictatorial with dictator 1, HO (a) hold*. By
unanimity and {l,3}-dictatoriality ({1.2}-dictatoriality) of / we have some information
about // and /;'. We summarize this information in the following table for < = xyz, where
agent l'a preference is as usually described by the rows. The other agent can be either




























r € /*''•*'. Suppose that (b) is false. For steps 1 to 4 we omit the superscript A; = 2.
p 1: The second row can ho filled with x, i.e.
= x for all <€ P.
Suppose contrapositive that u := /xy«(xzy, <) G {y, z} for some ( € P. Let A = {u, t»,«'},
and p = (xzy, uv«i,xi/z),g = (xzy, uwr.xyz). If /(p) / u then p is manipulable towards
(p 2.0 = (p 2.<p). *""' if /(/') = " *"<*" P w manipulahlo towards (p_,,xj/z) = (p_i,tp).
The same holds for r/. Clearly, p and q are anonymously inequivalent and satisfy |p(N)| =
= 3. Furtlicrmoro, p(^)U{/,,} = f/(N)U{^} implies that <p = MH'V and <, = «t»«>. As
/ x this implies that agent 2 is manipulating at p and q and so <p = t = <,, contradicting
ntcv, <, = utw. Hence, (b) is satisfied, a contradiction.
Sti-p 2: /r,,; is unaiiiinoiis.
In view of step 1 it •'(•mains to be shown that /,^.(J/JJ, J/JJ-) = /^.(y2x, j/xz) = y and
. zyx) = /r^,(zyx, zxy) = z. But for example by applying step 1 to /£., we obtain
i*) = /i*rt(!/**•*!/*) = V- Likewise the other parts of unanimity of /,„, follow.
Step 3: In the third and fourth row z cannot be chosen, i.e.
/r»«(r) ^ z if r(l) € {yxz.yzx}.
Suppose contiapo-sitive that r(l) e {.v-rt. j/--r} '»'<! /x«.-('') = z. Let p = (r(l), zxy,xyz) and
'/ = (»'(1). cj/.r, jj/z) If /(p) ^ J then pis manipulable towards (p_2,r(2)) = (p_j,tp), and if
/(p) = z then p is manipulable towards (p^3, r(l)) = (p_a, tp), as by {1,3}-dictatoriality of
/ we haw /(r(l), zj-y.r(l)) = y. The same holds for <j. Clearly, p and q are anom-mously
iiux|uivalont and satisfy |p(/V)| = |<7(N)| = 3. Furthermore. p(A') U {f,,} = q(A') U {f,}
implies that r,, = zj/.r and f, = zjy. As r(l) € {yj-c.i/:j-} this implies that agent 2 is
manipulating at p and </ and so tp = r(2) = <„. contradicting fp = zyx, r, = zxy. Hence,
(b) is satisfied, a contradiction.
Step 4: In the cell (yzx, zxy). y has to be chosen, i.e.
. zxy) = y
I^t p = (yzj, i.ry,.ryc) and <j = (ycx. cxy.xzy). By step 3 /(p) € {x. y}. Suppose
contrapositive to the claim of step 4 that /(p) = x. Then p is manipulable towards7.A SPECJAL RESl/LTS FOR T\\ O -AND THREE .4GEATS 127
(p-i.t,) by {l,2}-dictatoriality of /. If /(<j) ^ x thon 7 is nianipulable
towards p = (7,3, zyz) = (7.3, t,). and if /(<j) = x then 7 is manipulablc towards (</ |. cxy)
by {1.2}-dictatorial]ty of /. Clearly, p and 9 are anonymously inequivulent and satisfy
|P<W)l = M#)l = 3. As xry € 7< JV) but xiy * p(N) U {<,} (b) us satisfied, a contradiction.
<• Step 5: In the fourth row y has to be chosen, i.e. : .;
/n»,(y*j, 0 = V for all f € P.
We show step 5 for it = 2. The case Ar = 3 works in the same way. By step 3 wo have
that /^(yzx.O € {x,y} for all f € P. Furthermore, /^,(y;x. zyx) = /^(ysx,xyi) €
{x.y} n {y, s} = {y} by step 3 applied to /^, and /?„,. Hence, in view of step 4, wo
know that the claim is true if f € {yxc.y^x, cxy, cyx}. Now, suppose contraptvsitivc to
the claim that /;',,.(yix, f) = x for some t € {xyz.xiy}. Let p = (y:x, ;xy, .ry;). Then p
is manipulable towards (p_2,f) = (p-j,*p), as /(p) = /^.(ysx.yxi) = y and /(p ^,0 =•
/i*(tf».O = *• Let 9' = (yxz, zxy, iyz), 7* = (yzx.xzy.iyz) and <r' = (yxz, x*y, a-y«).
By step 3 /(?') € {x.y} for all i 6 {1,2,3}. We show that for all possible combinations of
/(4') 6 {x,y},t € {1.2.3}, (h) is satisfied, contradicting our assumptions.
If /(?') = -r *ben g' is manipulable towards (7',, y:r) = (fl' |, r,i) = (y^x, rxy, xyj), aa
/(yrx, riy, xyr) = y. Clearly, p and q' are anonymously inequivalcnt and satisfy |/'(N)| »
|7'(AT)| = 3. Asg'(l) = yxr ^ p(/V) U {tp} C {yzx, ziy,xyj,rry}, (b) is satis(ii>d. Ilcnre,
we are done unless /(</') = y.
^ /(<fO = !/ then 7^ is manipulable towards (7^2'') = (^-i-'o'') ~ (l/--'-'.•''//*)• ft"
/(y2i,<,xyj) = x. Clearly, p and 7^ are anonymously inequivalcnt ami satisfy |p(W)| •
|^(AT)| = 3. Asp(2) = zxy ^ ^(A^)U{t,j} C {yzx,i2y,xyj}, (b) is satisri<-<l. a contradic-
tion. Hence, we arc done unless /(<•/*) = x.
If /(<?'') = !/ then </^ is manipulable towards (<7*,,yx2) = (</'•* |./,i) = <y', as /(f/'') = 1.
Still, p and g* are anonymously inequivalcnt. satisfy |p(A^)| = |*/'•*(A^)| = 3, ami p(2) =
zxy ^ ^(AT)U {1,2} C {yzx,xzy.xyz.yiz}, so (b) is satisfied. Hence, /(</*) = x. But then
9' is manipulable towards (gi-^xzy) = (<7_2,',') = <T*. as /(</') = y. Still, p and 7' are
anonymously inequivalcnt. satisfy |p(Af)| = |</'(Af)| = 3. and r/'(l) = yxc ^ /'(A^) U {/,,} C
{yzx. jxy, xi/;. xri/}. so (b) is satisfied. This finishes the proof of step 4.
Step 6: In the third row y has to be chosen, i.e.
/*v;(yx*,<) = 2/ for all <€ P.
We show step 5 for Ar = 2. The case A: = 3 works in the same way. By step 3 we have
that /^,(yxz,<) € {x.y} for all f e P. Furthermore;, /^..(yxz. *yz) = /^(yxz.xyi) 6
{x, y} n {y, 2} = {y} by step 3 applied to /^ and /;'„,. Hence, we know that the claim
is true if t € {yxz, yzx, zyx}. We extend this to {xzy, yxz, yzx, 2xy, iyx}. So suppose con-
trapositive that < € {xiy. £xy} and /^.(yxz.f) = x. Then p = (yxz.t.xy^) is manipulable
by agent 1 towards (y;x.<.xyz) = (<p.f,xy2). As t e {x2y. 21;/}, |p(W)| = 3. Consider
< € {xzy, zxy} — {<} and let 7 = (yxsj.xyz). If 7(7) = x then 7 is manipulable by agent138 CHAPTER 7. IWAMAfJTY AND ANONYMITY
1 towards (j/zx, t, xyz) = (t,,£,xyz). If /(qi) = y then <j Ls manipulable by agent 2 towards
(yzz, <,xyz) = (yxi, <,,xj/2). In both cases |<j(N)| = 3 as ( € {xzj/, zxy}. Furthermore,
p(JV) U {tp} ^ g(N) U {<,,}. as ?€ ?(N) but F£ p(N) U {tp} = {yxz,yzx,«,x»2}. Hence,
(b) is satisfied, a contradiction. So, /r,,i(yxz,t) = y for all £ € P — {xj/z}. It remains to
be shown that /,^J(J/XZ,XJ/Z) = y. Suppose contrapositive that /j.,,.(yx2.xyz) = i. Then
p = (yxz,xzy, xyz) and 9 = (yxz, zxy, xyz), /(p) = /(g) = y, are both manipulable by
agent 2 towards (yxz,xyz,xy2). So (b) is satisfied, a contradiction. This proves step 6.













































The first four rows and the {zxy, zyx}''•''—cells follow by steps 1.5 and 6 applied to
/^,, By stops 5 and 6 applied to /^, we see that /?„;(<, yzx) = /;,'.,('.-ryz) = 2 for all
< € {zxy, zyx}. Likewise, //„,(', X2y) = 2 for all < € {zxy, zyx} by applying steps 5 and 6
to /?.,.
Wo prow now that / is dictatorial with dictator 1. This is equivalent to dictatoriality
of all //*, f € /'. To tho contrary suppose that for some f € P /,* is nondictatorial. Without
loss of grnorality f 6 {.ri/c, j/.rc}. Note that for both of these ? tho table of // is similar.
In view of step 7 this implies that there is a r € V := {zxy, zyx} x {xyz.yxz}, such that
u = /*(?') € {x,y}. Without loss of generality r(l) = zxy, otherwise exchange the roles of x
and 1/ whii-h is allowed as wo only fixed / € {xyz, yxz}. Let A = {u, v. 2}. p = (r(l), uzr, <).
Then ;»is manipulablo towards (/> j, r(2)) = (p. 2. 'p) = (r. <)• **s /,^(r) = u and /(p) = z. If
there is an r 6 {;y.r} x {.rye, y.rc} such that u = /,**(?) e {x, y}, A = {u, z, ?} then, likewise,
one obtains that </ = (r(l).iiz?,f)) Ls manipulablo towards (q_2,r(2)) = (9-2,1,) = (r,<).
Clearly, such ;>. (/. f,, and (, satisfy (b). a contradiction. Hence, we are done unless
//(zyx,<) = z forallTe P.
Let 1/ = (zxy, y.r;.O- If /(</) = z then 7 is iiuinipulalilc towards (q j.r(2)) = (</-2-'«) =
(r, f), as /(r, r) 6 {J\ y}. Clearly, p and </ an* anonymously iiuxjuix-alont and satisfy |p(N)| =
|^(yV)| «s 3. As p{2) = uzv ^ 9(N) U {*,} C {zxy, yxz, xyz} (b) is satisfied, a contradiction.
Hence, we are done unless /(q) 6 {x.y}. But then <j is manipulable towards (^_i,zyx) =
(ij 1,^). as /(cyx.c/) = /'(zyx,</(2)) = 2. Still, p mid q an' anonymously inequivalent.
satisfy |p(A)| = |<j(N)| = 3. and p(2) = tier g fl(A') U {f,} C {zxy. yxz. xyz. zyx}.
Hence, (b) is -satisriwl. and we have obtained contradictions in all cases. So, there is no7.4. TOE LOU'Efl BOIWD 2*-2 < ^H 129
nondictatorial /, and this finishes the proof. • <. »••-•-
7.4 The lower bound 2" - 2
In this section we will prove Mtirt/^/. |A//| > 2" - 2. using the results from Section 7.3.
Let it: P*' — { [2] n} be given by
*(p) := min{|p.,(r)| | T C P. |p~»(T)| > £}
and /: P" -» {0 f=]} by /(p) := n - *(p). Then the following lemma holds for profile!
that contain at least three different preferences.
Lemma 71 Letp 6r a pro/iir suc/i tAa« |p(^V)| > 3. 77ien








The first inequality holds as
IIlP '(01! < (MP) - m + 1)!
(6 7'
for all T C P by applying Lemma 67 repeatedly. Furthermore, by |p(N)| > .'} either
|P - T| > 2 and
or |T| > 2 and
which justifies the second inequality. Finally the third inequality is valid an
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for all j€{0,..., /(p) - 1}, since Jfc(p) > £.
Let A/^ := {p e A//| |p(yV)| > 3}. and if A/}'^ 0 let
Pi € arg nun A:(p),fci := *(pi), ii := /(pi), ^' '» *'-'
and if A/j! = 0 let A:i = A2 = "• Furthermore, if Atj < n and A/j! - [pi] ^ 0 let
pa € arg min
and If A/; - [p,J = 0 let Jfcj = n.
The next lemma shows, using the results from Section 7.3, that for all fc €{["§],..., fci -
1} we have two profiles i/f, 7.J € A// such that |</{"(7V)| = |9.J(Af)| = 2 and Ar(qf) = fc(^) = fc.
If ifc j*6 ! we show that these two profiles are anonymously inequivalent. For all fc e
{it|,.. .,jfcj - 1} we show that there is one profile </f € A// such that |<rf(N)| = 2 and
jfcfa*) = fr. Now note t.hnt profiles />, 7 € P^, such that |p(N)| = |^(A/")| = 2 and fc(p)
are anoiiyinouslv mc<|UJval<iit Altogether, this then shows that, if n is odd,
|A/,| > I jj [«f]U (j [fl{]U[p,]U[p2]|
/a-1
where we (ise Leiniua 71 for the second inequality. Likewise one shows that |A//| > 2" — 2 if
H IN even, the only difference is that the two profiles <?,' ,<jj do not have to be anonymously
inequivnlent.
Lemma 72 /W / : P* —» .4 6f « tinantmotu anrf nnonymotw sorio/ rAotrf /unrtion. Let
fci.kj-Pi.p-j ft<' "•* <iryi»i«f (lAotip. T/irr» /or «// it € {[T|] Jti — I} f/irrr nrr <«>o prw^/«
tf.'/S € A// -sur/i //irtf |</f(A)| = |</i(A')| = 2 onrf Jt(^) = it(qj) = A". //* # = «AP.S«> two
/i/r.v <ir»' aftonytnoits/j/ inrytitfa/rnt. For a// A: € {A."i,..., fcj — 1} tAere is a pro^/e o,f € A//
= 2 ami A.(<jf) = A:.
Proof. We will apply Lemma 69 to the following two agent social choice functions to show
the existence of the </*.
Lot Jt € A' :={[=] n}. ami I := « - A\ Define /* : P"•'» - A by7.4. THE LOWER BOUND 2*-2 ui\ \\ 131
for all p € P<'*>. where (p(l)*.p(2)') denote* a profile 9 in P\ such that |<r'(p(l))| = *
and |<7 '(p{2))| = /. As / is anonymous /* is wvll defined and as / is unanimous, /* is
unanimous.
To apply Lemma 69 to a /*,* < itj, we have to show that /* is noudict atonal. Let 4
be the smallest fc € A' such that /* is dictatorial,
d := min{Jt € A' | /* is dictatorial}.
Note that /„ is dictatorial with dictator 1, so rf < »i. We show that Aj < rf, which implies
that all /t, fc < Arj, are nondictatorial.
Claim 1: , r
If of = n this is trivial. Suppose that d < n. Let [ := ri - d. As / is anonymous d. > § > (•
Consider the following three agent social choice function. Ix>t # : pC'^l —. /I 1K> given
b.V »(p) := /(p(l)-"',p(2)'.p(3)'-). where (;i(l)'-< ',p(2)'.p(3)') can l>e understood similarly
to (p(l)*,p(2)') al)ove. As / is anonymous y is well defined find as / is unanimous, r/ is
unanimous. Furthermore, as /^ is dictatorial, (/is {1,2} and {1,3}-dictatorial. So we can
apply Lemma 70 to 9.
If part (a) of Lemma 70 holds, i.e. if agent 1 is a dictator, then /,, where f/ :=*
max{2(,d - /} € A', is dictatorial. If rf ^ ^ then, as </ > !|, this contradicts the minimality
of d. So, d > d, which implies that 2/ > d. If 2/ = d then .9 is anonymous, contradicting
dictatoriality. So, / > rf — /. Consider the profiles
r' := (o6c^ '^,6ca'-,coM),i € {0,... ,2/ - d}.
Then, /(r°) = a, /(r^~-) = 6, as / is anonymous and .9 is dictatorial with dictator I. lint
any r'"*"' is a j-deviation of r' for an agent j such that (6,n) € r'(j). Hence, one of the r'
is manipulable. Clearly, r' € A/y and Ar(r') < d for this r'. For the same reasons a r\
f := (acfc»-'+-',6ca'^,ca6'),j € {0 2/- d},
is manipulable. in A/jf, and fc(r') < d for this r-*. As this r' is anonymously inetjuivalcnt to
r' we have fc2 < max{/r(r'), A-(r>)} < d.
So. suppose that part (b) of Iyemma 70 is true. Then we have anonymously incquivnlent
p,g 6 A/g. manipulable towards (p.,,/p),(i)..,.l,),i,j € {1,2,3}, respectively, such that
|p(N)| = MW)| = 3 and p(JV) U {<p} ^ 9(N) U {<,}. If i € {2,3} then by anonymity of /
t' = 2 without loss of generality. The same holds for j. Let
,...^/ W1)-~'".<;.P(2)',P(3)') if. = i,«e {0,...,(/-(-l},
\ (p(l)^.p(2)^',<;,p(3)') if. = 2,*€{0 /-I},
and
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By manipulability of p and 9 under 9 there are such r" and f" that are manipulable under
/. As |p(N)| = |g(N)| = 3, r*,r" € A/jf. As p and 9 are anonymously inequivalent and
p(N) U {<p} / </(N) U {<,} we have [r«] * [f"]. So, ifcj < max{ifc(r'),it(r")} < d. This
finishes the proof of claim 1.
Let /k € {[5] ,..., itj - 1}. By claim 1 /* is nondictatorial. So, by Theorem 68 there
are p,9 6 A//j. Note that we do not demand p 7^ <7 here, because we want to allow for
the moment for the possibility that p and <y fall under case (a) of Lemma 69. However, if
necessary we can always choose p and </ to satisfy p ^ g by the same theorem. By the first
part of U-mrna 69 there are (t, <p) € D/»(p), (J, t,) € D/Jg) such that tp £ p(N), t,
Let
. J (pO)* "'P(2)',<",) ifi=l,a€{0 it — 1},
*" I (P(l)*-P(2)' V,) if« = 2,«€{0,...,J-l},
iind
By manipulability of p and 7 under /& there are a and u such that r",f™ 6 A// that are
manipiilalilr towards r" ' or r"" respectively. Ix-t S be the smallest index .s such that an
/" is manipulable, i.e. the manipulation does not haw to occur towards r" '. Let H be the
Hinallest index « such that r" is manipulablc towards f"*'. The reason for these choices
will become apparent in case (c).
Suppose that
"<fil *•-'»•
As A(r") < it < it,, A-(f) < it < it,, |r"(N)| > 3 if s > 1 and |f"(N)| > 3 if u > 1, we must
have .s = 0 and u = 0. So q} := (p(l)*,p(2)') = r" € A// and q.J := (q( 1 )*.«?(2)') = f" e A/,
satisfy ,/{,</$ € A//, |</f(/V)| = k}(N)| = 2 and A-(</f) = it(^) = it. If it = = we are done. If
it ^ § then it > / and choosing p ^ 9 implies that <jf and q* are anonymously inequivalent.
So, for it € {[5]..... it, - 1} we are done.
Suppose that
it 6 {Jt, it*- 1}.
We are done if 5 = 0 or ti = 0. So. suppose contrapositive that 3 > 0 and u > 0. Using
cases (a) to (c) of Lemma 69 we show that p and (7 can be chosen in such a way that
r* «* f*. As Jt(r') < it, it(f*) < it. |r*(N)| > 3 and |r=(N)| > 3 if u > 1, this contradicts
it < *a.
Caso (a): We can cluxwe p and </ in A//, that are manipulable by different agents, say
without loss of generality /» by agent 1 and 7 by agent 2. Note that here we haw to allow
for p = 17. Then
max|(r') '(01 = max {it - s./.S} < it - 1 < Jt = (r*)"'(<?( 1)).7.5. ATTAMVG THE LOWER BOUND 133
so r*~F*. • ' ; • •
Case (b): We can choose p and 9 in A//, such that p(Af) U {fp} ^ $(#) U {<,}. Then
r* <x< r* is obvious.
Case (c): Either t = j = 1 and . ; \ j»,
p = (6ca,ro6),(l.r6a)€ D/,(p)
« = (c6a,tea),(l,caJ>)€D/»(<j)
or t = j = 2 and
p = (ra6.6«j).(2,r6«)e fl/Jp) "^
/,(p) = a.
Suppose that i = j = 1 and r" ~ f*. Then
This implies that it-3 = /, 5 = *-ti and / = ii. Note tliat /(r") = /»(;<) « is tho
least preferred alternative of the manipulating agent, who has the preference* 6r«. By the
minimality of 5 and the anonymity of / this implies that /(r°) = /(r') = .. ./(r* ') =
/(r") = /(f") = a. Furthermore, as (rfca*",rafc",6f(i') is nmnipulahle by 1111 agent with
preference r6«, wo have /(r6a^~""',rrtfc"*',fcfn') € {6,r}. Hence,
/(cfco*-°',cai>=+',6ca') = /(c6a' ',ra6'*',6ra* *) e {fc.r}.
But then r* ' is manipulable, as /(r*"') = /(6ca*"*+',c6a* ',rol>') = a, and by deviating
to coi any agent with preference bca can manipulate. This contradicts the minimality of 3.
Suppose that t = j = 2 and r" ~ P. Then
r*~ = (6ca*,cai/-*,c6a*) ~ (rta*, tea'"',cafe") = f".
This implies by Jt > / that 6ai = dw, a contradiction.
Hence, in any of the cases (a) to (c) p and 9 can be chosen in such a way that r' ->" f°.
This contradicts then jfc < itj if 5 > 0 and ti > 0. So, without loss of generality fi = 0, and
letting <rf = r° € A// we have |qf (/V)| = 2 and *(</*) = *.
This finLshes the proof of the lemma. •
By the remarks before Lemma 72 we can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 73 L<>< / : P* - /I dc a unanimous anrf anonumou.? swin/ r/ioirr /unr<ion.
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7.5 Social choice functions /* that attain the lower
bound 2" - 2
.<•.'• • •• -,.-. j,,.4V,-.t. . • . i »S«
Let F* := {/ G F | |A//| = 2"—2} be the set of all social choice functions attaining the lower
bound. In this section we formulate a conjecture about F*, saying that /* € F*,n > 4, if
and only if /* belongs to one of three classes of social choice functions which we describe
completely. There will be an exception for « € {2,3}. First of all one class is only defined for
TI > 3, where its definition in the case ;i = 3 compared to n > 4 alters a litte. Furthermore,
for n = 3 a fourth extra class of social choice functions is needed. Altogether we define
four clauses Cj,i € {1,2,3,4}, of social choice functions such that Cj C F', For any x € A
imd p P P" let
Prt(i.p) := (j 6 y| - {x} | (y, x) € p(i) for all i € W}
be the set of nil alternatives that P«TT'<« r/ominn<f x in p. In 1. up to 5. it is to be
understood that indeh'niteness is resolved in such a way that anonymity and unanimity
hold. Let A = {x, y, z}.
1. Let C| C F be the set of all social choice functions / such that
{
r if Po(z,p) = 0
r if Pa(z.p) = {x}
y if Pa(z,p) = {y}
nnd /(/)) = /(</) € {.r,;/, c} for nil </ 6 P'^ such that
9) = {z.y}>[<7] = [p]-
2. Let fjCF be tin- set of all social choice functions / such that
J if Pa(*,p) = 0
y if /'«(;,p) = {t/} and p
; if p
and /(p) = /(<j) € {a:,y,;} for all p.</ e P^ such that Po(z,p) = Pa(z,g)
3. If n > 4 let C» C F be the set of all social choice functions / such that
; ifPn(;.p) = 0
.r if Po(;,p) = {x} and p £ [(yxz"~'.;r;y)]
y if Pa(z,p) = {y} and p ^5 [(arys" ',
z ifp€
s ifp6
.r if p € [(xyi" >.»«)] U |(xy2"-».
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*cfrx.;: and /([p]) € {x.y,*} if Pa(z.p) = {x.y} andp£ [(xyz"'.yxs)]u{(xy«" »,yxz*))U
[(yx2"-',xy2)] U [(yxz"~*,xyj*)].
4. If n = 3 let C3 C F be the set of all social choice functions / such that ^
X if Pa(*,p) = 0 : vr
x if Pa(z,p) = {x} and p
y if Pn(z,p) = {y} and p
2 if p€
2 if p €
» if p€ [(xyz^.yx*)] i
y if p€ [(yxz*,xyz)] s
and /(p) € {x,y,2} if Pa(z,p) = {x,y} and p£ [(xy;*,yxi)] U [(yx«*,xy«)].
5. If rt = 3 let C4 C Fbe the set of all social choice functions / for which there are
x, y € A, x ^ y. such that /(p) is determined by majority voting bet WITH J- and y,
f r if |{i € N I (x,y) € p(t)}| > |{i € N I (y,x) € p(i)}|,
\ y if |{t € N I (y,x) 6 p(i)}| > |{i € JV I (x.y) e p(i)}|,
for all profiles p where /(p) is not determined already by unanimity.
The following lemma CJUI be proven by counting lniuu'pulable profiles and evaluating
the freedom left in the definitions of the CV The counting argument can be simplified by
noting that no agent will want to manipulate to a Pareto dominated alternative. Since the
rest is elementary counting we do not present the proof here.
Lemma 74 Let F" 6e tne set 0/ a// mmm«i//j/ mamptiiafc/e unanimous «ri
socia/ c/ioice /unction wit/i n agents and tnree a/ternntit)e.». T/ien, C'i UCjC F* «/ n = 2,
Ci U C2 U C:, UC, Cf i/n=3 and C, U d U C;, C F* i/ n > 4. Furt/jp»wore, t/ir <7,
are de/ined in a parttcuiar rase are disjoint. We /lave |C]| = 3", |C;i| = 2*3" ', and
= 3""*, IC4I = 3, i/tAey are de/ined, and
15 i/n = 2,
>< 51 i/n = 3,
3"+ 2*3" ' +3"-^ i/n>4.
We conjecture that equalities hold in the lemma. We l>elieve that the proof of the main
result in Section 7.4 can be used to show this conjecture and explain how this might be
done.
First of all we note that in the statement of Lemma 71136 CHAPTER 7. UJVAMM/TY AND ANONYMITY
equality cannot hold. Going through the proof of that statement one can see that equality
would imply that /(p,) = 1, fc(p,) = n - 1, and |p,(N)| = 2, a contradiction. So. My'. = 0
for any /" G F*. This also implies that d = n. Hence, all manipulable profiles arise from the
/*. In particular for each /* we must have that it yields only two anonymously inequivalent
manipulablc profile*. Now, classifying all such /*, we know the possible A//s and what /
can look like on {p € P^ | |p(N)| < 2}. Connecting this information by strategy-proofness,
in particular on #' := {p € P* | |p(N)| > 3}, it might be possible to characterize F".
The reason why we rlo not pursue this here is the classification of all such /*. There are
125 unanimous and nondictatorial two agent social choice functions with two manipulable
profile* which have to be checked first, and there might be even more with more manipulable
profiles, but only two that give anonymously inequivalent profiles for /.
Wc> mention also that we have confirmed the following conjecture up to 8 agents by
computer, which is also how we found the 125 unanimous and nondictatorial two agent
social choice functions over three alternatives. :
Conjecture 75 £P< F' 6f </ir sr< o/ a// rntnima//j/ mnntpu/nfc/p unanimous ana" anonymous
r- a
( CUC2UC3 «/n>4,
n//»m' <AP C< are <if/infti as »n Lemma 7^. FwrtAprmorp, as tAe C, arr du^otnt,
9 + 6=15 i/n = 2,
27+18 + 3 + 3 = 51 t/n = 3,
3" + 2*3""' +3"~* i/n>4.
7.6 Pareto optimality and anonymity
In this section wo show how our results and the conjecture apply when unanimity is replaced
by the stronger requirement of Pareto optimality.
A social choice function is called Parrfo optima/ if it does not choose Pareto dominated
alternative, i.e. if P<i(.r.p) / 0. .r € .4. implies that /(p) ^ r. Pareto optimality is
a stronger requirement than unanimity. Let p bo such that /(p) = J is determined by
unanimity. Then Pn(j/,p) D {.r} for all j/ € A - {x}, implying that /(p) ^ y for all
y € A— {.r}. So /(p) = .r also by Pan^to optimality. On the other hand /(nfcc.6ea) € {o.fc}
by Pareto optimality. but unanimity doe not reduce the choice at this profile. Let G be
the set of Pareto optimal and anonymous social choice functions. Then G C F.
Let iT7 C G be the set of all sm-ial choice functions j € G for which there is a labeling7.6. PARETO OPT/A/AL/TY AND ANONYMITY 137
of the alternatives A = {x, y. 2} such that
!
2 if Po(2,p) = 0
x ifPa(2.p) = {x}
y if Pa(;.p) = {y}
{x, y} for all g € P* such that
Note that f[ C C C F and 5[ C fi C P So the followiiiR lemma is implied hy
Lemma 74 and counting ("V
Lemma 76 £<•* G* 6e tne set o/mtnimaJ/y manipu/a6/r .socio/ <7»oicr/tmrttons «« G. 77»en
C7 C G', |CT| = 3 * 2" and |G*| > 3 * 2".
Furthermore, G C F implies then the following corollary to Theorem 73.
Corollary 77 Let 3 : P^ —> A 6r a Parrto op/imu/ and anont/»iotw jiociai c/»oirr /unrtion.
It is easily choc;k«l that there are no Pareto optimal social choice functions in C,,t €
{2,3,4}, whenever these sets are defined. So we ciui state the following conjecture bused
on conjecture 75.
Conjecture 78 Let G* 6e t/ie set o/a// mtntma//j/ mantpu/afc/r Parrto optima/ and anony-
mous sorto/ c/iotce /unctions /or a /ixed size 0/ tfte ayent ,s<7 ;i. TV/en
and
|G*| = 3*2".
Note that for any p € C\ there is an alternative z that is chosen whenever it is not Pareto
dominated by one of the other alternatives. We call this alternative the status 9110. If *
is Pareto dominated, then the choice is taken among one of the dominating alternatives in
an arbitrary way. In practice this arbitrariness might be replaced by a voting rule between
x and y that seems reasonable in the given situation. For example it might be that y is
declared as a second status quo, so that x is only chosen if p = x...".
Anyway these explanations show that our result has a nice interpretation if a status quo
2 among the alternatives exists, e.g. a current jurisdiction 2 about which there is consensus
that it should only be altered to one of two new jurisdictions x and y if every voter prefers
the new jurisdiction. Then, the least manipulable social choice functions that guarantee
anonymity and Pareto optimality of the outcome are as follows. Choose 2 in the situation
where there Is consensus that no change should lw made. In the other situations choose
an alternative Pareto dominating 2; if necessary, i.e. if there are two such alternatives,
according to any unanimous social choice function over two alternatives.138References
Akerk)f. G.A. (1970): "The market for "Lemons": QuiUity uncertainty and the market
mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics 84. 488-500.
Aleskerov, F., and E. Kurbanov (1999): "Degree of mnni])ulal>ility of social choice pro-
cedures ". In: Proceedings of the Third International Meeting of the Society for the
Advancement of Economic Theory. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. "'''*'
Allen, B. (1984): "Generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with
uncertainty when prices convey information". Econometrica 49, 1173-1199.
Allen, B. (1991a): "Market games with asymmetric information and non-transferable util-
ity: Representation results and the core". Center for Analytic Research in Economics and
the Social Sciences, Working Paper #91-09, University of Pennsylvania.
Allen, B. (1991b): "Transferable utility market games with asymmetric information: Rep-
resentation results and the core". Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social
Sciences, Working Paper #91-11, University of Pennsylvania.
Allen, B. (1994): "Market games with asymmetric information: The core with finitely many
states of the world". In B. Munier and M. .1. Machina (Eds), Models and Experiments in
Risk and Rationality. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
Arrow, K. (1963): "Social choice and individual values". New York: Wiley.
Dasgupta. P., Hammond, P., and E. Maskin (1979): "The implementation of social choice
rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility". Review of Economic Studies 46,
185-216.
Debreu, G. (1959): "Theory of Value". Cowles Foundation Monograph 17. New York:
Wiley.
Einy, E., Moreno, D., and B. Shitovitz (2000): "On the core of an economy with differential
information". Journal of Economic Theory 94, 262-270.
Einy, E., Moreno. D.. and B. Shitovitz (2001): "Competitive and core allocations in large
economies with differential information". Economic Theory 18, 321-332.
139140 REFERENCES
Fristnip, P., and H. Kciding (1998): "Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-
person social choice functions". Social Choice and Welfare 15, 455-467.
Gihbard, A. (1973): "Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result". Econometrica 41,
587-602.
HarHanyi, J.C. (1959): "A Bargaining Model for the Cooperative n-person Game". In:
Tucker, A.W. and Luce, R.D., (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, Annals
of Mathematics Studies No. 40. Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Hart, S., and A. Mas-Colell (1989): "Potential, Value, and Consistency". Econometrica
57, 589-014.
Herves-Beloso, C, Morcno-Garcfa, E., and N. Yannelis (2003): "Characterizing Radner
Equilibria". Working paper.
Hildcubraiid, W., and A.P. Kinnan (1988): "E<iuilibrium Analysis. Variations on themeB
by Hdgeworth and Walnut". Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Vol. 28. Amsterdam/New
York/Oxford: North Holland.
llousiiian, I). (2001): "Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined co-
operative games". International Journal of Game Theory 30, 377-404.
Kelly, J.S. (1988): "Minimal mnnipulnhility and local strategy-proofness". Social Choice
and Welfare 5, 81-85.
Kelly, J.S. (1989): "Interjacency". Social Choice and Welfare 6, 331-355.
Kelly, J.S. (1993): "Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't".
Social Choice and Welfare 10. Mil-175.
Koutsougernn, L., and N. Yannelis (1993): "Incentive compatibly and information su-
periority of the core of an economy with differential information". Economic Theory 3,
195-216.
Krasa, S.. and N. Yannelis (1994): "The value allocation of an economy with differential
information". Econometrica 62. 881-900.
Krasa, S., and N. Yannelis: "Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy
with differential information". Journal of Mathematical Economics 25. 165-179.
Liu. C. (1992): "From a theorem of Radner". Economics Letters 39, 401-404.
Maus. S. (2002): "Ilalanctxlness and the core in economies with asymmetric information".
Economic Theory 22. 613-627.• :/.'.iU-VV. 141
Maus. S. (2003): "The expected Shapley value". Research Memoranda Universitoit Maas-
tricht RM /03/004. University of Maastricht. v -ri
Maus. S. (2004a): "Exchange economies with asymmetric information: competitive tH|iii-
libriuin and core". Economic Theory- 24, 395-418.
Maus. S.. Peters. H.. <uid A. Storcken (20O4h): "Minimiil inanipuluhility: Anonymity and
Surjectivity". Research Memoranda Uuiversiteit Maastricht RM /04/O07, University of
Maastricht. r: ;«_ I
Maus, S., Peters, H., and A. Storcken (2004c): "Minimal manipulability: Umuiimity and
Nondictatorship". Research Memoranda Universiteit Maastricht RM /04/(K)6, University
of Maastricht.
Maus, S., Peters, H.. and A. Storcken (2004d): "Minimal inanipulnbility: Anonymity and
Unanimity". Research Memoranda Universiteit Maastricht RM /04/0O26, University of
Maastricht.
May, K.O. (1952): "A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple
Majority voting". Econometrica 20, 680-684.
Moulin, H. (1983): "The strategy of social choice". Advanced Textbooks in Economics 18.
Amsterdam/New York/Oxford: North-Holland.
Page, P. (1997): "Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional
commodity spaces: The core". Economic Theory 9, 151-159.
Radner, R. (1968): "Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty". Econometrica 36, 31-
58.
Radner, R. (1979): "Rational expectations equilibrium: Generic existence and the infor-
mation revealed by prices". Econometrica 40, 655-678.
Radner. R. (1982): "Equilibrium under Uncertainty". In: Arrow, K.J. and lutiilli-
gator. M.D. (Eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics Vol. II. Amsterdam/New
York/Oxford: North-Holland.
Satterthwaite, M. (1975): "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence ami cor-
respondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions". .Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 10. 187-217.
Scarf, H.E. (1967): "The core of an n-person game". Econometrica 35, 50-69.
Schwalbe, U. (1999): "The core of economies with asymmetric information". In: Lecture
Notes in economics and mathematical systems 474. Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer.142 REFERENCES
Shaplcy, L.S. (1953): "A Value for n-person games". In: Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W.,
(Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies No. 28.
Princeton/New Jersey: Princeton University Press. ^
Slinko, A. (2002): "On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules". The-
ory and Decision 52, 389-398. _ .
WillHon, S.J. (1993): "A Value for Partially Denned Cooperative Games". International
Journal of Game Theory 21, 371-384. ;f. •
Wilson, R. (1978): "Information, Efficiency and the Core of an Economy". Econometrica
46,807-816.
Ynimelis, N. (1991): "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information". Economic
Theory 1. 1NH-198.
YOUMK, HI' (1985): "Monotonic Solutions of Cooperative Games". International Journal
of Game Theory M, 05-72.Author Index
..thor
Akerlof 2
Alcskerov 97. 99. 114. 117. 118
Allen 10, 11, 13, 15, 22, 36, 30
Arrow 99 ; --n^,v: • -. r
Dasgupta 102 . .
Dcbreu 9, 10, 25, 26, 30 ,/
Einy 10,26,27,48 '
Pristrup 6, 73, 74, 78-80, 90, 91, 97,
101, 118, 120







Housman 3, 51, 52, 66-69
Keiding 6, 73, 74, 78-80, 90, 91, 97,
101, 118. 120
Kelly 5, 73, 74, 78. 80. 90, 91. 97,








Maus 9. 25-27. 30. 51, 73, 74, 97-99,
101, 113. 117. 118, 120. 121
May 98. 118




Peters 73, 74, 97-99, 101, 11.1. 117,
118, 120. 121
Radnor 9, 10, 23, 25-27, 30, 32, 33, 48 "




Shaploy 3, 51,52, 62, 63, 69
Shitovitz 10, 26, 27, 48
Slinko97, 114, 117
Storcken 73, 74. 97-99, 101, 113, 117,
118, 120, 121
Willson 3, 51, 52, 66-69
Wilson 9. 26
Yannolis 10, 23, 26
Young 3, 51, 52, 56, 59,69
143144
A
gj J ,Tli ..{.;
•••AAbout the Author
Stefan Maus was born on December 22, 1975 in Erkelcnz, Germany. FVom April 1996 till
January 2001 he studied mathematics at the RWTH Aachen, Germany. In between he
spent a year at the Imperial College. London. UK. where he received the Imperial College
International Diploma, under the Erasmus exchange program from October 1997 to
September 1998. In January 2001 he received the master's degree in mathematics
(German title: "Diplom-Mathematiker (Univ.))". Professor Dr. Hans Peters supervised
his master's thesis.
From February 2001 on he worked as an "assistcut in opleiding" (AIO) at the
Department of Quantitative Economics at Maastricht University, The Netherlands. His
research in economic theory, game theory and social choice theory was supervised by
Professor Dr. Hans Peters and Dr. Ton Storcken.
145:. i:s ,J.,;.'..- • iW'